Concept Development:Political Differences in COINTELPRO Operations

            The citizens of a Republic have an expectation that their right to free speech and political participation should not be interfered with by the State.  In addition, citizens expect that actions undertaken by the State be subject to public review.  The complication between theory and reality comes into play when anti-Republic forces use extra-legal means to achieve political goals.  States may choose to employ secrecy and extra-legal means to combat these subversive organizations.  This approach leads to conflict between the expectations of the society and the means to protect it.  In addition, in any state, representative or not, political influences affect operations of the state.  It is possible that these political influences can aligned with subversive organizations and interfere with national security operations.  In the case of the United States in the 1960's, the country was under attack from illegal and violent acts by  the racist organization, the Ku Klux Klan.  At the same time, Leftist terrorist groups that were part of the collective "New Left" movement were also committing violent attacks against America.  The FBI initiated operations against both groups. There are several reasons to determine if political influence was responsible for differences in operations between the two goups; first, to identify and remove any political influence from the government that aligns with and abets subversive organizations that commit illegal acts, to determine whether governemt agencies acted improperly, and to determine if government agencies violated the balance between citizen rights and national security.

            The following research questions must be answered to explore the basic question:

·       Is counter subversion a primary responsibility of the FBI?

·       What is subversion?

·       What is a legitimate domestic threat?

·       Was the Klu Klux Klan a legitimate domestic threat?

·       Was the New Left a legitimate domestic threat?

·       Were there demonstratable differences in how operations were conducted between the two groups?

·       Can politics be demonstrated to account for any of those differences, if such differences exist?

            The primary method that will be  used is comparative historical inquiry.  There will also be some use of phenomenological research,  as the viewpoints of Hoover assistants Sullivan and DeLoacha will be examined. There has been some academic work done in examining COINTELPRO operations, particularly in operations ahgainst the New Left.  Cunningham, as an example, examines operations against both groups.  Drabble specializes in COINTELPRO:WHITE HATE operations, which targeted the Klan. Powers, Gentry, Theoharis, and several others dig into the FBI's history, including the political factors that drove the development of that history.  There is what could be seen an endless fountain of government reports.  In the first type of government reports, actions of the Klan and the New Left are investigated as a threat to domestic security.  The second type of government reports focuses on how the FBI responded to that threat, with many reports focusing on the allged excesses of the program.  The third type of government report discusses the legal boundaries that domestic security agencies must act within;  this last type of discussion continues today as America faces continued domestic threats from Islam and the Left.

Selected References

Bendle, M. F. (2006). Terrorism and the New Left in the ’Sixties. National Observer, 71.

Berman, E. (2014). Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection. Washington and Lee Law        Review, 71(1), 3–91.

Bjelopera, J. (2013). The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations.        Congressional Research Service.

Boraz, S. C., & Bruneau, T. C. (2006). Reforming Intelligence: Democracy and Effectiveness.           Journal of Democracy, Volume 17,  Number 3.

Bowornwathana, B., & Poocharoen, O. (2010). Bureaucratic politics and administrative     reform: Why politics matters. Public Organization Review, 10(4), 303–321.

Brister, P. D. (2011, September). Ku Klux Rising: Toward an understanding of American right       wing terrorist campaigns. (Dissertation). Naval Postgraduate School.

Collier, P. and Horowitz, D. (2006). Destructive generation: second thoughts about the sixties.      San Francisco: Encounter Books.

Cunningham, D., & Browning, B. (2004). The Emergence of worthy targets: Official frames          and deviance narratives within the FBI. Sociological Forum, 19(3), 347–369.

Cunningham, D. (2003). Understanding state responses to Left-versus Right-wing threats: The          FBI’s repression of the New Left and the Ku Klux Klan. Social Science History, 27(3),   327–370.

Cunningham, D. (2003). The Patterning of Repression: FBI Counterintelligence and the New       Left. Social Forces, 82(1), 209–240.

DeLoach, C. (1995). Hoover’s FBI: the inside story by Hoover’s trusted lieutenant. Washington,         D.C.: Lanham, MD: Regnery Pub

Drabble, J. (2004). To ensure domestic tranquility: The FBI, COINTELPRO-WHITE HATE          and political discourse, 1964–1971. Journal of American Studies, 38(2), 297–328.

Drabble, J. (2007). From white supremacy to white power: The FBI, COINTELPRO-WHITE             HATE, and the Nazification of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1970s. American Studies, 48(3),

Gill, P. (2012). Intelligence, threat, risk and the challenge of oversight. Intelligence & National     Security, 27(2), 206–222.

Powers, R. G. (1987). Secrecy and power: the life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York; London: Free      Press; Collier Macmillan.

Theoharis, A. G. (2004). The FBI & American democracy: a brief critical history. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Introduction of Project Subject - COINTELPRO

   In my research to determine whether politics had an effect on the way that COINTELPRO operations were conducted, and specifically if politics caused different approaches between anti-Klan and anti-New Left operations, it is critical to understand not just the anti-subversive function of the FBI, but also how such operations were undertaken.  For this discussion, I will review two sources I will be using in my study; an academic paper by John Drabble, and a report by the Comptroller General to the United States Congress.

   Drabble examines the FBI effort to discredit the image of the Klan in the communities “it” (there were multiple Klan organizations) operated within  (2004, p. 297).  He is answering the question of “how” the FBI conducted anti-Klan operations in one facet of their strategy.  The report of the Comptroller General attempts to answer the question of “how do we make domestic intelligence operations 'better' in terms of authority to initiate operations, the result of operations, how operations are conducted, how intelligence is shared, and the oversight of such operations (1976, p. I).

Drabble describes the tactics of the FBI used in their campaign of discrediting the Klan; intelligence was shared with local leaders that opposed the Klan who used the information in public, discord was sown within the rank and file of the Klan to discredit leadership, the patriotism of the Klan was called into question,  and prosecution of Klan leaders for perjury was sought to publicly discredit their honesty.  “Klan activity was depicted as a ‘'transgression of domestic tranquility’“(Drabble, 2004, p. 320).  Drabble's findings are in alignment with my own understanding of COINTELPRO operations in general.

   The Comptroller General's report states that “there is a continuing need for Intelligence collection with responsible oversight but with sufficient flexibility to do a job adequate to respond to changing conditions and needs” (1976, p. 217).  The report further noted there was not a consistent view of what constituted subversion, as “There is no way to say with assurance that these terms had at all times the same meaning or that persons concerned with them understood them the same way” (1976, p. 199).  I am still researching this report, but what I have read so far does match my expectations.

Drabble's study could be used in propaganda operations, if such operations were currently legal under domestic intelligence situations.  I think that portions of the report to Congress were used to reform the guidelines that the FBI operated within, but I have not matched this reports recommendations to the Levi guidelines yet.

   Drabble used a primarily qualitative approach to his research, by using anecdotal evidence from government reports, histories, and news sources.  The report by the Comptroller General used a primarily quantitative-based method, as “The recommendations are based on GAO's analysis of 898 domestic intelligence cases randomly sampled from a universe of 19,659” (1976, p. I).

I will be able to use both studies to examine FBI operations;  Drabble's will give me a base to compare operations against the Klan with operations against the New Left.  In addition, the government report is useful to me in that it discusses the mission of the FBI and the history that FBI domestic operations evolved in.

Comptroller General of the United States. (1976). FBI domestic intelligence operations--Their purpose and scope: Issues that need to be resolved (No. GGD-76-50). Retrieved October 3, 2014 from http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/113988.pdf

Drabble, J. (2004). To ensure domestic tranquility: The FBI, COINTELPRO-WHITE HATE and political discourse, 1964–1971. Journal of American Studies, 38(2), 297-328. http://doi.org/10.1017/S002187580400845X

   COINTELPRO is an acronym for COounter INTELlligence Program. There were several such programs from the 1950's through the 1970's. Prior to the intelligence scandals of the early 1970's the intelligence community had more leeway in dealing with security threats in general, and one of the primary missions of the FBI was counter subversion. FDR had ordered investigations of the Nazi (National Socialist) movement in America as early as 1934 (O'Reilly, 1982, p. 646).
    The COINTELPRO operations were a set of discrete programs aimed at certain movements; mostly versus Leftist groups, but the Klan and other right-wing groups were targeted as well. COINTELPRO operations were intended to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, neutralize or otherwise eliminate" these movements. There is a great deal of misinformation about these programs; the common meme is that the government was trying to silence the anti-war movement (Nixon did institute an Operation CHAOS targeted at the anti-war movement run by CIA and the Army, however). The base of much of this misinformation is that much of the "research" done on COINTELPRO has been conducted by Ward Churchill, a leftist whose bias can be understood in his characterization of the victims of the 9/11 attacks as "little Eichmanns"
    One of the primary methods the FBI used in COINTELPRO was the discrediting of the targeted movements by providing derogatory information to journalists, which is one of the methods discussed in the Drabble article.

O’Reilly, K. (1982). A New Deal for the FBI: The Roosevelt Administration, crime control, and national security. The Journal of American History, 69(3), 638–658. http://doi.org/10.2307/1903141

I may be working with an incomplete understanding of the qualitative method.  Tewksbury states that “numerical descriptions of things and their relationships is not the focus of qualitative research” and contends that “Qualitative research methods provide more emphasis on interpretation and providing consumers with complete views, looking at contexts, environmental immersions and a depth of understanding of concepts (2009, p. 39).  My view of qualitative research is of the interpretive mode.

Drabble uses the case study mode as Hagan defines it.  “Case study methods are in-depth, qualitative studies of one or a few illustrative cases” (2010, p. 231).  Drabble gathers his cases to study from FBI reports, news stories, and histories.

If I were to operationalize the data that Drabble provides, I could assign each instance of FBI activity against the Klan with a “value”, but any measurement I chose to define the value by, other than nominal, would need to be interpreted as to the relations between each other.  For example, I could assign an FBI action in which confidential information was provided to the media for publication as an “A” type of activity, but if I were to assign a value for the damage caused to the target on a 1-10 scale, I would have to interpret that value as some of the damage caused may be non-objective as far as measuring it.  To illustrate that last point, suppose that the FBI targeted two separate Klanmen, and informed both of the wives that their husband was having an affair with the result that both Klansmen get divorces; if one was unhappy with his marriage while the other was not, the damage caused would be different in each case.

Hagan, F. (2010). Essentials of research methods for criminal justice, 3rd Edition. Pearson Learning Solutions.

Tewksbury, R. (2009). Qualitative versus quantitative methods: Understanding why qualitative methods are superior for criminology and criminal justice. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology, 1(1), 38–58.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Challenges to Mission Accomplishment

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Challenges to Mission Accomplishment

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) faces a myriad of challenges in facing the threats presented to the security of the United States. Partisan politics, organizational issues, concerns about civil liberties, and interorganizational law enforcement relations all interfere with the ability of the FBI to serve their mission; since 9/11, the primary responsibility of the FBI is counterterrorism.

Political grandstanding and hackery is nothing new to American politics. One example of this affecting the FBI is in Sen. Leahy's attack on the Bush Administration by proxy of asserted FBI failures (United States Senate, 2006, p.4).

There are three organizational problems that the FBI faces. The first is their responsibility for multiple goals. Svendson notes that “A persistent but frequently overlooked problem for the FBI is balancing multiple roles” (2012, p.376). A GAO report highlights the issues with vacancies in the counterterror mission, partly a result of shifting agents fro the CT mission (2012). Agency turf problems are also an issue; “Federal Bureau of Investigation officials are in a turf battle with other federal law-enforcement agencies over perceived attempts to muscle into what the FBI considers its territory” (Grossman, 2014, para. 1). The third issue is internal security with the issue. A RAND study examines this issue, particularly in the context of mole Robert Hansson (Treverton et al, 2003).

Concerns about civil liberties also raise opposition to FBI methods. Berman contends that “a Federal Bureau of Investigation wielding robust domestic intelligence-collection powers poses a threat to civil liberties” (Berman, 2014, abstract). However, we have also seen the problems that arise when FBI intelligence operations are overly restrictive, and agents find themselves as “risk aversive”, as Powers would explain.(2004, p.47). This is an area in which effort must be made to balance security with freedom.

Other interorganizational issues may arise with the consideration of relations with local law enforcement agencies. The FBI's major contribution is “the ability to communicate and disseminate intelligence through FIGs has proven effective, greatly improving coordination between agencies at the federal, state,and local levels” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006, p. 6). There are those that would call for local agencies to be subordinate to the FBI, however those calls seem to ignore the system of checks and balances to central power that is the American federal system. Kincaid and Cole bring up the point that the major terror attacks on 9/11, in particular, the response of local agencies, “vindicated the values of self-government and the system of federalism” (2002, p.181). Fromme and Schwein use Operation Smokescreen as an example of successful agency cooperation, as opposed to hierarchical command (2007, p. 6).

Other examples of successful agency cooperation can be seen in the use of Intelligence Centers and Joint Task Forces. Each model is best used in the role it was created for, but both models benefit greatly from agency cooperation such as that illustrated in Operation Smokescreen. In the case of drug task forces, they “were designed to combine resources of many local police

departments and provide services across jurisdictions” (Reichert & Sylwestrzak, 2012, p.1). The mission of an intelligence center is to compile, analyze, and disseminate criminal or terrorist data, including public safety threats of all natures, and to support efforts to anticipate and criminal or terrorist activity (National Network  of Fusion Centers, 2014, p. 8). For all practical purposes, the intent and operations of the two models are the same.

References

Berman, E. (2014). Regulating domestic intelligence collection. Washington and Lee Law Review, 71(1), 3–91. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/ docview/1516782598?pq-origsite=summon

FBI oversight hearing before the committee on the judiciary  United states Senate. 109^th Congress Second session. Serial No. J–109–122, § Committee on the judiciary (2006). Washington, D. C.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2006). FBI’s field intelligence groups and police: Joining forces. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 75(5), 1–6. Retrieved October 3, 2014 from http://www2.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2006/may2006/may2006leb.htm

Fromme, R., & Schwein, R. (2007). Operation Smokescreen: A successful interagency collaboration. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 76(12), 20–25. Retrieved April 30, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/215270968?pq- origsite=summon

Grossman, A. (2014, August 26). FBI agents say rivals encroach on their turf. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved August 27, 2014 from http://online.wsj.com/articles/fbi-agents-say-rivals- encroach-on-their-turf-1409095148

Kincaid, J., & Cole, R. L. (2002). Issues of federalism in response to terrorism. Public Administration Review, 62(S1), 181–192. Retrieved September 28, 2014 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/197170960/3D62A896B4E846 83PQ/18?accountid=87314

National Network  of Fusion Centers. (2014). 2014–2017 National strategy  for the  national network of  fusion centers. Retrieved April 24, 2015 from https://nfcausa.org/html/National %20Strategy%20for%20the%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers.pdf

Powers, R. G. (2004). A bomb with a long fuse. American History, 39(5), 42–47. Retrieved September 10, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx? direct=true&db=a9h&AN=14624935&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Reichert, J., & Sylwestrzak, A. (2012). Examining multi-jurisdictional drug task force operations. Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. Retrieved August 22, 2014 from http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/ResearchReports/Examining_multi- jurisdictional_drug_task_force_operations_Aug2012.pdf

Svendsen, A. (2012). The Federal Bureau of Investigation and change: Addressing US domestic counter-terrorism intelligence. Intelligence & National Security, 27(3), 371–397. http://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.668080

Thornburgh, D.(2005). Transforming the FBI progress and challenges: A report by a panel of the National Academy of Public Administration for the U.S. Congress and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: National Academy of Public Adminstration. Retrieved May 20, 2015 from http://www.napawash.org/Pubs/FBI010505.pdf

Treverton, G. F., Darilek, R., Gabriele, M., Libicki, M., & Williams, W. (2003). Reinforcing security at the FBI. Santa Monica, CA. RAND Corporation.

United States General Accountability Office. (2012). FBI counterterrorism vacancies have declined but FBI has not assessed the long-term  sustainability of its  strategy for addressing  vacancies (No. GAO-12-533).