Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)

The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), like many other federal programs, was a response to the 9/11 attacks and the threat of future terrorist attacks. C-TPAT is based on a partnership between the the government, in the agency of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and private corporations engaged in the global supply chain. In essence, private entities that sign a C-TPAT agreement identify security issues within the entity, and provide CBP with a security plan. C-TPAT is a voluntary program, although Ritchie and Melnyk assert there are additional regulatory burdens on corporations that do not participate (2012, p. 862). Laden contends that the rationale that CBP used to justify a voluntary program was that legitimate corporations would want to cooperate (2007, p. 77).

C-TPAT has several benefits to it's private sphere partners. The first is to avoid additional regulatory scrutiny, as Ritchie and Melnyk stated. O'Donnell makes the argument that C-TPAT partners have a competitive advantage over non-partners (2009, p.139). Richard Reed, deputy assistant to the president for Homeland Security, proposed that C-TPAT enhances not only the security of critical infrastructure for government, but for industry as well ( Annual C-TPAT conference closes, 2013, para. 3).

C-TPAT may not work at 100% efficiency, however, the program should not be terminated. Natter, citing the Government Accountability Office (GAO), reports that oversight over the program is “inadequate” in that “Customs and Border Patrol failed to adequately verify its members' security practices” (2008a, para. Para. 2). Natter also reports that some politicians have called for “100 percent ocean container scanning” (2008b, p.11). Considering that some companies may not be as legitimate as O'Donnell (see first paragraph) contends is necessary for the program's success, this is something to keep in mind. The practice changed in 2014, when 100% of U.S.-bound containers are to be scanned in accordance with 2007 law (Nolan, 2013, para. 3). Melnyk et al quote a C-TPAT partner, as follows: “It may not help but I am not going to be the first firm to have a security screw-up and not be C-TPAT certified, so I am going to do it irrespective of the costs; it is going to happen” (2013, p.298). Voss and Williams provide the fundamental reason as to why the program should not be terminated; terrorism, theft, damage ,or insertion of unauthorized cargo are “significant” risks to the global supply chain (2013, p. 321). Even if the program is not 100% effective, every step to make a terrorist act less successful is a step in the right direction.

Annual C-TPAT conference closes. (2013, January 19). US Fed News Service, Including US State News. Washington, D.C., India. Retrieved May 5, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1270842790?pq-origsite=summon

Laden, M. (2007). The genesis of the US C-TPAT program: Lessons learned and earned by the

government and trade. World Customs Journal. 1 (2). Retrieved May 5, 2015 from http://www.worldcustomsjournal.org/media/wcj/-2007/2/the_genesis_of_the_us_c-tpat_program_lessons_learned_and_earned_by_the_government_and_trade.pdf

Melnyk, S. A., Ritchie, W. J., & Calantone, R. J. (2013). The Case of the C- TPAT border security initiative: Assessing the adoption/persistence decisions when dealing with a novel, institutionally driven administrative innovation. Journal of Business Logistics, 34(4), 289–300. http://doi.org/10.1111/jbl.12027

Natter, A. (2008a, May 27). C-TPAT oversight inadequate: GAO. Traffic World. Retrieved May 5, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/195731589?pq-origsite=summon

Natter, A. (2008b, June 9). Report: C-TPAT inadequate. Traffic World, 272(23), 11–11. Retrieved May 5, 2015 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=32748121&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Nolan, C. (2013). The Rubik’s Cube of cargo security. The Brief, 42(3), 58–64. Retrieved May 5, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1366357221?pq-origsite=summon

O’Connell, J. J. (2009). C-TPAT: major challenges. Journal of Transportation Security, 2(4), 137–147. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1007/s12198-009-0032-5

Ritchie, W. J., & Melnyk, S. A. (2012). The impact of emerging institutional norms on adoption timing decisions: evidence from C-TPAT-A government antiterrorism initiative. Strategic Management Journal, 33(7), 860–870. http://doi.org/10.1002/smj.1948

Voss, M. D., & Williams, Z. (2013). Public-private partnerships and supply chain security: C- TPAT as an indicator of relational security. Journal of Business Logistics, 34(4), 320–334. http://doi.org/10.1111/jbl.12030

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This is a comparison that is hard to make.

On one hand, it is next to impossible to physically check 100% of cargo, especially when considering the timeframe.  By allowing the shippers to take part in security procedures, the need to check every container goes down.

On the other hand, legitimate companies that play by the rules and have a low-risk security profile can be suborned by a number of methods (blackmail, corruption, extortion) into shipping threat materials into the United States.

I think that the benefits of C-TPAT outweigh the risks, but I understand there is a significant risk to the process.

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I seem to remember some discussion of the problems of drug smuggling via container prior to 9/11.  After 9/11 C-TPAT was the best option for security for the vast amount of cargo to check;  it is still etter than nothing, but a "suitcase nuke" could still be walked across the border even if C-TPAT was at 100%. Our best solution is to attack the terror ideology at it's sources, and be preemptive in that regard.  But we should still maintain customs and border security measures as best as we can do.