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Showing posts with label Course - Political Terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Course - Political Terrorism. Show all posts

Monday, February 15, 2016

Terrorism in American Cities

Terrorism in American Cities

A commonly agreed upon facet of defining terrorism is that the goal of an attack is to spread terror. One method of achieving this goal is by creating mass casualties. Mass casualties are easier to create in a city environment. Cities have been targeted repeatedly by terrorists; New York City in 1993 and 2001, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and Boston in 2013. The United States, as the principal symbol of liberty in the world, will be targeted again. Can American cities be protected by taking away the rights of American citizens?

Perhaps it would be better to to predict and preempt terror attacks. The capabilities for analyzing terrorist data and using that to predict terrorist activity is growing constantly. The use of statistical analysis and relationship mapping software technologies had advanced, but a true leap forward has been made in using the internet to build a human analysis network;“social forces that are propelling network intelligence – namely citizen groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around the
world – are formidable and continue to grow” (Deibert, 2003, p. 175). This prevents data from being "stovepiped”, “which means they keep much of the immediate results of their intelligence collection activities within their own institutional structure” (Lee & Schwartz, 2005, p. 1473). Once terrorists have been identified they can be killed or captured, preemptively ending their attacks. Terror attacks can never be fully prevented, especially in a country that tolerates extremist anti-American views and is open to free movement.

Local law enforcement must be involved in American counter terror efforts. This “need for improved sharing of intelligence information between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies was recognized as early as the 1964 Warren Commission report” (Davis, Rand Corporation, & National Institute of Justice (U.S.), 2010, p. 39). The attacks of 9/11 further confirmed such a need. Legislative reforms of the security community and the intelligence institutions removed some of the barriers for intelligence sharing. Many of the reforms of the 1970's were “based on a presumption that domestic terrorism could be handled by investigating crimes after they were committed rather than preventing them” (Powers, 2004, p. 45). Barriers of this type are not conducive to developing sound counterterror policy, and must be avoided.

It is not necessary for Americans to give up personal freedom for improved security. By using effective intelligence to target actual terrorists and preempting their attacks, there is no need for a mass data collection, “shotgun” approach to surveillance. Indeed, Americans are hostile to the idea of an all encompassing police state.“American legal traditions, cultural norms, and a deeply-ingrained minimalist philosophy regarding the size and capacity of the state make a heavy-handed approach both undesirable and politically unacceptable” (Clutterbuck & Rosenau, 2009, p.5). Americans may not be able to prevent large scale attacks on our cities, but we wouldn't be able to do so even with a security state.














References

Clutterbuck, L., & Rosenau, W. (2009). Subversion as a facet of terrorism and insurgency the case for a twenty-first century approach. Strategic Insights: v.8, issue 3 . Retrieved October 17, 2014 from https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/25445

Davis, L. M., Rand Corporation, & National Institute of Justice (U.S.). (2010). Long-term effects of law enforcement’s post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism and homeland security. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. Retrieved September 22, 2014 from http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=669776

Deibert, R. J. (2003). Deep probe: The evolution of network intelligence. Intelligence & National Security, 18(4), 175–193. doi:10.1080/02684520310001688925

Lee, R. D., & Schwartz, P. M. (2005). Beyond the “war” on terrorism: Towards the new intelligence network. Michigan Law Review, 103(6), 1446–1482. Retrieved September 10, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=17240839&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Powers, R. G. (2004). A bomb with a long fuse. American History, 39(5), 42–47. Retrieved September 10, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=14624935&site=ehost-live&scope=site






Sunday, February 14, 2016

Effective Counter Terror Operations

  • How effective are elite counterterrorism units? What impact do elite units have on international terrorism? Discuss.

Special operations units have been extremely effective against terrorism. From the assassination of Osama Bin Laden to the raid on Entebbe, units of highly trained men have performed key missions against terrorists. “the Sayeret Mat'kal (the General Staff's own reconnaissance commando unit) mobilized, rehearsed its plans, flew 2,500 miles, and struck at the Entebbe airport, rescuing more than 100 passengers and crew with a minimum loss of life”(Henriksen, 2007, p.18)

  • What counterterrorism or combating terrorism measures work most effectively with the elite counterterrorism units, and which measures work least effectively for missions like hostage rescues, punitive strikes, abductions, and reconnaissance operations? Provide reasons and examples to support your answers.
The most effective counterterror measures that elite units can undertake are leadership decapitation tactics and reconnaissance missions. “targeted killings, whether conducted by Israel, the United States, Great Britain, or other nations, are more frequently the result of action un-dertaken not by conventional military forces, but rather by specialized troops, such as special operations forces (Sof)” (Hunter, 2009, p. 3). Hostage rescues have been the least effective, but they are also a potent tool in public relations/propaganda. One area that is overlooked in the context of elite unit operations is the role of training foreign, allied agencies to carry out operations that benefit the U.S.; elite units “have historically specialized in enabling partner nation foreign military capacity through the teaching of technical fighting and military administration skills “(Grespin, 2014, p.38)
  • What are the challenges of creating a counterterrorism policy? Counterterrorism measures and policies are being created and implemented internationally. Do you think that counterterrorism policies are effective and can help control and combat terrorism? Why/why not? In what ways do they control and combat terrorism and in what areas are they weak? Explain.
The major challenge to designing, implementing, and maintaining a counterterrorism policy is that it can be likened to shoveling sand back into the sea, as it is a task that will never end. “Counterterrorism should be seen not as an effort to rid the world of terrorism, but as an ongoing struggle to constrict the operating environment in which terrorists raise funds, procure documents, engage in support activities, and conduct attacks” (Levitt, 2004, p.33). A secondary challenge to creating counterterror policy is the political consideration. Is there a political party willing to lie about national security in order to win votes? A country in which politicians conduct propaganda operations against their own defenders can not expect to create an effective counterterror policy. “a culture of denial exists on the left about the problem of Islamic terrorism. This takes four key forms: mystification (the failure or refusal to acknowledge its true character); displacement (the transformation of the perpetrators into avengers and the victims into wrong-doers); evasion (the reluctance or unwillingness to recognize its significance);and minimization (the unwillingness to recognize the scope of the problem)(Cottee, 2005, p.119).
Once these challenges have been recognized, effective counterterrorism policy requires operational bases. Roberts discusses these as “ three components of any government that must come together to form an alliance of shared capabilities, risk analysis, and political resolve” (2011, p. 125).
  • Examine the current counterterrorism policy of the U.S. and discuss its effectiveness. In the light of the current counterterrorism policy in the U.S., how easy or how difficult is it for terrorist groups to execute acts of terror in the U.S.? Why?
The effectiveness of American counterterror policy has certainly reversed direction over the last six years. Iraq was abandoned despite the protestations of the security community, who were proven to be proven right; military capabilities have been cut severely; terrorists were traded for a known deserter; the current administration can't even be honest about naming the ideology that the majority of terrorists we are fighting follow. “We are at a point in our history where 'timidity' will prove an undesirable and fatal flaw in the defense of this nation”(Hughbank, 2009, p.49). However, it is not the failure to pursue the enemy in his own lair that opens America up as an easy terrorist target. We are an open society and we choose not to be hindered by onerous security restrictions. Terrorists, foreign and domestic, can use our freedom to move to attack us.
Which is why it is critical that we recognize and make war against ideologies that are hostile to the American ideals of freedom and capitalism, whether those enemies be foreign or domestic. This is reflected in the oath of service:
"I, (state name of enlistee), do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God" (Army Regulation 601-210).
  • Do you agree that the U.S. counterterrorism policy is a just policy and protects the privacy rights of the citizens? Why/why not? What do you think should be given precedence—security of citizens or privacy rights of citizens? Why?
The domestic security history of the United States has been taken up with the argument between citizen rights and security needs from our inception as a country, and this debate can seen in such examples as The Alien and Sedition Acts up through the publicly contested NDAA. Privacy concerns have been around as long as the technology itself. “telephone surveillance is as old as telephony itself, dating back to the nearly simultaneous commercialization of the telephone and phonograph” (Agur, 2013, abstract). One thing to remember is that security and privacy concerns do not need to clash. “The balance between civil liberties and security is not a zero-sum game” (The Heritage Foundation, 2004, p. 7). By restricting surveillance methods to those who espouse anti-American ideologies instead of using mass collection techniques, we can maintain the balance.







Agur, C. (2013). Negotiated order: The fourth amendment, telephone surveillance, and social interactions, 1878-1968. Information & Culture, 48(4), 419-447. Retrieved from February 17, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1492199073?accountid=87314
Cottee, S. (2005). The culture of denial: Islamic terrorism and the delinquent Left. Journal of Human Rights, 4(1), 119–135. doi:10.1080/14754830590947653

Grespin, W. (2014). From the ground up: The importance of preserving SOF capacity building skills. Journal of Strategic Security, 7(2), 37–47. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.7.2.5

Henriksen, T. H. (2007). Security lessons from the Israeli trenches. Policy Review, (141), 17–31. Retrieved February 17, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/216454496?pq-origsite=summon

Hughbank, R. J. (2009). Guerilla warfare & law enforcement: Combating the 21st century terrorist cell within the U.S. Journal of Strategic Security, 2(4), 39–52. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.2.4.4

Hunter, T. B. (2009). Targeted Killing: Self-defense, preemption, and the war on terrorism. Journal of Strategic Security, 2(2), 1–52. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.1

Levitt, M. (2004). Untangling the terror web: Identifying and counteracting the phenomenon of crossover between terrorist groups. The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 24(1), 33–48. Retrieved January 24, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/231348224?pq-origsite=summon

Roberts, J. Q. (2011). Building a national counterterrorism capability: A Primer for operators and policymakers alike. Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 10(2), 125–138. Retrieved February 17, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1290416673?pq-origsite=summon

The Heritage Foundation. (2004). The Patriot Act reader: Understanding the law’s role in the  Global War on Terrorism. Retrieved February 14, 2015 from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/09/the-patriot-act-reader








I think targeted killings are a vital part of CT strategy; of course if we can bag a terrorist leader it is better than killing him, but you have to take the shots you're given.

But targeted killings must be directed at targets that will have an impact on terrorist operations.  These should be either leaders or members of the support network.  It does not make sense to spend resources on an easily replaced "line" terrorist.  Targeting leaders is known as decapitation or kingpin tactics.“Kingpin strategies can effectively disrupt and fragment an illicit network, whether it be insurgent or profit-seeking“(Jones, 2013, p.170).  An overlooked strategy would be to assassinate or capture those members of terror networks that provide financial, logistical, propaganda, or recruiting services.

I may have missed something, but my reading of the 2001 AUMF led me to believe that it authorized ops against terrorists involved with the 9/11 attacks.  I still haven't looked at the NDAA material to see if the scope of the domestic legalities has changed.

As far as international law is concerned, terrorists have very few legal rights, as they do not respect the laws and customs of war.  Article 4 of the 3rd Convention is very clear about who is allowed the protection of the laws of war. People that target civilians do not apply. American law may not permit it, but under the Geneva Convention we could torture terrorists to death in broad daylight and it would be kosher.
Thanks for the CFR reference; I haven't done a lot of study on the use of drones yet (institutional prejudice at play), and this looks like a good place to start.


Convention (III) relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War. (1949). International Committee of the Red Cross. Retrieved February 18, 2015 from https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=2F681B08868538C2C12563CD0051AA8D
Jones, N. (2013). The unintended consequences of kingpin strategies: kidnap rates and the Arellano-Félix Organization. Trends in Organized Crime, 16(2), 156–176. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1007/s12117-012-9185-x


I don't have a lot of faith in the ability of the UN to do much past bloviating.  I wont go into it, but my base objection is allowing terror supporting and /or tyrannical nations on the Security Council, which kind of defeats the purpose.  There are other criticisms of the UN from both Left and Right.

Wiki is not a valid reference, but here is a link to a Wiki page which outlines some criticism and some effectiveness evaluation of the UN to start searching
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_United_Nations

Make sure to use the references at the bottom of the page, and check out the "Talk" tab to see argumentation about what is or isn't included on the main page.

"We should not be constrained by Boy Scout ethics in an immoral world." (Kenneth Adelman)

That is a great quote.  It fits squarely with Kaplan's argumentation in
Warrior Politics.

Intelligence, as we all have seen in this course, is the most important facet of counterterror (or almost ALL human endeavor).  O'Connor's point re: identifying the terrorists with the skills fits perfectly with Walt's discussion on targeted killings.


Kaplan, R. (2002) Warrior politics: Why leadership demands a pagan ethos. New York, New York. Vintage Books


I still haven't read enough of the USA PATRIOT Act, criticism of it, and defense of it, to make a judgement on it yet.

I was trying to find a definite answer on whether the NSA surveillance revealed by Snowden was legal or not.  I don't see how it could be, but I haven't been able to parse through the information I've read so far.

Most importantly though, I don't think it's necessary for the general public to lose any amount of liberty to gain security.  We should focus our attention on the people that promote anti-American ideology, not just Islamic but Leftist and racist ideologies as well.  We can analyze their relation networks to determine who they know that we need to know, and who not to bother with.  It is a waste of resources to use the shotgun approach in addition to a violation of American liberty.  Why should folks that hate our way of life get any benefit or protection from it?

I keep going back to this point.  The NSA was keeping tab on American porn habits, while the Tsarnaev brothers (the ones that Russian security told us about) planned their attack.
"The FBI said in a statement: 'The request stated that it was based on information that he was a follower of radical Islam and a strong believer, and that he had changed drastically since 2010 as he prepared to leave the United States for travel to the country’s region to join unspecified underground groups"  (The Huffington Post, 2013, para. 4)

Great counter-intelligence technique here:
FBI, "Sir, are you a terrorist?"
Tsarvaev, "No"
FBI, " OK, have a nice day!"
Boston Bombing suspect Tamerlan Tsarnaev questioned by FBI In 2011, after suspicions raised about radical Islamism. (2013, April 21). The Huffington Post UK. Retrieved February 18, 2015 from http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/04/21/boston-bombing-suspect-ta_n_3125896.html

I would contest the judgement that Delta Force erred in Operation Eagle Claw.  My opinion is that the JCS did not plan the op well at all.  There were not enough aircraft for redundancy, intelligence was poor, and using units from all services without training together first was asking for something bad to happen. "The involvement of multiple units - Sea Stallion helicopters, C-130 transport aircraft, Marine Corps pilots, Army Rangers and Delta Force operators ­ and stages in the mission makes it highly complex" (Fong, 2002, para .19)  Bureaucratic politics, in that all the services wanted to be represented, sabotaged the mission.

The good thing is that the services recognized this, and implemented some changes addressing those issues.

Fong, C. (2002). Operation Eagle Claw, 1980: A case study in crisis management and military planning. Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces V28, N2. Retrieved February 18, 2015 from
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2002/Vol28_2/5.htm

Saturday, February 13, 2016

Counterterrorism Debrief: Week 5

Counterterrorism Debrief: Week 5


“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War (goodreads.com, 2015, para. 1)

The main supporting tactic of any counterterror (CT) strategy must rely on relevant and timely intelligence. Without the knowledge of who the enemy is and the why, when, where, and how he fights, the enemy can not be defeated. The use of other tactics, such as targeted killing, is less effective when not conducted with proper intelligence preparation. “The undiscerning use of force in terrorism can be as productive as cutting off one of hydra’s heads”(Barba, 2014, p.62). Once the the need for productive intelligence has been recognized, it must be recognized that successful counterterror policy relies on whichever tactics apply to the enemy at any given time, as “any effective counterterrorism strategy is likely to involve a significant number of fairly complex elements”(Weisman, 2009, p.13).

The most effective method of addressing terrorism is also the most direct; the targeted elimination, through killing or capture, of terrorist leaders and facilitators. “The literature on targeted killings suggests that their use diminishes the coercive and operational capability of violent, non-state groups in a number of ways”(Wilner, 2010, p. 312). The most counter-productive method is through negotiation. In the first place, terrorists are extremists who political raison d'etre is to control a society, not to compromise with it. In the second and more important place, negotiating political or social concessions with a group that uses murder and terror legitimizes the uses of those tactics the next time the terror group wants something from the larger society.

A sound counterterror policy must be based primarily on it's intelligence capabilities. Next an operational group must be created to act upon that intelligence, whether in an unconventional warfare or a law enforcement mode. A public relations (or propaganda) section must be detailed to fight the media battle. A legal section must take part in order to keep operations within the law, and to clarify real life to the legal community. Sun Tzu's quote applies in this sense as the CT operator must know his society as he knows himself.

There are several issues that can interfere with the creation of a CT program. The primary issue is that terrorism itself will not end. The CT program must be developed with the awareness that CT operations are an “ongoing struggle” (Levitt, 2004, p.33). A second issue is that the program must contend with political factors; bureaucratic politics related to growth complex and “turf battles” between agencies and partisan politics are just two of the internal political concerns that a CT policymaker must be aware of. Sun Tzu's quote about knowing oneself comes into play again.

The United States presents several unique problems in creating CT policy. One of the underlying ideas in American justice is the notion of due process., and it forms the backbone of American liberty. This is extremely important in dealing with domestic terrorism, but there is a great deal of political thought in this country that international law should be considered in the due process consideration of dealing with terrorists. A second issue is the prevalence of Leftist thought in our governmental and educational institution. It is difficult to establish a consistent CT policy when policy makers deny the root causes of several variations of terror, for example, Islamic terror; “a culture of denial exists on the left about the problem of Islamic terrorism” (Cottee, 2005, p.119). Finally, due to the adversarial nature of American politics, developing a consistent CT program is difficult in that the goals of the political party in charge of the program may change every four years.



References

Barba, P. E. S. (2014, June). Breaking terrorists’ will to fight (Thesis). Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved from https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/42721

Cottee, S. (2005). The Culture of Denial: Islamic Terrorism and the Delinquent Left. Journal of Human Rights, 4(1), 119–135. doi:10.1080/14754830590947653

Levitt, M. (2004). Untangling the terror web: Identifying and counteracting the phenomenon of crossover between terrorist groups. The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 24(1), 33–48. Retrieved January 24, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/231348224?pq-origsite=summon

goodreads.com. (2015). Sun Tzu > Quotes > Quotable Quote. Retrieved February 18, 2015 from http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/17976-if-you-know-the-enemy-and-know-yourself-you-need

Wilner, A. S. (2010). Targeted killings in Afghanistan: Measuring coercion and deterrence in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(4), 307–329. doi:10.1080/10576100903582543

Weisman, E. S. (2009). Learning to win: An examination of counterterrorism in Northern Ireland. Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut. Retrieved October 6, 2014 from http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1270&context=etd_hon_theses



Friday, February 12, 2016

Changes to U.S. Policy Relating to Counterterror Measures and Their Impact on America, Post 9/11 to Present

Changes to U.S. Policy Relating to Counterterror Measures and Their Impact on America, Post 9/11 to Present

  1. Introduction
After the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, the American people have elected different sets of politicians with differing views of terrorism and how (or even whether) to fight it. As a result of these political shifts, several legislative acts have been written into law. These laws determining how America deals with the terrorist threat directly impact the four principals of our counterterror policy. The laws have sometimes been contradictory to previous law, and many of these laws directly affect the liberty of Americans. This report will summarize the most relevant of these laws, Executive Orders enacted by our Presidents, court cases involving the laws, how the laws affect counterterrorism policies, and how Americans are affected in their Constitutional freedoms.

  1. Laws
Beyond political consideration, the American legal system depends on consensus between the three branches of government. “The Supreme Court gives some indication that it is willing to lessen its role in what amounts to foreign policy and war, provided the two political branches come together to give the democratic imprimatur of legislation to counterterrorism policy and to the inevitable trade-offs between national security and civil liberties” (Anderson, 2006, p. 5) The immediate laws passed following the attack will be summarized, as they provide a framework on which subsequent laws were written. Other laws will be cited for reference.

    1. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
The PATRIOT Act amends several previously existing laws of the United States as well as establishing new law in several areas. Although a concise summary is hard to provide, as “the Patriot Act is very detailed and sometimes difficult to assess” (The Heritage Foundation, 2004, p.7), the Heritage Foundation contends that the base purpose of the act is removing barriers to intelligence gathering and collation; “the Patriot Act changes adopt as a general principle the rule that any information lawfully gathered during a foreign or domestic counterintelligence investigation or lawfully gathered during a domestic law enforcement investigation should be capable of being shared with other federal agencies” (2004, p.30). The PATRIOT Act requires periodic re-authorization by Congress.

    1. Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001)
The AUMF of 2001 provided for the President to determine whether military force was to be used against any agency (individual or organized) involved in the September 11 attacks; “That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons” (Authorization for use of military force, 2001, p.1)

    1. Homeland Security Act of 2002
The Homeland Security Act (HSA) established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), reorganized the chain of command within the the agencies of the American security community, and provided a foundation for planning of emergency and national security planning. The DHS has three primary missions; to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States”, to “reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism”, and to “minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States” (Department of Homeland Security, 2012, para. 2).

    1. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 “defines national intelligence to include information gathered in the U.S. or abroad that pertains to more than one agency and involves threats to the U.S”, requires “the President to establish an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to facilitate the sharing of terrorism information” and establishes “a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board within the Executive Office of the President that would ensure that privacy and civil liberties concerns are appropriately considered in the implementation of laws, regulations, and executive branch policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism” (Globalsecurity.org, 2004, para. 25, 26, 29).

    1. Additional Laws For Reference
These are modifications of the initial laws ( which modify previous laws in their own existence) or which touch upon areas which the “original” post-9/11 laws did not cover, such as bio-terrorism and cyberterrorism. Some are re-authorization acts or legislative responses to court challenges.
      1. Project BioShield Act of 2004
      2. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
      3. Military Commissions Act of 2006
      4. Protect America Act of 2007
      5. FISA Amendments Act of 2008
      6. Military Commissions Act of 2009
      7. PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011
      8. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012

  1. Executive Actions
    1. Executive Order 13355
    2. Executive Order 13470
    3. Executive Order 13581
    4. Executive Order 13584
    5. President's Surveillance Program
    6. National Response Plan: December 2004

  1. Court Cases
    1. Rasul v. Bush 2004
    2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006
    3. United States v. Mahenna, 2011
    4. Hedges v. Obama, 2012

  1. Four Principals of Counterterror Policy
    1. The government makes no concessions to or agreements with terrorists
In accordance with the notion that American counterterror policy changes depending on the politicians making it, we may look at two extremes. “In 2003, for example, US President George W. Bush (2003) declared: ‘You’ve got to be strong, not weak. The only way to deal
with these people is to bring them to justice. You can’t talk to them. You can’t negotiate with them’”(Toros, 2008, p.407). In contrast, the Obama administration traded five known terrorists for a soldier that the Army had declared a deserter, a trade that the GAO defined as illegal. “ 'In our view, the meaning of the [law] is clear and unambiguous,' the GAO wrote to nine Republican senators who requested the legal opinion” (Shultz, 2014, para. 4).
    1. Terrorists must be brought to justice for their crimes
Bush may have called for “justice” in dealing with terrorists, but the American mode of attaining justice has wavered from one method to another. “The United States since 9/11 has approached terror for the most part as a blend between a war-fighting approach (GWOT) as they would a war against a nation state, including the use of military trials for prosecution, and a law enforcement approach (Boston Marathon Bombing)”(Clarke, 2013, p. 57) . In either a law enforcement or a war fighting capacity, the nation's ability to gather effective intelligence becomes a priority. McCarthy suggests that the issues with American intelligence, especially regarding terrorism suffered from a “single”, “institutional” “root cause”. (2004, pp.11-12). The law enforcement mode is a Constitutional necessity when dealing with United States citizens, but may not be the most effective in dealing with terrorism. “Because the FBI was and still is a law enforcement organization, its agents are trained and acculturated, rewarded and promoted within an institutional culture whose primary purpose is to catch and prosecute criminals” (Treverton, 2003, p. 129).

    1. States that sponsor terrorists and terrorism must be isolated and pressured so as to force a change of behavior
Again, we have seen the transition in policy from an aggressive stance towards terror supporting states (toppling Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2004) to full withdrawal; a withdrawal that backfired as we were required to address a threat the Obama administration minimized as “junior varsity” (Mazzetti & Cooper, 2014, para. 1).

    1. The counterterrorism capabilities of countries allied with the U.S. and those that require assistance in fighting terrorism, must be bolstered
Terrorism became a major consideration in American foreign policy after the 9/11 attacks . “The resultant declaration of a War on Terror (WOT) by the United States and its allies has also had global ramifications” states Aning, in an examination of “the multiple linkages and connections between development aid, security, and the WOT” (2010, pp. 7,8). Aning concludes that “that aid has become highly securitised and politicised as a weapon for the realisation of the goals of
that war” (2010, p. 23).

  1. Impact on American Liberty
    1. Laws
A listing of laws, executive actions, and court cases involving those laws and actions can be found in Sections II-IV.
    1. Security at Airports
Because the 9/11 attacks were delivered via a method of hijacked airliner, airline security became a focus of public attention in discussion regarding the War on Terror. Indeed, a government agency, the Transportation Security Administration was created by the Homeland Security Act with a major purpose of securing the nation's airports. However, Goldberg contends that the TSA is “an egregious waste of tax dollars” and intended as a public show of security as opposed to a actual attempt to secure the airways. (2008, para. 1).
    1. Security at Public Events
Much of the security at public events is handled by the private entities that host the events. Very often, local law enforcement aids in this regard either as a public order issue or as paid security for such events. Even so, those that handle security for such events, whether as a private entity or as a law enforcement agency, realize the danger that such events present as a “soft” target for terrorists. “Since 9/11, America has become more aware of the dangers surrounding the country enabling security to keep civilians safer with out altering their day-to-day lives” (buchholtzsidoramericanstudies, 2015, para. 3).
    1. Personal Freedoms
There are disparate views on the overall effect that these laws have had on American liberties. Breinholt asserts that “People who are alarmed by such things as the PATRIOT Act should acknowledge that American courts, which operate on the basis of historical precedent,
remain available and are willing, when necessary, to redraw the lines between collective security and personal liberty” (Breinholt, 2004, p.141) On the other side of the issue, the ACLU contends that “expanded government authority to pry into the private lives of people whether or not there is any evidence of wrongdoing” (Clarke, 2013, p. 32). An issue with quantifying possible damages to liberty is the extensive scope of these changes. “These changes represent a sector-by-sector reduction in privacy protections and expansion of government authority. Because these occur on a sector-by-sector basis, their privacy impact is fragmented and disjointed —as many have argued the laws themselves are” (Regan, 2004, p. 483).

    1. Surveillance
A constant theme in the history of American domestic security has been the balance between civil liberty and the government's “need” to snoop into personal affairs in the name of national security. The Heritage Foundation argues that “one must understand the general structure of laws governing when law enforcement or intelligence agents may secure authorization to conduct electronic surveillance relating to suspected foreign intelligence or terrorism activity”, and that by understanding “Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act” and “FISA (the statute governing intelligence and terrorism surveillance)”, one would understand that the “FISA warrant structure is 'a reasonable
response' based on a balance of the legitimate need of the government for foreign intelligence information to protect against national security threats with the protected rights of citizens.” (2004, p.32).
    1. Use of Force
Although the historical standard for the legal use of American military force has been a declaration of war by the President, and approved by Congress, there has been no such declaration since WWII. Presidents have unilaterally used their prerogative as Commander in Chief to take short term military actions within the bounds of the War Powers Resolution, and have gone to Congress for approval for longer term military commitments. “In the modern era authorizations have sometimes been quite broad and some have, arguably, been equivalent in scope to a declaration of war”(Elsea & Weed, 2014, p.23). The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force has been the legal justification for much of the use of force in the War on Terror.

  1. Conclusion
Because the American form of government is subject to short term political shifts, “Homeland security is an ever evolving study of history, emergency management,
technology”(Penn, 2007, p.87). However, the balance between national security and personal liberty remains as a central issue in this study.













































References

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Aning, K. (2010). Security, the War on Terror, and official development assistance. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 3(1), 7. doi:10.1080/17539151003594178

Authorization for use of military force. Public Law 107–40. 115 Stat. 224.

Breinholt, J. (2004). How about a little perspective: The USA PATRIOT Act and the uses and abuses of history. Texas Review of Law & Politics, 9(1), 17–61. Retrieved September 10, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=16272356&site=ehost-live&scope=site

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