Implications of COINTELPRO study

A study of this nature is limited in focus in order to understand the effects of one factor;  in this case, the factor was limited to Hoover's use of political tactics, as in the bureaucratic politics model, to promote and protect the interests of the Bureau.  However, starting from this narrow focus leads to the extrapolation of it's application to other factors and from there to wider implications of COINTELPRO as a concept.

Further research could involve exploring the relationship between other factors and the efficiency of COINTELPRO;  the other factors including the internal culture of the FBI, personality conflicts between Hoover and sitting Presidents (in particular, Hoover's conflict with Nixon), personality conflicts within the Bureau (such as the one between Hoover and Sullivan), public opinion shifts, the focus of Hoover on leftism as a result of foreign agency rather than as a threat of its own accord, the possibility that Hoover's advanced age left him relatively incompetent to keep using such tactics, in the timing of Hoover's death and the almost simultaneous legal trouble that the Nixon White House put itself into, and possibly that the liberal block of politicians that supported COINTELPRO against the KKK withdrew that support when those methods were directed at leftists.  The exploration of issues surrounding the efficiency of COINTELPRO can in turn shed light on cultural, leadership, and political issues that affect domestic security issues in general.

However, the nature of COINTELPRO itself has leads to a debate on the merits of using these methods in a free society. Wilson (1978) defends the use of such tactics although the majority of opinion finds such tactics undemocratic, illegal, and/or immoral.  The resolution of this question lies partly in these questions, which in turn raise additional questions:

What is the relationship between effective security operations and the rights of individuals in a Republic?

What is subversion?

How does a Republic define a security threat?

Is leftism/socialism an ideology that is inherently hostile to liberty?

Is Islam an ideology that is inherently hostile to liberty?

At what point does organized crime move from a criminal threat to a security threat?

Is there a conflict between security and freedom, or is there a method to balance these concerns?

Obviously, these are not simple questions, and highly subject to politics in study and in application.  In the history of the domestic security of the United States, from the original Alien and Sedition Act through the mass NSA surveillance of Americans today, there develops a clear pattern of overreaction and failure.  An initial overreaction to security concerns that lead to abuses of liberty that lead to a curtailment of the ability of security agencies to perform their function that lead to a spectacular failure that result in overreaction.  One example of this involves COINTELPRO.  The Nixon administration felt that anti-war protestors as a whole were subversive, and that FBI efforts (including NEW LEFT) were not enough.  The White House then developed the Huston Plan targeted at the anti-war movement (which was not completely a New Left action, although New Left members often led segments of the anti-war movement). The methods used under this plan were clearly illegal, and the public was made aware of these abuses at roughly the same time as other programs such as the COINTELPRO operations were exposed.  The Church Committee was the catalyst for overreaction in the restriction of security agencies.  Powers (2004) contends that the reforms that were born as a result of that overreaction caused a hesitation to act in FBI agents that may have been a factor in the intelligence failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks.  In the "Homeland Security" reforms that were a response to those attacks, the PATRIOT ACT was composed.  We see the wheel make the complete turn as the mass surveillance of the public in general by the NSA was justified on the basis of the PATRIOT ACT.

The failure to make sound policy decision based on honest and full research leads to overreaction and extremes in operational guidelines that cyclically lead to the abuse of liberty and the failure to protect the country.  The investigation of the bureaucratic politics model in relation to efficient domestic security policy is simply the first step in examining all factors that affect domestic security.  Certainly, the underlying justice of security operations plays a part in their efficiency.

Powers, R. G. (2004). A bomb with a long fuse. American History, 39(5), 42–47.

Wilson, J. Q. (1978). The investigators: managing FBI and narcotics agents. New York: Basic Books.

               

You have chosen a topic that has been debated over a long period of time.  Wilson (2013) states that people on both sides of the rehabilitation issue have misinterpreted Martinson's 1974 “nothing works” study.  Wilson suggests that rehabilitation works for SOME people, SOME of the time, and that was the conclusion people should have drawn from Martinson's study. 

Wilson also postulates that a review of research shows that repeat offenders, especially violent offenders, tend to have a history of repeat juvenile delinquency offenses.  Which is fortunate, because the literature also suggest that juveniles have a better chance to respond to rehabilitation efforts than adults, although this might also be due to the “aging out of crime” phenomenon. So perhaps it would be best to identify “what works” in keeping juveniles from delinquency.  Turner et al (2007) look at this issue from the perspective of non-delinquent youth in a “resilience” lens.

Huebner (2009) presents a bibliographic overview of rehabilitative literature. You should be aware of bias when one particular approach is being defended. If one is thinking about policy, it might be best to stay away from a “one approach fits all” viewpoint, or a “this OR that” perspective.  The rehabilitative method may indeed work best when combined with a punitive mode.

References

Huebner, B. (2009, December 14). Rehabilitation. Retrieved September 10, 2015 from http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396607/obo-9780195396607-0046.xml

Martinson, R. (1974). What works? questions and answers about prison reform. Public Interest 10:22–54

Turner, M. G., Hartman, J. L., Exum, M. L., & Cullen, F. T. (2007). Good kids in bad circumstances: a longitudinal analysis of resilient youth. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 46(1-2), 81–111.

Wilson, J. Q. (2013). Thinking about crime (Revised edition). New York: Basic Books, A Member of the Perseus Books Group.

We are all off to the next step, whether that is the study of justice or the application of justice. What have y'all learned from the program? For me, I started with the viewpoint that the way to reduce crime optimally was to decriminalize anything that wasn't a property crime or a personal crime and then to jail or execute those that wouldn't learn to keep their hands off other people and their things. For the most part, my view hasn't changed that much. But I have learned the importance of public order criminal enforcement in some cases... I have learned that there are limitations to the application of classical criminology... I have been surprised that the bell curve can accurately represent so many populations... And I have learned that there are many more factors to any given situation than are usually considered in a study;  while we probably shouldn't "pick at" any given research attempt for minor contributors to the problem that weren't included in the study  (I dropped a LOT to get my paper into 10 pages lol), we should always attempt to ascertain bias, and to identify major factors that weren't considered in the study...whether we agree with the results or not. Good luck!

Limitations to study

Since I have chosen a highly complex research question that relies on interpreting data from conflicting and often partisan sources, there are many limitations to my study.

The first limitation is the context in which the research question was developed.  Perhaps it would have been better to ask a quantitative question; “Was there a difference in the way that COINTELPRO programs were conducted against NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE targets?”   This is a question that possibly should be resolved before investigating the relationship between Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics and the efficiency of COINTELPRO operations in the two programs.

A second contextual issue is that bureaucratic politics is just one factor in several that may have affected COINTELPRO success; there is the possibility that the internal culture of the FBI interfered with the ability of agents to infiltrate the New Left, the possibility that Sullivan's attempt to replace Hoover as director and the resultant fall-out from that situation affected field operations, and the possibility that political liberals who had no problems in countering the right-wing terror of the Klan suddenly discovered “Constitutional” concerns when the terrorists of the Left were targeted, and thus abandoned the alliance with Hoover.

A limitation involving the sampling design is that the sample I used to generate my content analysis is relatively small compared to the amount of literature that exists;  I could have used additional material from the Church Committee (Intelligence activities,1976), from Theoharis (2004), from Jeffreys-Jones (2007), from Elliff (1979), and from Cunningham (2003).  I chose specifically to avoid using material from Churchill (1990) due to the extreme level of bias in that material.

The research instrument I used was a content analysis.   I was unsure of both my use of this method (my first attempt), and the thoroughness of my attempt. There is software that can aid in this approach, but I did it manually.  It is worth the effort to redo this analysis with the addition of additional source material and a more efficient approach. 

There is also the issue in data collection of estimating the effect that COINTELPRO had on the New Left.  DeLoach (1995) notes this difficulty and briefly mentions possible factors for the subsequent decline in New Left activity which do include COINTELPRO. 

Another data collection limitation is the difficulty in separating Hoover's personal identification with the agency from his direction of the agency for the Bureau's sake.  For instance, Gentry (1991) notes an example in which Raymond Chandler, the writer, insulted Hoover personally, and was subjected to the collection of 250 pages of personal data in an FBI file. 

The last data collection issue is in using data related to Assistant Director Sullivan's statements.  The literature demonstrates that Sullivan had a pattern of telling his audience what they wanted to hear at any given time.  This applies particularity to data regarding New Left activities;  Sullivan enthusiastically took part in organizing the Huston plan directed at the New Left, yet in his autobiography claims that the New Left was not a threat...this, at a time Mark Felt was being prosecuted for covert FBI operations.

Finally, the theoretical underpinnings of the study could use some fleshing out.  Bureaucratic politics is a good model to explain the basics of how Hoover used these particular tactics and why they succeeded on an organizational advancement basis, but a model I referred to as the “politics of the personal” could have more fully explained why Hoover made these tactical choices.  “Politics of the personal” was a theory I was exposed to in undergraduate political science some 25 years ago, but I was unable to locate a source explaining it, and the only examples I was able to find of it in use were out of the context I was familiar in understanding; it seems that the term had been hijacked by 3^rd wave feminism.

References

Churchill, W. (1990). The COINTELPRO papers: documents from the FBI’s secret wars against domestic dissent. Boston, MA: South End Press.

Cunningham, D. (2003). Understanding State Responses to Left-versus Right-Wing Threats The FBI’s Repression of the New Left and the Ku Klux Klan. Social Science History, 27(3), 327–370.

DeLoach, C. (1995). Hoover’s FBI: the inside story by Hoover’s trusted lieutenant. Washington, D.C. : Lanham, MD: Regnery Pub.

Elliff, J. (1979). The reform of FBI intelligence operations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gentry, C. (1991). J. Edgar Hoover: the man and the secrets. New York: Norton.

Intelligence activities and the rights of Americans. 94^th Cong 1. (1976).

Jeffreys-Jones, R. (2007). The FBI: a history. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Theoharis, A. G. (2004). The FBI & American democracy: a brief critical history. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

State the consequences of the limitations.  For example, what is the consequence of a small sample?  You mentioned content analysis - how can the results be validated?

All studies rely on validity and reliability to be of use; validity refers to the accuracy of measurement and reliability refers to the stability or the consistency of the measuring instrument (Hagan, 2012), in this case, my content analysis.  If my content analysis valid, then it accurately measures what I mean it to, the percentage of supporting literature that had discussed the specific use of the tactic of bureaucratic politics that I had identified as a variable.  If my analysis is reliable, then I should get the same results every time I repeat the analysis with the same data.  If my study is not both valid and reliable, then the study is of no use and presents no useful knowledge.

Sample size is important in the validity of a study. Triola (2014) warns that a sample size can be too small in statistical sampling.  On the other hand, Krippendorff (2013) explains that the content analysis method deviates from the representational mode of sampling theory in that the researcher is seeking to sample texts that can accurately answer the research question, not to seek to represent the textual population.

Krippendorff discusses validity in terms of face validity, social validity, and empirical validity.  Empirical validity is what we are discussing in relation to research technique.  Krippendorf specifies three obstacles to validation; substantive, conceptual, and methodological obstacles.  Krippendorf suggests that validating evidence used in the content analysis can be achieved by two methods.  The first is by measuring the correlative validity, which involves checking the findings obtained through the content analysis with other findings from methods considered more valid.  The second is predictive validity, in which the findings of the content analysis accurately anticipate knowledge which was not in the analysis.

Hagan, F. E. (2012). Essentials of research methods in criminal justice and criminology (3rd ed). Boston: Prentice Hall.

Krippendorff, K. (2013). Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology (3rd ed). Los Angeles, Calif.: Sage.

Triola, M. F. (2014). Elementary statistics (12th edition). Boston: Pearson.

Methodology - Hoover's direction of bureaucratic politics

            This plan of inquiry discusses the method used to explore the relationship between Hoover's direction of bureaucratic politics and whether or not that direction had any affect on the success of COINTELPRO operations.  A comparison between the COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE and COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT programs will be made on the basis of two variables: (1) How Hoover used bureaucratic politics regarding that specific program, and (2) was that operation considered a success or not.

Research Question

RQ: How did  FBI Director Hoover's political direction of the agency affect the efficiency of COINTELPRO operations?

IV = Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics
DV = The successful use of a COINTELPRO program to degrade a subversive group's ability to harm a nation.

Data Sources

            The data sources chosen were selected for their applicability to the study in several criteria; a phenomenological approach in which those that participated in the operations subjectively judged both or either variable,  the identification of themes used in text (used primarily in identifying the use of Hoover's political maneuvering), statistical information, and content analysis.  The sources were located from a variety of origination, although most sources were located from cross-referencing bibliographies once a data source had been identified.  Enough sources were selected to provide a balance between credibility and validation on one hand, and redundancy on the other.

            Annotated Bibliography

Cunningham, D. (2003). The patterning of repression: FBI counterintelligence and the New Left. Social Forces, 82(1), 209–240.

Cunningham, D., & Browning, B. (2004). The emergence of worthy targets: Official frames and deviance narratives within the FBI. Sociological Forum, 19(3), 347–369.

Cunningham is a professor of sociology at Brandies University.  His work has centered on the FBI's response to subversive groups (referred to by Cunningham as “dissidents”).  In these studies, he examines the FBI's internal policies in COINTELPRO and discuses Hoover's role.  Cunningham performs a content analysis on 2,487 COINTELPRO” NEW LEFT memos in which he coded background information, type, and target. 

Drabble, J. (2008). The FBI, COINTELPRO-WHITE HATE, and the decline of Ku Klux Klan organizations in Alabama. Alabama Review, 61(1), 3–47.

Drabble's work has focused specifically on COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE.  He is a professor who teaches Human Rights at the University of California at Berkeley.  Drabble provides a historical narrative that relies primarily on internal FBI memos and contemporary news reports, although he also sources Keller and O'Reilly.  He does conclude that FBI action against the Klan caused a loss in membership, and provides membership figures to demonstrate his claim

Keller, W. W. (1989). The liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and fall of a domestic intelligence state. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Keller, an analyst with the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, Program of International Security and Commerce, discusses Hoover's alliances with political liberals in protecting and establishing the FBI's bureaucratic domain.

Kessler, R. (2003). The bureau: the secret history of the FBI (St. Martin’s Paperbacks ed). New York: St. Martin’s Paperbacks.

Kessler, a former Washing Post reporter, has written more than 10 books concerning the FBI and other security agencies of the United States.  This a history based upon the interview method and using other historical sources.  Kessler's writing about Hoover and the FBI provide information regarding Hoover's personality and it's effect on the way that he utilized politics to advance the FBI's interests.

Powers, R. G. (1987). Secrecy and power: the life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York; London: Free Press ; Collier Macmillan.

Power's biography of Hoover is the most controversial of those listed as sources. Powers, a professor of history at the College of Staten Island, specializes in American security issues and the FBI.  The focus of this book is on Hoover's decision making and political infighting capabilities.  It can help in explaining COINTELPRO operations in terms of the bureaucratic politics model.

Sullivan, W. C. (1979). The Bureau: My thirty years in Hoover’s FBI (1st ed). New York: Norton.

Sullivan was an Assistant Director of the FBI under Hoover, and responsible for several COINTELPRO operations.  However, this book was written after his retirement from the FBI.

This is primarily an autobiography focused on Sullivan's time in the FBI overall.

Sullivan does discuss COINTELPRO operations against both the Klan and the New Left.  His perspective adds a phenomenological approach to the study.

Varon, J. (2004). Bringing the war home: the Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and revolutionary violence in the sixties and seventies. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Varon is an assistant professor of history at Drew University.    His purpose in writing this book was to compare the violence committed by the New Left in America versus the New Left in Germany.  His sources range from ethnographic interviews with the terrorists themselves to government reports to histories and news reports.  This information in gauging the success of COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT

Weiner, T. (2013). Enemies: a history of the FBI. New York: Random House.

Weiner is a national security reporter for the New York Times; he has won the National Book Award for his work on the CIA, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.  Weiner based his research on Freedom of Information requests and 208 oral histories that had been compiled by retirees. Weiner's information can be utilized to gather data regarding Hoover's bureaucratic politics.

Research Design

            Data needs to be collected for both variables. As the bulk of the data collected will be narrative in nature, Creswell (2012) suggests coding for themes as a method of analysis.  The application of coding for theme is most suited for the variable of Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics.  The level of success in each program can be weighed on two basis;  success against the Klan can be measured in membership levels and in the narrative of those that conducted the operations, while success against the New Left can be measured in the narrative of those that took part in New Left terror actions, and the narrative of those that conducted the operations against them.

Data Analysis Strategy

            There are five steps in exploring the relationship between Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics and whether a given operation could be considered a success.  Data should be analyzed with the purpose of identifying the methods of politics that Hoover used.  Then which method of politics Hoover used in regards specifically to each program (WHITE HATE, NEW LEFT) should be classified.  At this point, an analysis must be made as to whether there was a significant difference in Hoover's maneuvering between the two programs.  Both programs must be judged as to the level of success.  Finally, the political method used must be evaluated against the success or failure of that operation.

Summary

            The methodology used to explore the relationship between Hoover's direction of bureaucratic politics and whether or not that direction had any affect on the success of COINTELPRO operations.  A comparison between the COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE and COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT programs is based upon the independent variable of  Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics and a dependent vraiable of the level of that program's success.  Data has been gathered from biographies, histories, interviews and studies regarding both Hoover and COINTELPRO.  This data must be analyzed to identify the methods of politics  used by Hoover, and the data must also be used to evaluate the success of the two COINTELPRO operations.

References

Creswell, J. W. (2012). Educational research: planning, conducting, and evaluating    quantitative and qualitative research (4th ed). Boston: Pearson.

Cunningham, D. (2003). The patterning of repression: FBI counterintelligence and the New       Left. Social Forces, 82(1), 209–240.

Cunningham, D., & Browning, B. (2004). The emergence of worthy targets: Official frames and   deviance narratives within the FBI. Sociological Forum, 19(3), 347–369.

Drabble, J. (2008). The FBI, COINTELPRO-WHITE HATE, and the decline of Ku Klux Klan organizations in Alabama. Alabama Review, 61(1), 3–47.

Keller, W. W. (1989). The liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and fall of a domestic intelligence            state. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Kessler, R. (2003). The bureau: the secret history of the FBI (St. Martin’s Paperbacks ed). New           York: St. Martin’s Paperbacks

Powers, R. G. (1987). Secrecy and power: the life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York; London: Free      Press ; Collier Macmillan.

Sullivan, W. C. (1979). The Bureau: My thirty years in Hoover’s FBI (1st ed). New York:         Norton.

Varon, J. (2004). Bringing the war home: the Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and     revolutionary violence in the sixties and seventies. Berkeley: University of California        Press.

Weiner, T. (2013). Enemies: a history of the FBI. New York: Random House.