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Monday, January 11, 2016

The Effects Of Hoover's Bureaucratic Tactics On COINTELPRO Operations: A Comparison Between NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE

The Effects Of Hoover's Bureaucratic Tactics On COINTELPRO Operations: A Comparison Between NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE
Steve Durchin

Politics can have a negative impact on a nation's security.  This is applicable whether the harm is done by expediting the development of nuclear weapons for religious fanatics to the unsuccessful degradation of a subversive group.  By being able to analyze and how a subversive group was unsuccessfully confronted, the process of understanding how political interference can interfere with security can be extrapolated to explain how other factors can hinder national security as well. In the 1960s, the FBI continued a series of intelligence/harassment programs against violent and subversive groups within the United States against vastly different groups. How did  FBI Director Hoover's political direction of the agency affect the efficiency of COINTELPRO operations in dealing with the Ku Klux Klan versus those dealing with the New Left? A content analysis of the literature exploring COINTELPRO operations may possibly demonstrate if Hoover's personal application of the bureaucratic politics model hindered the success of these counter-subversive operations.

Section I: Introduction

Politics has been a driving force in the development and operations of the FBI throughout its history. The important question is how much effect has the influence of politics has on the efficiency of operations in protecting the United States. In the 1960s, the FBI continued a series of intelligence/harassment programs against violent and subversive groups within the United States. The programs were a continuation of COINTELPRO (an acronym for Counter Intelligence Program) operations in the FBI's long history of addressing the issue of subversion in the United States. Two specific programs were of note, as they were targeted at vastly different subversive movements. These specific programs were COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE, targeted at the Ku Klux Klan, and COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT, directed at the New Left.
COINTELPRO operations had a formal start in 1953 targeting the Communist party, but were a continuation of the FBI's anti-subversive mission. Jeffreys-Jones (2007) relates that the Justice Department, to which the FBI is subordinate, was founded as Congress passed the Enforcement Act of 1870 in part as a reaction to Ku Klux Klan subversion. Weiner (2012) adds that there was no policing agency assigned to the Justice Department, and Congress refused to establish such in fear of an "American secret police" though the early 20th Century. In 1908, Congress allowed the creation of what would eventually become the Bureau of Investigation, however, due to fears that the agency could be used as a "secret police" and enmeshed in politics, this new agency was not authorized to make arrests or to carry weapons (Kessler, 2003). Theoharis (2004) contends that two factors changed this state of affairs; the first was the growth of militant leftist groups and the second was the advent of World War I and German sabotage efforts within the United States.
It was during this period that J. Edgar Hoover joined the Department of Justice. The growth and the direction of the FBI can not be explored without understanding Hoover's central role and how his personality affected it. Powers (1987) explains that Hoover's work during this period allowed him to become "known to his superiors as someone who was reliable and efficient" (p. 54). After World War I, the Department of Justice continued its war against subversion after a series of bombings by Leftists included the Attorney General Mitchell Palmer as a target (Gentry, 1991). The Radical Division of the Bureau of Investigation, which Hoover was in charge of, was tasked with this responsibility.
Hoover's work as head of the Radical Division put him in good standing when Attorney General Harlan Stone sought to reform the Bureau of Investigation in 1924; Hoover was selected as Acing Director of the Bureau. Gentry (1991) contends that Hoover rebuilt the Bureau. In the era prior to World War II, Hoover's direction of the agency resulted in several changes, including the sanction to carry weapons, make arrests, and the new name of the agency...the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These changes, however, included involving the FBI in internal politics. O'Reilly (1982) discusses how FDR personally directed the FBI to target the subversive activities of Nazis and Communists and legitimized domestic intelligence operations; FDR also required the agency's use as a political police, and to solicit bureau reports on the president's critics. In the future, the FBI would provide political intelligence on political rivals for each and every President through Hoover's tenure at the FBI.
But it was not until Truman that a formal legally sanctioned role was for anti-subversion was designated for the FBI; Keller (1989) discusses how a Truman directive stated explicitly that the FBI should be responsible for matters relating to espionage and subversive activities. It was in this environment that the FBI initiated the first formal COINTELPRO operation, which was against the Communist Party in the United States, COINTELPRO: CPUSA. Powers (1987) explains how the FBI's success in this operation led to the use of these methods against other subversive groups.
In the 1960s, the political climate directed COINTELPRO operations against the Ku Klux Klan and the New Left. J. Edgar Hoover validated the danger of these groups, whose "verbal assaults are reinforced with violent acts: murder, assault, arson, bombings" (1969, pp. 289-290). While COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE and COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT were not public knowledge, Hoover's history of public relations suggests that he was aware of the possibility of disclose of the programs and wished to stress that operations against violent subversive groups was justified.
It is in examining the differences in operations between the two groups that the question of whether or not politics interferes with security operations arises.
Rationale For Study
Politics can have a negative impact on a nation's security.  This is applicable whether the harm is done by expediting the development of nuclear weapons for religious fanatics to the unsuccessful degradation of a subversive group.  By being able to analyze and explain why a subversive group was unsuccessfully confronted, the process of understanding how political interference can interfere with security can be extrapolated to explain how other factors can hinder national security as well.
Research Question
RQ: How did  FBI Director Hoover's political direction of the agency affect the efficiency of COINTELPRO operations?
IV = Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics
DV = The successful use of a COINTELPRO program to degrade a subversive group's ability to harm the United States.
The purpose of the methodology is to clarify what this thesis is asking by explaining how it is asking those questions. Accordingly, the theory which potentially explain the differences, the general approach to the study shall be discussed, the frames of reference will be explained, the rationale for using these methods will be given, and potential issues in the study will be highlighted.
The theory which best explains COINTELPRO operations is the bureaucratic politics model (also known in variation as growth complex theory, or Pournelle's Iron Law of Bureaucracy).
The primary method used is through content analysis of secondary material exploring both COINTELPRO operations and Hoover's direction of the Bureau. This includes some use of phenomenological research, as the viewpoints of Hoover assistants Sullivan and DeLoach will be examined.
Data will be obtained from secondary sources. These will include academic studies, historical studies, and biographical sources.
Frames of Reference
What is the mission of the FBI? The mission of the FBI, under the frame of reference for this study, is to protect the country from domestic threats.
Should New Left operations be counted as a subset as counter communist/leftist operations, or on its own merits? The term “New Left” should be interpreted as referring specifically to the New Left in America, unless otherwise stated. It is within reasonable interpretation to interpret COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT operations in aggregate with other anti-Communist/anti-socialist operations, but for the purposes of this thesis, COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT is being considered as a discrete set of data.
Rationale for Qualitative Methods
The qualitative approaches collect nonnumerical data to answer the research question in a
descriptive or exploratory manner. Tewksbury (2009) asserts that “Qualitative research methods provide more emphasis on interpretation and providing consumers with complete views, looking at contexts, environmental immersions and a depth of understanding of concepts” (p. 39)
Potential Issues in Study
The covert nature of COINTELPRO is the primary issue in this study. Although some material has been made publicly available through the Freedom of Information Act, it is likely that there is material that needs to be uncovered to fully explore the nature of the program. Theoharis (1990) contends that FBI documents released for Freedom of Information Act requests are often redacted and of limited research value.
Lost material due to time and destruction. There is an issue based on the passage of time. The Archives note that the material on hand is from the national FBI offices, and that most of the operational notes were kept at the field offices. It is likely that most of this material is now lost. In addition, Steinwall (1986) recounts that the FBI destroyed over 700,000 cubic feet of records between 1976 and 1978 although this material has not been specified to include documentation on COINTELPRO operations.
There may difficulty in assigning qualitative characteristics when comparing New Left operations against Leftist groups as a whole. SDS, for example, evolved from the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID), a group that the FBI had been monitoring under a different COINTELPRO program aimed at the Socialist Worker's Party.
Political bias is a serious issue for studies of this type. Most discussion of the COINTELPRO program is based on the contention that it was somehow “immoral” to investigate and harass violent groups that had the goal of breaking American law; in addition, the vast majority of this discussion has been conducted by leftists that focused on leftist groups as “victims” of this program, and ignored completely COINTELPRO operations against the Klan (not to mention the violent nature of the crimes committed by the New Left). The majority of the remainder often brushed off efforts against the Klan as an FBI front for public relations...in a secret program. There is also the question of my own personal bias.
While it would be nice if research was fundamentally unbiased, Sampson (2012) understands that bias is normal in research and explains how to mitigate it; “Qualitative researchers contend that bias is inherent, yet can be described clearly enough to allow the reader to judge if bias has inappropriately influenced the research” (p. 8). In my own case, I will be upfront about my hostility towards Leftist ideals, the reality in results from Leftist programs, the political methods that Leftists employ, the contempt of Leftists for liberty, and the lack of honesty in which Leftists engage in public discourse.
Section II: Literature Review
This review will provide a limited overview of of the current studies regarding Director Hoover's involvement in the direction of the FBI, moving on to a lens regarding Hoover's application of bureaucratic politics (in the general, not specifically theoretical sense of the term) in that direction, and finally narrowing down into more detail on Hoover's involvement in COINTELPRO operations,. Denney and Tewksbury (2013) describe different uses of focus in a literature review. The primary focus relates to the concepts surrounding the research question, and can take an integrative focus which synthesizes research based on conclusions, a theoretical focus which contrast the use of different theories to explain an event or set of events, or a methodological focus, which compares the methodological approaches used in completed research. As qualitative research explores how actions and situations relate to each other, the theoretical approach will be used for this study. In particular, the independent variable in this study relies on examination of the bureaucratic politics model, and Hoover's personal application of the model.
Gentry (1991) and Powers (1987) are in agreement that Hoover's personality played a large part in his success at the Attorney General's office which led to his appointment and early preeminence at the Bureau of Investigation, which soon became the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). They also agree that Hoover's perfectionism and autocratic leadership style were the key components in that success. Gibson (1994) reinforces this idea of Hoover as an autocratic leader in that all FBI information roads led to Hoover's office; Gibson's description of Hoover's use of margin comments in these memos in order to direct the agency supports this argument. Underhill (2012) argues that Hoover's manipulation of the media played a part in making Hoover, and thus the FBI, a national symbol of heroism. The public image of the FBI is a theme throughout the literature. Gage (2012) uses the case of Mark Felt to illustrate Hoover's managerial control of the agency in addition to his desire to protect and exalt the public image of the FBI, but most importantly though the prism of Felt's loyalty to Hoover the institutional culture that Hoover built in the FBI. The theme that this overview presents is one of Hoover's domination of the FBI, which comes into play as it ties Hoover individually to a role as a player in the bureaucratic politics game.
O'Reilly (1982) demonstrates Hoover's early use of bureaucratic politics to adapt to FDR's expansion of Federal power and to gain a sanction for the continued use of the FBI in addition to expanding the agencies responsibilities, especially in domestic security concerns. Bowornwathana and Poocharoen (2010) explain this in the context that administrative reform in government is a function of politics, not management direction; they also define the bureaucratic politics framework. In this framework, government is not a single agency, but a competing set of bureaus that seek to protect and advance their segregate agendas. Webb (2004) shows Hoover's impulse to protect the FBI in domestic security responsibilities while engaged in a turf battle over control of the FBI's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), a foreign intelligence service with responsibility for Latin America. Webb asserts that Hoover's desire to control the SIS went only as far as his absolute control of the agency, demonstrating not only Hoover's political infighting ability but reinforcing the idea of Hoover as an autocratic leader. Keller (1989) discusses Hoover's political alliances with liberals to formalize (thus protecting) the domestic security responsibilities that FDR had bestowed upon the agency. Stockham (2013) discusses Hoover's relationship with members of Congress and further explores Hoover's use of the media to advance the goals of the FBI. In concert with Underhill's assertion of media manipulation, it can be seen that Hoover used public media as an additional political tool. Keller advances the Liberal Theory of Internal Security to explain the liberal/Hoover alliance, but also to describe three levels of domestic security organization based upon a matrix including the level of autonomy. Keller argues that this alliance increased the FBI's level of autonomy. As Hoover's domination of the FBI has been demonstrated, it can be seen that Hoover's ability to succeed at bureaucratic politics advanced his own autonomy in directing the FBI, and in specific the FBI's domestic security responsibilities.
COINTELPRO operations were the epitome of the FBI response to these domestic responsibilities. Hoover (1969) presented a public case for the dangers presented by both the Ku Klux Klan (the targets of WHITE HATE) and the New Left (the targets of NEW LEFT). This also serves as an indicator of Hoover's motives in dealing with these subversive groups. However, it must be noted that both NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE were only initiated after direct requests from the White House to resolve specific domestic security concerns. Cunningham (2003) operationalizes data which allows direct comparison between the two programs. Sullivan (1979), in his autobiography, discusses the judgment of senior FBI officials regarding the success of the operations. The current research, however, does not take into account the relationship between Hoover's political maneuvers and the success of the operations. Ergo, Hoover's personality, and its resultant affects upon his bureaucratic infighting, must be analyzed in regards to whether or not these COINTELPRO actions were a success.
Section III: Data Collection Methods
This plan of inquiry discusses the method used to explore the relationship between Hoover's direction of bureaucratic politics and whether or not that direction had any affect on the success of COINTELPRO operations. A comparison between the COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE and COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT programs will be made on the basis of two variables: (1) How Hoover used bureaucratic politics regarding that specific program, and (2) whether that operation was considered a success or not.
Data Sources
The data sources chosen were selected for their applicability to the study in several criteria; a phenomenological approach in which those that participated in the operations subjectively judged both or either variable, the identification of themes used in text (used primarily in identifying the use of Hoover's political maneuvering), statistical information, and content analysis. The sources were located from a variety of origination, although most sources were located from cross-referencing bibliographies once a data source had been identified. Enough sources were selected to provide a balance between credibility and validation on one hand, and redundancy on the other.
Research Design
Data needs to be collected for both variables. As the bulk of the data collected will be narrative in nature, Creswell (2012) suggests coding for themes as a method of analysis. The application of coding for theme is most suited for the variable of Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics. The level of success in each program can be weighed on two basis; success against the Klan can be measured in membership levels and in the narrative of those that conducted the operations, while success against the New Left can be measured in the narrative of those that took part in New Left terror actions, and the narrative of those that conducted the operations against them.
Data Analysis Strategy
There are five steps in exploring the relationship between Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics and whether a given operation could be considered a success. Data should be analyzed with the purpose of identifying the methods of politics that Hoover used. Then which methods of political tactics Hoover used in regards specifically to each program (WHITE HATE, NEW LEFT) should be classified. At this point, an analysis must be made as to whether there was a significant difference in Hoover's maneuvering between the two programs. Both programs must be judged as to the level of success. Finally, the political method used must be evaluated against the success or failure of that operation.

The methodology used to explore the relationship between Hoover's direction of bureaucratic politics and whether or not that direction had any affect on the success of COINTELPRO operations. A comparison between the COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE and COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT programs is based upon the independent variable of Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics and a dependent vraiable of the level of that program's success. Data has been gathered from biographies, histories, interviews and studies regarding both Hoover and COINTELPRO. This data must be analyzed to identify the methods of politics used by Hoover, and the data must also be used to evaluate the success of the two COINTELPRO operations.
Section IV: Discussion and Conclusions
Answering the question, “What effect did Hoover's bureaucratic politics have on the success of COINTELPRO operations?”, requires a three step process. First, the tools of Hoover's maneuvering must be identified; second, which types of maneuvers affected which operation in the comparison between WHITE HATE and NEW LEFT must be stated; and finally, the success of those specific operations must be judged. These findings are based upon a content analysis of several histories of the FBI and of biographies of J. Edgar Hoover: Gentry,1991; Keller, 1989; O'Reilly, 1982; Powers,1987; and Weiner, 2013.
As the concept of bureaucratic politics is classified into types of tactic and identified via the percentage of literature in which use of the tactic is discussed, the usage of the types should be explained:
  • Acquiescence to a previously resisted policy: Hoover would oppose the use of the FBI in certain situations; as political pressure increased, Hoover would acquiesce to the policy to protect the Bureau's interests.
  • Alliance with a politician (i.e. Congressman or President) or a block of politicians: Hoover would provide public support, provide private information, or would consult with the politician in the creation of policy. These alliances would be conducted outside the normal chain of command. Examples include bypassing the Attorney General in dissemination of information.
  • Implied threat of media use to expose political opponent: Hoover would suggest to a political opponent that people close to the opponent were doing illegal or immoral things, and that the opponent should take steps to protect themselves.
  • Reducing operations or refusing to initiate operations: In contrast to the aforementioned acquiescence, Hoover often refused to take on certain responsibilities for the FBI or reduced operations that the Bureau was already conducting if he felt that the political situation required this to be done in order to protect the Bureau.
  • Retaliation against critics of the FBI: Hoover regarded the public image of the Bureau as necessary to its continued existence. Critics that “attacked” the FBI publicly were subject to retaliation.
  • Use of the media, either via a front or via FBI public affairs: The media was used in several ways; to establish the FBI's position on a policy, to discredit political opponents, to promote the FBI's image, and to bolster public support
  • Using collected data as intelligence rather than to justify criminal charges: Although this tactic was mainly used to perform the Bureau’s intelligence mission rather than as a bureaucratic maneuver, because the data had been collected, it was in the files to support the use of other types of bureaucratic politics.
Table 1 demonstrates the frequency in which these tactics are discussed in the literature; Appendix 1 lists the supporting reference material.

It should be noted that Table 1 is a breakdown of the types of bureaucratic politics that Hoover engaged in as a whole in the direction of the FBI, not simply those that he used in the guidance of COINTELPRO programs. The most striking difference in the use of these tactics in regards to COINTELPRO is that Hoover acquiesced to committing the FBI against the Klan (WHITE HATE) at the behest of LBJ, a reversal of Hoover's policy of withholding intervening in civil rights issues, with Hoover's decision to curtail operations after the break-in at the Media, Pennsylvania FBI office which could potentially (and later did in fact) expose extra-legal FBI operations including COINTELPRO. This reduction in domestic security operations had the greatest effect on NEW LEFT operations due to the timing of the decision.
How then, to measure the success of the COINTELPRO programs individually? Membership figures are available for the Klan, but not for the New Left. The ability of these groups to operate in public can be explored. Finally, the assessment by senior FBI officials of these operations can be looked into. Drabble's (2008) demonstration that Klan membership dropped significantly meshes with Assistant Director Sullivan's (1979) determination that COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE was a successful program. This is in contrast to Sullivan's judgment of the decision to end COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT (indeed, all COINTELPRO programs were ended at this time), which left Sullivan and other FBI agents upset that their most effective weapon against subversives had been removed (Weiner, 2013). Indeed, Varon (2004) notes that the FBI were simply unable to find the Weathermen.
For the most part, these findings confirm the established literature in describing Hoover's personality, his leadership of the FBI, and how these factors related to his use of bureaucratic politics. The interplay between political infighting tactics and selection of COINTELPRO targets adds some contradictory depth to the image of Hoover as an inflexible dictator. Hoover curtailed operations several times during his tenure at the FBI in order to protect the agency as a whole, and took on operations that he had previously resisted for the same reason. As the discussion moves into the conclusion, it will take into account the relationship between Hoover's political maneuvers and the success of the operations.
Ensuring domestic tranquility may have been the task set for the FBI, but Hoover sought to protect the Bureau politically before committing fully to that mission. The most glaring example of this lay in the comparison of political tactics that effectively began WHITE HATE to the tactics that effectively ended NEW LEFT. Hoover resisted using the FBI to prevent Klan terror on the grounds of federalism, although there are enough examples of his own racism to suggest that he did not hold the civil rights of black Americans as a priority. After the political desires of the President were made clear to Hoover, his compliance with this directive bolstered his alliance with the liberals and advanced the support of the liberals for the Bureau. In contrast, as Hoover became aware of changing popular and political support for the methods of the FBI, he limited covert operations. In response to revelations about FBI wiretapping methods, which were exposed in the Fred Black case heard before the Supreme Court in 1966, Hoover ended the FBI “black bag” method Bureau -wide. Once the FBI office in Media had been burglarized (in 1971) and FBI files at the office disseminated to the press, Hoover ordered an end to all COINTELPRO operations. Hoover was attempting to protect the public image of the FBI as opposed to its mission. Thus a full operational run at the Ku Klux Klan ended their effectiveness as a subversive group, but an abrupt end of NEW LEFT operations left the New Left room to run.
The Ku Klux Klan is an active organization today. How then, can WHITE HATE be portrayed as a success? The issue lay in human nature. As Durkheim suggests that crime is a normal function of human society, it can be safe to say that there is a normal urge to seek power in humans, either legally through the republican process, or illegally through subversion of that process. WHITE HATE ended, and the pressures that reduced the efficiency of the Klan and prevented its further recruitment of members ended as well. The history of the government's struggles against the Klan, in the 1870s, the 1920s, the 1960s, the 1980s, through today can testify to the constant need to fight subversion.
In part, this is why the study of effective methods of combating subversion is important. It is necessary to understand what can cause an effective campaign against a subversive operation and what can cause a failure of such operations. Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics can illuminate both how an agency can use such tactics to protect is organizational integrity, as well as how such tactics can prevent the agency from performing its mission. It should be emphasized that bureaucratic politics is only one possible factor that can hinder domestic security operations.
The selection of bureaucratic politics as a sole independent variable is just one of many limitations in this study. Since this is a highly complex research question that relies on interpreting data from conflicting and often partisan sources, there are many limitations to the study.
The first limitation is the context in which the research question was developed. Perhaps it would have been better to ask a quantitative question; “Was there a difference in the way that COINTELPRO programs were conducted against NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE targets?” This is a question that possibly should be resolved before investigating the relationship between Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics and the efficiency of COINTELPRO operations in the two programs.
A second contextual issue returns to the issue of the bureaucratic politics model, which as a variable is just one factor in several that may have affected COINTELPRO success; there is the possibility that the internal culture of the FBI interfered with the ability of agents to infiltrate the New Left, the possibility that Sullivan's attempt to replace Hoover as director and the resultant fall-out from that situation affected field operations, and the possibility that political liberals who had no problems in countering the right-wing terror of the Klan suddenly discovered “Constitutional” concerns when the terrorists of the Left were targeted, and thus abandoned the alliance with Hoover.
A possible limitation involving the sampling design is that the sample used to generate the content analysis is relatively small compared to the amount of literature that exists; the sources that also could have been used include the Church Committee (Intelligence activities, 1976), from Theoharis (2004), from Jeffreys-Jones (2007), from Elliff (1979), and from Cunningham (2003). Material from Churchill (1990) was excluded due to the extreme level of bias in that material. While Triola (2014) warns that a sample size can be too small in statistical sampling, Krippendorff (2013) explains that the content analysis method deviates from the representational mode of sampling theory in that the researcher is seeking to sample texts that can accurately answer the research question, not to seek to represent the textual population.
The research instrument used was a content analysis. The thoroughness of the manual process used in this content analysis may be questioned. It is worth the effort to redo this analysis with the addition of additional source material and a more efficient approach, perhaps using software designed for content analysis.
There is also the issue in data collection in estimating the effect that COINTELPRO had on the New Left. DeLoach (1995) notes this difficulty and briefly mentions possible factors for the subsequent decline in New Left activity which do include COINTELPRO.
Another data collection limitation is the difficulty in separating Hoover's personal identification with the agency from his direction of the agency for the Bureau's sake. For instance, Gentry (1991) notes an example in which Raymond Chandler, the writer, insulted Hoover personally, and was subjected to the collection of 250 pages of personal data in an FBI file.
The last data collection issue is in using data related to Assistant Director Sullivan's statements. The literature demonstrates that Sullivan had a pattern of telling his audience what they wanted to hear at any given time. This applies particularity to data regarding New Left activities; Sullivan enthusiastically took part in organizing the Huston plan directed at the New Left, yet in his autobiography claims that the New Left was not a threat...this, at a time Mark Felt was being prosecuted for covert FBI operations.
Finally, the theoretical underpinnings of the study may benefit from additional theoretical perspective. Bureaucratic politics is a good model to explain the basics of how Hoover used these particular tactics and why they succeeded on an organizational advancement basis. Keller's (1989) Liberal Theory of Internal Security explained the reasons that liberals allied with Hoover, but was too specific to apply to the research question, and was also excluded from the study. Finally, Loewenstein's (1937) “Militant Democracy” may explain a Republic's need to combat extremism, but is too general to apply to the research question, and was excluded.
Future Research
Finally, such a study leads to additional questions. How does a free society identify security threats? Is the ideology of socialism an inherent threat to a free society? Is the ideology of Islam an inherent threat to a free society? What methods of combating racism are effective and do not interfere with personal liberty? How does security law get written so that security operations are legally conducted, effective in nature, and attain balance between security and liberty?
Policy Implications
Recommendation 1: The first policy recommendation that springs to mind in regards to the study derives from Hoover's use of political tactics and his identification with the Bureau that resulted in a long tenure as Director; although there have been laws to prevent longevity in such offices, the political abuse that accompanies such offices does not occur solely with longevity (see Lerner's use of the IRS to attack opponents of the Obama administration for a current example). This abuse is more easily concealed in security agencies. Therefore an office needs to be established in the judiciary in which all communications between elected representatives and security officials are monitored. Of necessity, the monitors would need the appropriate security clearances. The responsibility of this office would be to ensure that such communications remain within the bounds of the respective office, and that breaches in this protocol are punished, and the nature of those breaches presented to the public when they do not present security risks.
Recommendation 2: Individual targets should be legally designated for enhanced security operations, whether for surveillance or neutralization. A security agency should be required to go before a security oriented court (similar to the FISA process, yet with the possibility of designating a citizen as a security risk), and present a solid case that the individual in question presents a risk to the security of the United States. The benefit of this policy is that members of criminal organizations could be designated as such when involved in actions that involve subversion of the judicial process such as intimidation of witnesses or bribery. The reason to focus on individuals as opposed to movements is based upon the due process principle. However, membership in organizations that are doctrinally hostile to America, or the public support of hostile ideologies should be prima facie reasons to focus on an individual.

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Appendix 1: Page References Used in Content Analysis

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