Preliminary Evaluation: Strategic Plan for Natural Disaster Response Training and Development

Board of Commissioners

Assignmentland Emergency Regional Authority

Preliminary Evaluation: Strategic Plan for Natural Disaster Response Training and Development

1. Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide the Board of Commissioners with the foundations for creating a strategic plan for training all personnel in our regional authority involved in emergency management.

2. Guidelines for the Strategic Plan

Our purpose in establishing guidelines is to train our employees in the procedures that will allow them to respond to critical incidents with maximum efficiency. “The public increasingly expects better public sector leadership before, during, and after catastrophic disasters (emergencies) and extreme events (crises) than it has seen in the past” (Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010, p. 452). To do so, we will look at the National Incident Management System (NIMS) guidelines, successful incident responses, and failed incident responses.

1. National Incident Management System (NIMS)

NIMS was developed in order to provide standard guidelines to emergency agencies, “The scope of its intended use is comprehensive, including mitigation, preparedness, response, and disaster recovery” (Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006, p.16) The key component of NIMS is in it's interoperability component.

1. Interoperability

Due to the necessity of having multiple agencies respond to an emergency crisis, it is imperative that training provides a framework for standardization between agencies, especially in communications. “One of the most prominent issues facing the public safety community today is the lack of communications interoperability, which is commonly defined by many as 'the ability of public safety emergency responders to communicate with whom they need to, when they need to, as authorized.' Communications interoperability serves as a vital tool for public safety and public service professionals” (The Governor's Office of Emergency Services,2011, para. 2).

2. Reviews of Successful Operations

We should look to California's emergency agencies for guidelines to develop our training plan. The success of the response to the 2009 wildfires demonstrated that their training guidelines were efficient. “Cal EMA evaluated that they had achieved successful response in the following areas; “efficient resource deployment; effective fire suppression and control, notification and alert, and sheltering operations; and well organized and rapid communications and coordination between state agencies and local governments, and state/federal partnership” (Cal EMA, n.d., p. 4)

3. Reviews of Failed Operations

There are many lessons to be learned from the Katrina response, but perhaps the greatest failure of significance was in the area of communications; “Research since Katrina...,shows that a higher percentage of respondents blamed “lack of communication between levels of government” for the Katrina debacle than for any other reason” (Garnett & Kouzmin, 2009. p.392). Communications must be emphasized in our training plan.

3. Expected Outcomes

In order that our training plan have any practical effect on incident response, we need to focus on the realities of our current level of preparedness and the effects the training will have on that level. “In order for response to be effective, planning and groundwork must be done to set an agreed-upon framework that will be employed in actual response efforts” (Wise, 2006, p. 312)

4. Anticipated Challenges

Hoskin and Wood attribute the failure to implement planned change to “incomplete organizational acceptance” (1993, para. 3). Jensen applies the concept of “organizational acceptance” specifically to emergency planning. In that “not all counties in the United States intend to implement the system they are mandated to use in the way it was designed [which] has important implications for the potential of the system to act as an organizing mechanism for emergency management” (2010, p. 96).

5. Implementation

This Board recommends the following steps be taken to implement our training plan.

1. Review and Implement NIMS Standards

2. Evaluate additional training requirements based upon actual response evaluations, both successful and failed.

3. Include an evaluation monitoring process in the training plan to match expected training goals to reality.

4. Recognize and provide additional training or resource support to agencies that may experience “organizational resistance”

5. Include realistic training exercises that take into account day to day operations of participating agencies.

References
Buck, D. A., Trainor, J. E., & Aguirre, B. E. (2006). A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS. Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, 3(3), 1–27. Retrieved February 3, 2015 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=i3h&AN=22625019&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Cal EMA. (n.d.). California Emergency Management Agency 2009 Los Angeles County Wildfires  after action / corrective action report: Executive summary.  Retrieved February 6, 2015 from
 http://www.calema.ca.gov/PlanningandPreparedness/Documents/2-%20Los%20Angeles%20County%20Fires%20Exec%20Summ%203_8_11%20Edits.pdf

Garnett, J., & Kouzmin, A. (2009). Crisis Communication Post Katrina: What are we Learning? Public Organization Review, 9(4), 385–398. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1007/s11115-009-0096-5

Hoskin, R., & Wood, S. (1993). Overcoming strategic planning disconnects. The Journal for Quality and Participation, 16(4), 50.  Retrieved February 19, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/219116713?pq-origsite=summon

Jensen, J. A. (2010). Emergency management policy: predicting National Incident Management System (NIMS) implementation behavior (Dissertation). North Dakota State University. Retrieved February 3, 2015 from https://cms-devel.ndsu.nodak.edu/fileadmin/emgt/Final_Dissertation_Complete.pdf

Kapucu, N., Arslan, T., & Demiroz, F. (2010). Collaborative emergency management and national emergency management network. Disaster Prevention and Management, 19(4), 452–468. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1108/09653561011070376

The Governor's Office of Emergency Services. (2011). Interoperable Communications Program. Retrieved February 8, 2015 from http://www.calema.ca.gov/TechnologyOperations/Pages/Communications-Interoperability-%28CICO%29.aspx
Wise, C. R. (2006). Organizing for Homeland Security after Katrina: Is Adaptive Management What’s Missing? Public Administration Review, 66(3), 302.  Retrieved February 5, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/197175662?pq-origsite=summon

Fictionland PD: Citizen Trust Initiative - SARA Summary

Fictionland Police Department Citizen Trust Initiative Summary of Research Design and Outcome Evaluation

Fictionland Police Department

Citizen Trust Initiative

Summary of Research Design and Outcome Evaluation

Table of Contents

1. Citizen Trust Initiative - Research Design
   1. Design Approach
   2. Design Approach Rationale
   3. Pros and Cons of Approach
   4. Complicating Factors
2. Citizen Trust Initiative - Outcome Evaluation Measures
   1. Objective - Equip all officers with body cameras
   2. Objective - Re-organization of the Internal Affairs Department
   3. Objective - Review of past citizen complaints
   4. Measurement Validity Rationale

In undertaking the Citizen Trust Initiative, we need to validate that the changes we make have positive, valid, and reliable results; we will establish a research design in order to asses the outcome of the program, and assign specific measurements against our objectives to weigh how successful these changes are in relation to our desired program goals.

1. Citizen Trust Initiative - Research Design
   1. Design Approach – The research design model we will be using is the simple pre-post testing model.
   2. Design Approach Rationale – The simple pre-post testing model will be used in that we are unable to use control groups in our measurement of our program; our target population lies in the community itself, but the measure we will use most often, the number of citizen complaints, is generated from contact with, to be redundant, the portion of the population that officers come into contact; in addition, we are unable to use multiple pre-tests due to the fact that our pre-test pool comes from a “unified” pool.
   3. Pros and Cons of Approach – On the positive side, the pre-post testing model is easy to use, and is the only model suitable for use in our situation; the negative consideration is that this model does not account for confounding factors.
   4. Potential Complicating Factors – The most likely confounding factors would be false citizen complaints generated in political bias and interference from special interest groups; Ferguson and the Zimmerman cases give us examples in which political considerations have developed a public presentation of a narrative devoid of relevant facts in these cases. The next most likely complicating issue is that we have three objectives aiming at the same goal; this may have the effect that it may be complicated to determine which of our three objectives has the most relevance in attaining our goal.
2. Citizen Trust Initiative - Outcome Evaluation Measures
   1. Objective - Equip all officers with body cameras
      1. The first measure will be in comparing the number of citizen complaints made before the change (pre-test) against the number of complaints made after the population of officers has been quipped with cameras (post-test)
      2. The second measure will be of a comparison in the number of use of force incidents prior to such equipage to the number of incidents after equipage.
   2. Objective - Re-organization of the Internal Affairs Department
      1. We return to the use of citizen complaints as a measurement; however, this will be a continuing evaluation post-intervention.
      2. The second use of citizen complaints will be a measurement of cases that can be validated as justified; the number of citizen claims as a whole can be seen a a measure of trust in the department, while the number of times that we find officer misconduct will reflect how well our officers have internalized our reforms and as a measure of how IAD has responded to the re-organization.
   3. Objective - Review of past citizen complaints
      1. The pre-test measure will be a ratio of citizen complaints against the number of validated complaints prior to the review; the post-test will be a comparison in how many of the reviewed cases were found to be reviewed incorrectly by the previous iteration of IAD.
      2. The second measure will be a comparison of officer discipline cases generated through citizen complaints pre-review to the number of cases after reviewing the same cases.
   4. Measurement Validity Rationale – We justify the use of citizen complaints as a primary measure of trust in the department on three bases; face validity, content validity, and criterion-related validity. The number of citizen complaints satisfies the requirements of face validity due it the value of direct feedback after officer interaction. We are also satisfied that this method of measurement covers the range of public trust in the department, meeting content validity requirements. Finally, we feel that the use of this measure can reliably be correlated with other data-collection measures such as use of force incidents and officer discipline cases.

The Citizen's Trust Initiative must successfully prove to the public that the focus of the department is in fulfilling our criminal justice mission fairly and equitably; to do so requires that objective, not subjective, measures are taken of interactions between our officers and the community, and the consequences thereof.

Fictionland PD: Citizen Trust Initiative - Action and Monitoring Plan

Fictionland Draft

Fictionland Police Department: Citizen Trust Initiative

1. The Smith/Jones case has demonstrated several issues within the department, leading to a loss of public trust; racism, lack of profesionalism, and a lack of integrity. The Fictionland PD has instituted a program of reorganization and review designed to remove unprofessional officers and ensure a higher level of community trust. We have chosen to implement a program because we have found no issues with our current policy, and we feel that a combination approach involving the re-organization of IAD, the outfitting of officers with body cameras, and a review of citizen complaints will put this department back on the right footing to build trust with the community.

2. The Citizen Trust Initiative composes of 3 action items designed to review past problems, remove troublesome officers, and provide accountability in the department as a whole.“ This period of innovation has demonstrated that police can prevent crime and can improve their relationships with the communities they serve” (Braga & Weisburd, 2006, pp.3,4) “Recent calls for improved “accountability” of state bureaucracies are a manifestation of society’s increased concern towards appropriate execution and satisfactory performance of public services “ quote Moore (Cabral & Lazzarini, 2010, p.2) “research on legitimacy and procedural justice supports the proposition that police can reduce the conflict simply by explaining their actions to the public.” (Fischer, 2014, p.4)

1. Re-organization of the Internal Affairs Department“deviant officials may use various channels of influence to obstruct evidence collection and affect the final judgment; similarly, investigating commissions may refrain from punishing top colleagues and turn a blind eye to certain deviations that are considered as “normal” among police officers “ (Cabral & Lazzarini, 2010, p.3) “One of the issues in police management is the code of silence”(Gottschalk, 2011, p.169)

1. All officers in IAD are subject to transfer to other departments
2. IAD officers that watched the Smith/Jones tape will be transferred
3. Evidence logs and witness testimony will be examined to determine who saw the tape

2. Equip all officers with body cameras(Silver, 2014) Ars Technica discusses four cases in which body cameras exonerated policemen in complaints, including complaints based upon edited footage of indicents.

1. The entire community of officers, including most undercover operators, will wear such cameras
2. We expect to reduce both complaints and assaults on officersWe can measure these results by simple comparison with previous data
3. gggb

3. All reported complaints by citizens will be reviewed by the Chief's Office

1. Citizens complaints from the last year will be reviwed
2. Officers who are found to have committed breaches of proffesionalism or criminal acts will be reprimanded, terminated, or charged as necessary
3. Either physical or recorded evidence that counters officer testimony will be considered

3. Target Polulation
4. How are targets selected and recruited for the intervention?
5. Define program components such as the precise nature, amount, and sequence of activities—Who does what to whom, in what order, and how much?
6. Define the job descriptions of the staff and list the skills and training required. “Creating a specialized assignment to address a problem appears to increase the likelihood that action plans will be implemented.”(Brown & Scott, 2007, p. 13)

“policemisuseofforceproblemsthathavealwaysexistedare

finallybeingbroughttothepublic’sattentionthroughmediasourcesand

politicalagendas” (Archbold & Maguire, 2002, p. 225)

“thedefinitionofexcessiveforceisopentointerpretationby

researchersandpolicepersonnelwhokeeptrackofexcessiveforcecases” (Archbold & Maguire, 2002, p. 230)

“Pate&Fridell,1993).Theinappropriateuseofforce

haspotentiallydevastatingconsequencesforthe

policeorganization,thepublic,andtherelationship

betweenthepoliceandthecommunity.Thegoodwill” (Brandl, Stroshine, & Frank, 2001, p. 521)

“officersaremorelikelytouseforce

againstsuspectsoftheirownrace” quote Alpert&Dunham (Brandl, Stroshine, & Frank, 2001, p. 523)

“Success in policing is enhanced when the police can gain and maintain support from the

public. In individual encounters with residents, police benefit when people are willing to accept

and defer to the appropriate use of police authority, rather than starting the encounter with

feelings of hostility and resistance. Further, if people have a high degree of respect for their local

police and the law, they are more likely to obey the law, including relatively minor traffic laws “(Fischer, 2014, p.8)

“Integrity in public office demands open and transparent decision making and clarity about the primacy of a public official's duty to serve the public interest “(Gottschalk, 2011, p.171)

Archbold, C. A., & Maguire, E. R. (2002). Studying civil suits against the police: A serendipitous finding of sample selection bias. Police Quarterly, 5(2), 222–249. Retrieved August 10, 2014 from http://pqx.sagepub.com/content/5/2/222.short

Braga, A. A., & Weisburd, D. L. (2006). Police Innovation and Crime Prevention: Lessons Learned from Police Research over the Past 20 Years. Retrieved August 23, 2014 from http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/218585.pdf?q=ideas-in-american-policing

Brandl, S. G., Stroshine, M. S., & Frank, J. (2001). Who are the complaint-prone officers?: An examination of the relationship between police officers’ attributes, arrest activity, assignment, and citizens’ complaints about excessive force. Journal of Criminal Justice, 29(6), 521–529. Retrieved August 10, 2014 from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047235201001143

Brown, R., & Scott, M. S. (2007). Implementing responses to problems. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved November 8, 2014 from http://www.popcenter.org/tools/pdfs/implementing_responses.pdf

Cabral, S., & Lazzarini, S. G. (2010). Guarding the Guardians: An Analysis of Investigations against Police Officers in an Internal Affairs Division. Retrieved August 10, 2014 from http://extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2010/cabral_lazzarini.pdf

Fischer, C. (2014). Legitimacy and Procedural Justice:  A New Element of Police Leadership. Police Executive Research Forum. Retrieved August 10, 2014 from http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Leadership/legitimacy%20and%20procedural%20justice%20-%20a%20new%20element%20of%20police%20leadership.pdf

Gottschalk, P. (2011). Management challenges in law enforcement: the case of police misconduct and crime. International Journal of Law and Management, 53(3). Retrieved August 22, 2014 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/868256452?pq-origsite=summon

Silver, J. (2014, June 21). Candid camera, part 2: Four times that video evidence exonerated cops | Ars Technica. Ars Technica. Retrieved August 25, 2014 from http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/candid-camera-part-2-four-times-that-video-evidence-exonerated-cops/

GED Program Selection Review

GED Program Selection Review

Due to decreasing budget allocations or educational purposes, the DOC has decided to choose one of two programs to assist inmates with securing a GED. The first program is Education First; Education First has a cost of $500 per inmate, and a success rate of 50%. The second program is GED Prep, which has a cost of $5,000 per inmate and a success rate of 80%. GED Prep is 60% more effective as a program than Education First, but at costs of 1000% the rate of GED Prep. Now we must look at the costs of failure; 80% of inmates without a high school degree that are released return to prison, while 40% of inmates with a high school degree that are released return to prison. The cost of keeping an inmate in prison is at $32,000 per year.^*

Let us compare the two programs per groups of 10 prisoners:

Education First

10 inmates at $500 each = $5,000

5 inmates pass, of whom 2 return to prison

2 recidivists at $32000 = $64,000

5 inmates fail, of whom 4 return to prison

4 recidivists at $32000 = $128,000

Total Cost of Education First for 1 year = $197,000

Cost of Education First per additional recidivist year of prison time = $192,000

GED Prep

10 inmates at $5000 each = $50,000

8 inmates pass, of whom 3.2 return to prison

3.2 recidivists at $32000 = $102,400

2 inmates fail, of whom 1.6 return to prison

1.6 recidivists at $32000 = $51,200

Total Cost of GED Prep = $203, 600

Cost of GED Prep per additional recidivist year of prison time = $153,600

In comparing the cost per year of these programs, there are two comparisons to make; the first of which is the initial cost, and the second is the cost per additional year of recidivist incarceration. There is a difference of $6,600 per 10 inmates per recidivist year in prison, or $660 per inmate for the initial year of prison time, with the Education First program being the cheaper. However, for every additional year of recidivist incarceration, GED Prep saves DOC $38,400 per 10 inmates, or $3,840 per inmate. To finalize the comparison, the average length of incarceration for recidivist offenders would be needed. However, figures provided by BJS would be inaccurate to use because “Inmates whose sentence was less than 1 year were also excluded” (Durose, Cooper, & Snyder, 2014, p ,17). The lack of accurate tracking is compounded by the fact that this is the population that would prove it cost effective to use the services of Education First.

The interim recommendation is to use the services of Education First until an accurate count of recidivist sentences can be compiled which compares the number of sentences with a duration under a year against an aggregate of sentencing in which the years after the first year were counted.

References

Durose, M. R., Cooper, A. D., & Snyder, H. N. (2014). Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Retrieved November 21, 2014 from https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/BJS%20recidivism%20study,%202014.pdf

*All figures provided by DOC

Fictionland PD Goal Statement

Analyzing Goals

Course Name: Criminal Justice Planning and Innovation

Course Code: MCJ6004

Week: Two

Assignment: Three

Assignment Name: Analyzing Goals

Case Scenario: Smitty Correctional Facility (SCF) is entertaining the idea of creating a job training program for its clients — prison inmates.

SCF has established a goal statement that reads as follows:

“SCF is committed to equipping inmates to lead healthy, pro-social lives upon re-entry into the general population.”

One objective, among many, is to provide inmates with marketable job skills to increase their chances of landing a job upon release. They know that employment is a key factor in preventing offender recidivism.

SCF has approached the Smitty City Chamber of Commerce (SCCC) to help them. The SCCC solicited bids from private companies that are interested in low-cost inmate labor. Jailbird Enterprises has won the bid and will pay the correctional facility a sizeable fee to establish a manufacturing base within the correctional facility. Jailbird Enterprises specializes in making rubber bands. Other companies that lost the bid specialized in training bookkeepers, travel agents, and software developers.

• What are the problems with the interagency arrangement in the case provided? Explain, in relation to this case scenario, when an organization should seek and when it should avoid interagency cooperation.

The first problem with the arrangement is that the objective is unlikely to be achieved from a real world perspective. To begin with, employers do not want to hire convicts; “A survey in five major U.S. cities found that 65 percent of all employers said they would not knowingly hire an ex-offender (regardless of the offense)” (Petersilia, 2001, para .23). In addition, Visher suggests that convicts are unlikly to be stable employees; “the poor employment histories and job skills of returning prisoners create diminished prospects for stable employment” (2003, p.95). Visher continues with the thought that convicts that successfully re-enter the workforce do so because they were stable employees prior to incarceration; “it is important to examine an individual’s preprison stakes in conformity and ties to conventional activities, through legitimate work and other behavior, to fully understand individual transitions from prison to the community and eventual reintegration” (2003, p.95).

The second issue is the expectation of training convicts to be software developers and bookkeepers as a marketable skills objective. These are skill sets that require higher levels of intelligence, which the majority of convicts do not posess. Diamond, Morris, and Barnes report that “the literature suggests that IQ – at the individual and macro-level – is negatively correlated with crime and this effect remains after controlling for possible confounds such as age, race, gender, and socioeconomic status”: Diamond et al associate this to prison studies by reporting that the studies “suggest that IQ is not related to the risk of criminal apprehension and provides support for the use of official reports in studying IQ” (2012, p.116).

Correctional agencies should always seek interagency cooperation, even with private enterprise, to seek cost-effective means of reducing recidivism. Wilson and Chapman discuss the fragmented nature of the criminal justice system, the input of the community, and re-entry issues. They report on the Tennessee Justice Summit which was held to seek common ground amongst stakeholders. This report suggests that coordination and consensus are important to deal with issues tthat are beyond the means of amy single agency to resolve (Wilson & Chapman, 2006).

• Will this collaborative effort with Jailbird Enterprises threaten SCF’s goal?

It is unlikely that the collaborative efforts could have a negative impact on SCF's goal. There are those that believe these kinds of programs to have positive effects; Wheeler & Patterson “found that vocational training and work release programs were effective for reducing recidivism “ (2008, p.145) For those, who as Visher suggested were likely to be able to hold a stake in legitimate behavior, this program may help. For McDonough states “Work is also a core value in our society, and able-bodied adults are expected by the citizenry to work and pay their own vvay”(2008, p. 71). And even if high school dropuuts arne't being trained to be brain surgeons, there is value in any kind of work;“Changing offender attitudes about work,developing a commitment to work andgiving them the skills to locate, secure,and maintain gainful employment.”(McDonough, 2008, p. 76).

References

Diamond, B., Morris, R. G., & Barnes, J. C. (2012). Individual and group IQ predict inmate violence. Intelligence, 40(2), 115–122. doi:10.1016/j.intell.2012.01.010

McDonough, J., William D. (2008). Offender Workforce Development: A New (and Better?) Approach to an Old Challenge. Federal Probation, 72(2), 71–76. Retrieved November 17, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pbh&AN=36530741&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Petersilia, J. (2001). When Prisoners Return to Communities: Political, Economic, and Social Consequences. Federal Probation, 65(1), 3. Retrieved November 17, 2014 from http://web.b.ebscohost.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/ehost/detail/detail?sid=da792b0f-f642-418b-9715-c17cb133e72e%40sessionmgr198&vid=1&hid=128&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=pbh&AN=5124169

Visher, C. A. T., Jeremy. (2003). TRANSITIONS FROM PRISON TO COMMUNITY: Understanding Individual Pathways. Annual Review of Sociology, 29(1), 89–113. Retrieved November 17, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pbh&AN=10878540&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Wheeler, D. P., & Patterson, G. (2008). Prisoner Reentry. Health & Social Work, 33(2), 145–147.

Retrieved November 17, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pbh&AN=32005954&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Wilson, J. A., & Chapman, G. (2006). Finding Common Ground: Building Consensus Among Criminal Justice Stakeholders. Corrections Compendium, 31(4), 7–10. Retrieved November 17, 2014 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/211805073?pq-origsite=summon

Fictionland Police Department Planning Division Preliminary Needs Assessment: Department Response to Racial Profiling and Police Brutality

Fictionland Police Department

Planning Division

Preliminary Needs Assessment: Department Response to Racial Profiling and Police Brutality

A videotape of Ofc. Tim Smith in the process of racially profiling, physically assaulting, and arresting without cause a citizen has been released to the public. The videotape flatly contradicted the findings of the Fictionland Police Department Internal Affairs Department in clearing Smith's actions. This videotape spotlights not only the officer's malfeasance, but also exposes issues such as the failure of the Fictionland Police Department Internal Affairs Department to do it's job correctly, a potential problem with the direction of our departmental culture, tension between the department and the minority community, and finally the degradation of the department's reputation within the community as a whole. This preliminary report will address the methods by which we will analyze these issues and propose changes to the department to correct and resolve the issues. We will be using the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment) model of analysis This preliminary report will focus on the Scanning component of the SARA model, primarily in “identifying recurring problems of concern to the public and the police.”, “confirming that the problems exist”, and “developing broad goals”.(Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, n.d., para. 2) Bradley and Connors define a “needs assessment” in terms of answering questions about the conditions a program is intended to address and the need for it. (2007, p.7) First, the need for change must be documented, and the data that will be used must be identified. Secondly, potential causes for these issues must be identified, Third, we must identify all concerned parties, or stakeholders, and identify their interests in these issues. Fourth and finally, there will be influences that will either resist or support proposed changes, and these influences need to be identified. We must recognize any factors that will redirect our department's efforts to providing equal and honest service to all citizens.

The need for documentation serves two purposes. In the first, we must not compound the breach of public trust which the videotape exposed. By documenting collected data, we will fulfill our obligation for public oversight and accountability. In the second, full documentation will allow us to maintain all data in a structured format for accessible analysis. One issue in the process of analysis is the selection of relevant data. “Unstructured analyses typically result in large amounts of data, confusion over the meaning of data, and non-analysis-driven responses”. (Bynum, 2001, p.5) We will need to collect information regarding profiling and abuse complaints over the last five years, IAD reports in that period, chain of custody of the Smith tape, we will need indicators of other of the relation between the police and the minority community,and political alliance information regarding all stakeholders.

It is obvious, based on what we have seen in the Smith video and in IAD's handling of that case, that there is some level of racism and dishonesty in the department's culture. Multiple people in the department will have seen the tape, yet the tape was leaked by someone in the department who felt that there was no credibility in the department to turn to for a just resolution in the case. Thus we can identify racism and dishonesty as potential causes for the issues the department is experiencing. However, we should not focus on quick and easy resolutions when there may be other causes for these issues. “Problem-solving projects can be complex. In action research, the team is expected to persist until success is achieved, refining and improving an intervention in the light of what is learned from earlier experiences.”(Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2014, para. 3) Is it possible that IAD thought they were protecting the department from the Michael Brown school of reporting? Perhaps IAD understood the level of Ofc. Smith's abuses and make a political decision to cover up his actions in order to protect the department's reputation. Finally, it is likely that there are multiple causes that can create problems that can reinforce each other; in a community in which assaults against the police are above average, do the police have in turn a higher use of force then the norm? Unless all causes are identified and remedied, then there will continue to be problems. Brown and Scott identify one reason that problem oriented initiatives may fail; “the real contributing or causal factors were not discovered” (2007, p. 2) It must be acknowledged however, that in the discussion of possible causes for tension between the police department and the minority community, that no justification can be found for Pfc. Smith's actions.

A list of interested parties will include the police department and constituent sub-groups within the department, such as the police chief and the police union. The mayor's office and the municipal office of civil rights will represent the community at large. The Center for Justice and local churches in the minority community will be concerned parties. The media will also play a part. The importance of recognizing all these stakeholders as part of the problem solving process can not be emphasized enough; ”situations might require the early involvement of key individuals or groups when determining the order of analysis activities”(Bynum, 2001, p.7) In addition, identifying agents who may play a part in support or in resistance to proposed changes becomes necessary;“Response plans that enjoy grassroots community support tend to be more likely to be implemented than those without it because you can convert such support into political influence, which can mobilize resources and action”(Brown & Scott, 2007, p.8)

The support or resistance by stakeholders to any given solution proposal is hard to predict until a specific proposal in made; but to illustrate the point that Brown and Scott make let us look at the forces in relation to a relatively neutral policy proposal; the equipping of police officers with body cameras. White finds that “Most of the empirical studies document a reduction in citizen complaints against the police and, in some cases, similar reductions in use of force and assaults on officers.” (2014, p.35) This directly addresses two of the issues that we are targeting for solution. The mayor's office may support or resist this idea depending on budget factors, but the civil rights office would support the proposal. The chief's office would support the proposal, but the union may be opposed on the basis of officer privacy. We would expect the leaders of the local churches to support the policy. The support or resistance by the Center for Justice depends on whether the Center is more interested in equal and honest enforcement of the law, or is more interested in pursuing “solutions” v based on identity politics, in which “A person is what his or her race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual preference is, and members of a particular category can be represented -- understood, empathized with -- only by persons of the same identity. “(Will, 2009, para.7)

References

Be guided by SARA – but not led astray. (2014) Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. Retrieved November 8, 2014 from http://www.popcenter.org/learning/60steps/index.cfm?stepNum=7

Bradley, K., & Connors, E. (2007). Training evaluation model: Evaluating and improving criminal justice training. Institute for Law and Justice. Retrieved November 8, 2014 from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/244478.pdf

Brown, R., & Scott, M. S. (2007). Implementing responses to problems. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved November 8, 2014 fromhttp://www.popcenter.org/tools/pdfs/implementing_responses.pdf

Bynum, T. S. (2001). Using analysis for problem-solving:

A guidebook for law enforcement. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice Office of Community-oriented Policing Services. Retrieved November 8, 2014 from http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e08011230.pdf

The SARA Model . (n.d) Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. Retrieved November 8, 2014 from http://www.popcenter.org/about/?p=sara

White, M. D. (n.d.). Police ofifcer body-worn cameras:Assessing the evidence. Washington, D.C.: OJP Diagnostic Center, U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved November 8, 2014 from http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=6525606

Will, G. (2009, May 27).Identity Justice: Obama's Conventional Choice. Washington Post . Retrieved November 8, 2014 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/26/AR2009052602348.html

Family Dynasties in the Criminal Justice System: Born Leaders, or Nepotist Opportunists?

Family Dynasties in the Criminal Justice System: Born Leaders, or Nepotist Opportunists?

Mayor Crawley and his family have held a prominent amount of influence over our local criminal justice system. Their multi generational service in office can be considered in the terms of political dynasty. This type of dynasty in criminal justice leads to several questions. Is there such as thing as a born leader? Are effective leaders people who have been shaped by the events and circumstances that they encountered in their lives? Did the various members of the Crawley family rise to positions of power and leadership due to innate personal qualities or skills of leadership acquired from experience in dealing with people? What part does social exchange theory play in the family success? Do criminal justice leaders benefit from charismatic leadership traits, or from skills gained through structured leadership training?

The term “born leader” is commonly used in popular culture when referring to someone who demonstrates leadership skills. However, there are, says Fiedler, no born leaders, “merely people with the potential to be successful leaders under certain conditions or resounding failures under other condition” (1976, p. 7). Alina contradicts Fiedler by suggesting a division in the origination of leadership; “ leaders are 1/3 born, 1/3 educated, and 1/3 is left to their choice to cultivate or not their talents.” (2013, p.213). One factor that must be explored as a potential contributor to political dynasty is the “anti-leadership” concept of nepotism, which is the “ the first principle of human political interaction” (Kuznar & Frederick, 2007, p.30). Nepotism can have the opposite results of leadership: “Working under a person who is clearly incompetent places a non-family member in a highly unattractive position” (de Vries, 1993, p.64); this applies “especially in the public sector through merit systems supposedly designed to ensure that only the most qualified applicants are hired or promoted” ( Pelletier & Bligh, 2008, p. 828). There is no evidence of nepotism in the success of the Crawley family, but neither is there evidence of effective leadership, other then the holding of political office.

Whether nepotist or meritocratic in origination, the participation in a dynastic family can have positive effects on a person's leadership traits in a similar fashion to other leaders who have been shaped by the events and circumstances that they encountered in their lives. A person growing up in the Crawley household would have been exposed to leadership issues within the criminal justice system throughout the formative years of their childhood. “This kind of knowledge may give family members a head start” (de Vries, 1993, p.63). Certainly, the drive to hold office can be “inherited”; Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Synder suggest “that a longer tenure induces a public service vocation in some family members” (2009, p. 116).

What other traits or skills could be “inherited”?Would it be traits, or perhaps skills that would be more likely to push a leader to success? Alina continues the train of thought regarding where leadership originates, and contends that in any case, “You can't become a great leader by waiting; you have to chase every opportunity to exercise your skills” (2013, p. 213). Fiedler disputes this idea; “Empirical studies of leadership training generally reveal the same disappointing results. On the average , people with much training perform about as well as people with little or no training” (1976, p. 6). Dal Bó et al raise the possibility that “persistent inequalities in political attainment reflect hereditary inequalities in talent and drive. If traits such as talent run in families, this may yield persistent advantages to some families that are not due to their already occupying positions of authority” (2009, p. 115).

Social exchange theory may also play a part in the establishment of political dynasty. If leaders can establish loyalty and patronage through rewards systems, then a longer period in office allows for the ability “to accumulate an asset that he then bequests like financial or human capital, name recognition, or contacts.” (Dal Bó et al, 2009, p. 116 ). And, “it would appear that 'brand name' identification is worth something in politics” (Hess, 2000, para. 10). Dal Bó et al conclude that “the longer one's tenure, the more likely one is to establish a political dynasty and that this relationship is causal” (2009, P. 128).

Criminal justice leaders can benefit from charismatic leadership traits, just as they can from skills gained through structured leadership training. Using the “Adjustment “ trait of the Big Five Model, an effective leader will use the best approach for any given situation. Another perspective of this is contingency theory, which asserts that certain leaders are compatible with certain situations that change based on variables. (Haberfeld, 2013, p. 97)

References

Alina, M. D. (2013). Leadership between skill and competency. Manager, (17), 208-214. Retrieved November 22, 2014 from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1518528941?accountid=87314

Dal Bó, E., Dal Bó, P., and Snyder, J. (2009) Political dynasties. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 76, No. 1, pp. 115-142. Retrieved November 22, 2014 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20185086

de Vries, M. K. (1993). The Dynamics of Family Controlled Firms: The Good and the Bad News. Organizational Dynamics, 21(3), 59-71. Retrieved November 22, 2014 from http://web.b.ebscohost.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=eecd714d-66ee-49b7-b13d-3ef7ad274967%40sessionmgr111&vid=5&hid=118

Fiedler, F. E. (1976). The Leadership Game: Matching the Man to the Situation. Organizational Dynamics, 4(3), 6-16. Retrieved November 22, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pbh&AN=5140621&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Haberfeld, M. R. (2013). Police leadership: Organizational and managerial decision making process (2nd Ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.

Hess, S. (2000, February 27). Political Dynasties: An American Tradition. Brookings. Retrieved November 22, 2014 from http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2000/02/27elections-hess

Kuznar, L. A., & Frederick, W. (2007). Simulating the effect of nepotism on political risk taking and social unrest. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 13(1), 29-37. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10588-006-9008-1

Pelletier, K. L., & Bligh, M. C. (2008). The aftermath of organizational corruption: Employee attributions and emotional reactions. Journal of Business Ethics, 80(4), 823-844. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-007-9471-8

Transition of Leadership Styles in Bay Harbor

MCJ6405: Organizational Leadership

Week 2
Assignment 4
Transition of Leadership Styles in Bay Harbor

Problem Statement

The leadership style of a criminal justice leader, such as a police chief, may have some bearing on the effectiveness of that organization.

Can the leader-member exchange (LMX) theory be used to describe the relationship that Murray and Johnson shared with their subordinates? Why or why not?

Although the term “favorites” was used in the description of Murray's relationship with some officers, the benefits that those officers received was not greater then the other officers in the department. If one looks at the difference between the treatment between the “favorites” and the non-“favorites” on a transactional basis, then LMX theory can't be used. LMX theory is predicated on a “mutual reciprocation of rewards within the relationship” (Barbuto Jr & Gifford, 2012, p.19). Since the rewards that both set of officers received was the same, there is no basis to consider this as a LMX situation. On the other hand, if one discounts the notion of “favorite” officers, one could see the application LMX theory as Johnson “traded” professional latitude for personal loyalty and team commitment in regards to the entire department

In a similar analysis, LMX theory cannot be used to describe Johnson's relationship with the department. All officers are subject to Johnson's directive style of leadership, and there is no description of rewards flowing in either direction, much less of a mutual exchange. If one were to describe Johnson's style in terms of LMX theory, it would have to be described as “low-exchange”, at best.

Does Johnson's style differ from participative leadership? If yes, why? If no, what level of participative leadership does he appear to use?

Johnson uses a directive style of leadership with no appearance of participative leadership. Instead of giving officers “influence over decisions that will affect them” (Yukl, 2012, p. 52), a major component of participative leadership, Johnson is described as making all decisions except those that officers have to make in emergencies.

What are the potential benefits and pitfalls of hiring someone with Chief Johnson's style for the position at Bay Harbor? Why?

The prime benefit of Johnson's leadership style, which may also be described as directive or authoritarian, is that there is one point of responsibility. If there is an issue with the way a program or policy is handled, the city can turn directly to Johnson for corrective action. The second benefit is that decisions can be made quickly; Johnson does not need to get feedback from clients or officers, he does not need to wait on a committee to research an issue, he does not need approval from a second level of command.

There are two major problems with this style; the first is that it has the potential for alienating employees, as some of the members of the committee noted. The potential is that some employees may lose trust in Johnson's leadership if they find it to be abusive; “If abusive supervision takes place frequently or lasts for a long time, it invariably causes employees’ antipathy and then brings about subordinates’ distrust.” (Xiaqi, Kun, Chongsen, & Sufang, 2012, p. 260) The second is that in areas in which Johnson is lacking expertise, he is likely to make mistakes in his decision-making.

How do Murray and Johnson use the normative decision model according to their styles of leadership? What are the differences in their approaches in adopting this model?

Murray used the consult(individual) model and encouraged informal communications. Johnson uses the decide model. It appears from the description that neither chief varied from their chosen model depending on the situation, in other words, that they continued to use that model of decision-making in all situations.

What could be reasons for Chief Johnson's lack of delegation? What approach should he use to delegate and empower officers at Bay Harbor?

It is likely that Johnson chooses a directive leadership policy based on his personality and experience. It is also possible that Johnson chooses to use this model to deflect responsibility for officer actions which are undertaken outside the sphere of Johnson's sphere of decision-making.

Is participative leadership more effective depending on the size of the department? Why? How does Murray's delegation and empowerment of his subordinates benefit a police department?

It is not the size of the organization that affects the effectiveness of the participative leadership model as much as it is the competence of the people doing the job. Participative leadership requires participants that can make effective decisions, even if that decision is to call in a supervisor to make the call. The prime example of a benefit that the Bay Harbor PD received from the effective use of this model was the high level of employee satisfaction. In addition, the department enjoyed the respect and trust of the citizenry.

What principles of dyadic relationships should Johnson use for correcting performance deficiencies at Bay Harbor? Why?

If Johnson wishes to be an effective leader, he should use the following guidelines that Yukl describes: gather information about the performance problem; try to avoid attribution biases; describe the deficiency briefly in specific terms; explain the adverse impact of ineffective behavior; stay calm and professional; mutually identify the reasons for inadequate performance; ask the person to suggest remedies; express confidence that the person can improve; express a sincere desire to help the person; reach agreement on specific action steps; summarize the discussion and verify agreement. Yukl explains that “Effective managers take a supportive, problem-solving approach when dealing with inappropriate behavior or deficient performance by a subordinate.” (2012, p.28)

References

Barbuto Jr, J. E., & Gifford, G. T. (2012). Motivation and leader-member exchange: Evidence counter to similarity attraction theory. International Journal of Leadership Studies. 7(2). Retrieved November 10, 2014 from http://www.regent.edu/acad/global/publications/ijls/new/vol7iss1/IJLS_Vol7Iss1_Winter2011.pdf#page=28

Yukl, G. A. (2012). Leadership in Organizations, 8th Edition. [VitalSource Bookshelf version]. Retrieved November 16, 2014 from http://digitalbookshelf.southuniversity.edu/books/9781256650225/id/ch03lev2sec2

Xiaqi, D., Kun, T., Chongsen, Y., & Sufang, G. (2012). Abusive supervision and LMX. Chinese Management Studies, 6(2), 257–270. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1108/17506141211236695