“The criminal justice system is often
viewed as a 'nonsystem' due to it's decentralized and fragmented
nature”(Welsh & Pontell, 1991, p.74) Although the
decentralized description can be explained by the
multi-jurisdictional nature of our
political system, how can the fragmented description be explained in
agencies whose sole function is criminal justice administration? The
main explanation for this can be found in
the concept of interorganizational conflict. Stojkovic states that
this type of conflict “occurs when different organizations share a
common purpose but disagree about how that purpose will be achieved.
This type of conflict arises when one organization (such as one
component of the criminal justice system) perceives its goals and
objectives to be in conflict with those of other
organizations.”(2014, p. 320). Interorganizational conflict
within the criminal justice system has been
a point of some study:
“a conference was held at the School
of Criminal Justice at Albany in which probation and police officials
were asked to identify types of conflict existing between their
agencies. The four types studied were: (1) conflict based on
dissensus reflecting differences in values among groups within a
system; (2) conflict arising from status and esteem differentials
between individuals ; (3) operational conflict which is centered in
the differences which occur when interrelated agencies seek to serve
their own organizational requirements; and (4) perceptual conflict,
the result of distortions which prevent a clear image of the duties,
functions, and purposes of others in the system from being
transmitted effectively. “ (O'Leary & Newman, 1970, Abstract)
We can see that interorganizational
conflict shares some characteristics with other levels of
organizational conflict in general. The first example of this comes
into play with a comparison of two extremes in group values within a
criminal justice system. The first extreme is the case of “The
Punishers”; “a rogue element in the Milwaukee police department
that operated under a set of norms that treated criminal suspects
very harshly and outside the pale of departmental policies and
procedures and existing laws.” (Stojkovic, 2014, p. 313) We will
look at further at their motivations in a
moment. The second extreme is the case of the LAPD Rampart
Division’s CRASH unit, which abused the criminal justice system on
the basis of gang allegiance and personal
corruption. In both extremes, we can see the group values within the
organization having a dissenual effect with other criminal justice
organizations.
Interorganizational conflict can also
be based on individual differences, and not solely on status or
esteem issues, such as suggested by O'Leary and Newman. Miller
discusses the ideological basis that
individuals hold as well as their weighting within different elements
of the criminal justice system, such as the
prevalence of a conservative view among policemen as opposed to the
likelihood of of liberal views amongst members of the judiciary.
“The major contention of this presentation is that ideology and its
consequences exert a powerful influence on the policies and
procedures of those who conduct the enterprise of criminal justice,
and that the degree and kinds of influence go largely unrecognized.
Ideology is the permanent hidden agenda of criminal justice.”(Miller,
1973, para. 10) In the case of The Punishers, it is obvious their
motivation lay in perception that justice was not being done, and can
be explained by Miller's proposition.
Operational conflict as suggested by
O'Leary and Newman can be best explained
with growth complex theory ( or bureaucratic politics, or Pournelle's
Iron Law of Bureaucracy). An organization grows, and as it grows, it
begins to replace it's founding goal with the goal of advancing the
organization.
One example of perceptual conflict is
discussed by members of the Center for Technology in Government, who
found in their dealings with criminal justice agencies an
unwillingness to cooperate; “Their resistance to move beyond
information exchange to truly collaborate in integrating information
across agencies came from their organizational cultures and their
previous experiences of joint projects” (Bodor, Thompson, &
Demirçivi, 2003, p.4) .
However, we should not paint a picture
of a criminal justice system in complete dysfunction, with officers
of each agency hiding behind squad car
doors or stacks of legal books glaring at each other with
uncooperative eyes. Some of the same factors that build good
leadership can also be used to promote goal sharing and conflict
management. Informal communications between respective members of
various agencies has often been used to cut the red tape, and formal
organizations such as task forces have often been used to collaborate
efforts. “Federally led law enforcement task forces and
intelligence information sharing centers are
ubiquitous in domestic policing. They are launched at the
local, state, and national levels and respond to a variety of
challenges such as violent crime, criminal gangs, terrorism,
white-collar crime, public corruption, even
intelligence sharing.”(Bjelopera & Finklea, 2014, p.3)
Bjelopera, J., & Finklea, K. M.
(2014). Domestic Federal law enforcement coordination: Through the
lens of the Southwest border. Congressional Research Service.
Retrieved August 22, 2014 from
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf
Bodor, T., Thompson, F., &
Demirçivi, F. (2003). Criminal justice cultures in the United
States: A context for understanding aspects of organizational change.
Center for Technology in Government. Retrieved August 19, 2014
from
https://ctg.albany.edu/publications/journals/hpa_2004_criminal/hpa_2004_criminal.pdf
Miller, W. (1973). Ideology and
criminal justice policy: Some current issues. Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology, 64(2). Retrieved August 19, 2014 from
http://www.hhs.csus.edu/Homepages/CJ/BikleB/Miller%20-%20Ideology%20and%20Criminal%20Justice%20Policy.htm
Journal of Research in Crime and
Delinquency 7:2 pp. 99-119, doi: 10.1177/002242787000700201
Welsh, W. N., & Pontell, H. N.
(1991). Counties in court: Interorganizational adaptations to jail
litigation in California. Law and Society Review, 73–101.
Retreived August 21, 2014 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3053890
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