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Showing posts with label Discussion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Discussion. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 13, 2016

Implications of COINTELPRO study



A study of this nature is limited in focus in order to understand the effects of one factor;  in this case, the factor was limited to Hoover's use of political tactics, as in the bureaucratic politics model, to promote and protect the interests of the Bureau.  However, starting from this narrow focus leads to the extrapolation of it's application to other factors and from there to wider implications of COINTELPRO as a concept.

Further research could involve exploring the relationship between other factors and the efficiency of COINTELPRO;  the other factors including the internal culture of the FBI, personality conflicts between Hoover and sitting Presidents (in particular, Hoover's conflict with Nixon), personality conflicts within the Bureau (such as the one between Hoover and Sullivan), public opinion shifts, the focus of Hoover on leftism as a result of foreign agency rather than as a threat of its own accord, the possibility that Hoover's advanced age left him relatively incompetent to keep using such tactics, in the timing of Hoover's death and the almost simultaneous legal trouble that the Nixon White House put itself into, and possibly that the liberal block of politicians that supported COINTELPRO against the KKK withdrew that support when those methods were directed at leftists.  The exploration of issues surrounding the efficiency of COINTELPRO can in turn shed light on cultural, leadership, and political issues that affect domestic security issues in general.

However, the nature of COINTELPRO itself has leads to a debate on the merits of using these methods in a free society. Wilson (1978) defends the use of such tactics although the majority of opinion finds such tactics undemocratic, illegal, and/or immoral.  The resolution of this question lies partly in these questions, which in turn raise additional questions:
What is the relationship between effective security operations and the rights of individuals in a Republic?
What is subversion?
How does a Republic define a security threat?
Is leftism/socialism an ideology that is inherently hostile to liberty?
Is Islam an ideology that is inherently hostile to liberty?
At what point does organized crime move from a criminal threat to a security threat?
Is there a conflict between security and freedom, or is there a method to balance these concerns?

Obviously, these are not simple questions, and highly subject to politics in study and in application.  In the history of the domestic security of the United States, from the original Alien and Sedition Act through the mass NSA surveillance of Americans today, there develops a clear pattern of overreaction and failure.  An initial overreaction to security concerns that lead to abuses of liberty that lead to a curtailment of the ability of security agencies to perform their function that lead to a spectacular failure that result in overreaction.  One example of this involves COINTELPRO.  The Nixon administration felt that anti-war protestors as a whole were subversive, and that FBI efforts (including NEW LEFT) were not enough.  The White House then developed the Huston Plan targeted at the anti-war movement (which was not completely a New Left action, although New Left members often led segments of the anti-war movement). The methods used under this plan were clearly illegal, and the public was made aware of these abuses at roughly the same time as other programs such as the COINTELPRO operations were exposed.  The Church Committee was the catalyst for overreaction in the restriction of security agencies.  Powers (2004) contends that the reforms that were born as a result of that overreaction caused a hesitation to act in FBI agents that may have been a factor in the intelligence failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks.  In the "Homeland Security" reforms that were a response to those attacks, the PATRIOT ACT was composed.  We see the wheel make the complete turn as the mass surveillance of the public in general by the NSA was justified on the basis of the PATRIOT ACT.

The failure to make sound policy decision based on honest and full research leads to overreaction and extremes in operational guidelines that cyclically lead to the abuse of liberty and the failure to protect the country.  The investigation of the bureaucratic politics model in relation to efficient domestic security policy is simply the first step in examining all factors that affect domestic security.  Certainly, the underlying justice of security operations plays a part in their efficiency.



Powers, R. G. (2004). A bomb with a long fuse. American History, 39(5), 42–47.

Wilson, J. Q. (1978). The investigators: managing FBI and narcotics agents. New York: Basic Books.



               


You have chosen a topic that has been debated over a long period of time.  Wilson (2013) states that people on both sides of the rehabilitation issue have misinterpreted Martinson's 1974 “nothing works” study.  Wilson suggests that rehabilitation works for SOME people, SOME of the time, and that was the conclusion people should have drawn from Martinson's study. 

Wilson also postulates that a review of research shows that repeat offenders, especially violent offenders, tend to have a history of repeat juvenile delinquency offenses.  Which is fortunate, because the literature also suggest that juveniles have a better chance to respond to rehabilitation efforts than adults, although this might also be due to the “aging out of crime” phenomenon. So perhaps it would be best to identify “what works” in keeping juveniles from delinquency.  Turner et al (2007) look at this issue from the perspective of non-delinquent youth in a “resilience” lens.

Huebner (2009) presents a bibliographic overview of rehabilitative literature. You should be aware of bias when one particular approach is being defended. If one is thinking about policy, it might be best to stay away from a “one approach fits all” viewpoint, or a “this OR that” perspective.  The rehabilitative method may indeed work best when combined with a punitive mode.

References

Huebner, B. (2009, December 14). Rehabilitation. Retrieved September 10, 2015 from http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396607/obo-9780195396607-0046.xml

Martinson, R. (1974). What works? questions and answers about prison reform. Public Interest 10:22–54

Turner, M. G., Hartman, J. L., Exum, M. L., & Cullen, F. T. (2007). Good kids in bad circumstances: a longitudinal analysis of resilient youth. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 46(1-2), 81–111.

Wilson, J. Q. (2013). Thinking about crime (Revised edition). New York: Basic Books, A Member of the Perseus Books Group.






We are all off to the next step, whether that is the study of justice or the application of justice.

What have y'all learned from the program?

For me, I started with the viewpoint that the way to reduce crime optimally was to decriminalize anything that wasn't a property crime or a personal crime and then to jail or execute those that wouldn't learn to keep their hands off other people and their things. For the most part, my view hasn't changed that much.

But I have learned the importance of public order criminal enforcement in some cases...
I have learned that there are limitations to the application of classical criminology...
I have been surprised that the bell curve can accurately represent so many populations...
And I have learned that there are many more factors to any given situation than are usually considered in a study;  while we probably shouldn't "pick at" any given research attempt for minor contributors to the problem that weren't included in the study  (I dropped a LOT to get my paper into 10 pages lol), we should always attempt to ascertain bias, and to identify major factors that weren't considered in the study...whether we agree with the results or not.

Good luck!

Tuesday, April 12, 2016

Limitations to study




Since I have chosen a highly complex research question that relies on interpreting data from conflicting and often partisan sources, there are many limitations to my study.

The first limitation is the context in which the research question was developed.  Perhaps it would have been better to ask a quantitative question; “Was there a difference in the way that COINTELPRO programs were conducted against NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE targets?”   This is a question that possibly should be resolved before investigating the relationship between Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics and the efficiency of COINTELPRO operations in the two programs.

A second contextual issue is that bureaucratic politics is just one factor in several that may have affected COINTELPRO success; there is the possibility that the internal culture of the FBI interfered with the ability of agents to infiltrate the New Left, the possibility that Sullivan's attempt to replace Hoover as director and the resultant fall-out from that situation affected field operations, and the possibility that political liberals who had no problems in countering the right-wing terror of the Klan suddenly discovered “Constitutional” concerns when the terrorists of the Left were targeted, and thus abandoned the alliance with Hoover.

A limitation involving the sampling design is that the sample I used to generate my content analysis is relatively small compared to the amount of literature that exists;  I could have used additional material from the Church Committee (Intelligence activities,1976), from Theoharis (2004), from Jeffreys-Jones (2007), from Elliff (1979), and from Cunningham (2003).  I chose specifically to avoid using material from Churchill (1990) due to the extreme level of bias in that material.

The research instrument I used was a content analysis.   I was unsure of both my use of this method (my first attempt), and the thoroughness of my attempt. There is software that can aid in this approach, but I did it manually.  It is worth the effort to redo this analysis with the addition of additional source material and a more efficient approach. 

There is also the issue in data collection of estimating the effect that COINTELPRO had on the New Left.  DeLoach (1995) notes this difficulty and briefly mentions possible factors for the subsequent decline in New Left activity which do include COINTELPRO. 

Another data collection limitation is the difficulty in separating Hoover's personal identification with the agency from his direction of the agency for the Bureau's sake.  For instance, Gentry (1991) notes an example in which Raymond Chandler, the writer, insulted Hoover personally, and was subjected to the collection of 250 pages of personal data in an FBI file. 

The last data collection issue is in using data related to Assistant Director Sullivan's statements.  The literature demonstrates that Sullivan had a pattern of telling his audience what they wanted to hear at any given time.  This applies particularity to data regarding New Left activities;  Sullivan enthusiastically took part in organizing the Huston plan directed at the New Left, yet in his autobiography claims that the New Left was not a threat...this, at a time Mark Felt was being prosecuted for covert FBI operations.

Finally, the theoretical underpinnings of the study could use some fleshing out.  Bureaucratic politics is a good model to explain the basics of how Hoover used these particular tactics and why they succeeded on an organizational advancement basis, but a model I referred to as the “politics of the personal” could have more fully explained why Hoover made these tactical choices.  “Politics of the personal” was a theory I was exposed to in undergraduate political science some 25 years ago, but I was unable to locate a source explaining it, and the only examples I was able to find of it in use were out of the context I was familiar in understanding; it seems that the term had been hijacked by 3rd wave feminism.

References

Churchill, W. (1990). The COINTELPRO papers: documents from the FBI’s secret wars against domestic dissent. Boston, MA: South End Press.

Cunningham, D. (2003). Understanding State Responses to Left-versus Right-Wing Threats The FBI’s Repression of the New Left and the Ku Klux Klan. Social Science History, 27(3), 327–370.

DeLoach, C. (1995). Hoover’s FBI: the inside story by Hoover’s trusted lieutenant. Washington, D.C. : Lanham, MD: Regnery Pub.

Elliff, J. (1979). The reform of FBI intelligence operations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gentry, C. (1991). J. Edgar Hoover: the man and the secrets. New York: Norton.

Intelligence activities and the rights of Americans. 94th Cong 1. (1976).

Jeffreys-Jones, R. (2007). The FBI: a history. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Theoharis, A. G. (2004). The FBI & American democracy: a brief critical history. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.




State the consequences of the limitations.  For example, what is the consequence of a small sample?  You mentioned content analysis - how can the results be validated?

All studies rely on validity and reliability to be of use; validity refers to the accuracy of measurement and reliability refers to the stability or the consistency of the measuring instrument (Hagan, 2012), in this case, my content analysis.  If my content analysis valid, then it accurately measures what I mean it to, the percentage of supporting literature that had discussed the specific use of the tactic of bureaucratic politics that I had identified as a variable.  If my analysis is reliable, then I should get the same results every time I repeat the analysis with the same data.  If my study is not both valid and reliable, then the study is of no use and presents no useful knowledge.

Sample size is important in the validity of a study. Triola (2014) warns that a sample size can be too small in statistical sampling.  On the other hand, Krippendorff (2013) explains that the content analysis method deviates from the representational mode of sampling theory in that the researcher is seeking to sample texts that can accurately answer the research question, not to seek to represent the textual population.

Krippendorff discusses validity in terms of face validity, social validity, and empirical validity.  Empirical validity is what we are discussing in relation to research technique.  Krippendorf specifies three obstacles to validation; substantive, conceptual, and methodological obstacles.  Krippendorf suggests that validating evidence used in the content analysis can be achieved by two methods.  The first is by measuring the correlative validity, which involves checking the findings obtained through the content analysis with other findings from methods considered more valid.  The second is predictive validity, in which the findings of the content analysis accurately anticipate knowledge which was not in the analysis.








Hagan, F. E. (2012). Essentials of research methods in criminal justice and criminology (3rd ed). Boston: Prentice Hall.

Krippendorff, K. (2013). Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology (3rd ed). Los Angeles, Calif.: Sage.

Triola, M. F. (2014). Elementary statistics (12th edition). Boston: Pearson.




Sunday, April 10, 2016

Data Collection Methods for Project



I have changed my initial research question, as my initial question was not sufficiently clear.  The adjusted RQ is as follows:

RQ: How did  FBI Director Hoover's political direction of the agency affect the efficiency of COINTELPRO operations?
IV = Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics
DV = The successful use of a COINTELPRO program to degrade a subversive group's ability to harm a nation.

Problem:
Politics can have a negative impact on a nation's security.  This is applicable whether the harm is done by expediting the development of nuclear weapons for religious fanatics or by the unsuccessful degradation of a subversive group.  By being able to analyze and explain why a subversive group was unsuccessfully confronted, the process of understanding how politics can interfere with security can be extrapolated to explain how other factors can hinder national security as well.

Underlying theory:
Bureaucratic Politics

The first set of sources I use discuss Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics.  These include Kessler (2003),  Weiner (2013), Gentry (1991), and Powers (1997).  There is a theme in the sources regarding the effort by Hoover to protect the FBI's public image and to more importantly, to protect it's "turf".

The second set of sources attempt at measuring the success of COINTELPRO in the two programs WHITE HATE and NEW LEFT.  These include Cunningham (2003), Drabble (2008),  George (1996), and Varon (2004).

The data collection methods I discussed in the Week 7 Assignment 2 paper are impractical to use in my research question.  The data sources I discuss above are secondary sources that are primarily based on case studies.  As such, there should be additional discussion regarding the use of case studies.  Flyvbjerg(2006)  begins his discussion of misconceptions regarding the use of the case study by providing it's definition from the Dictionary of sociology:

Case Study. The detailed examination of a single example of a class of phenomena, a case study cannot provide reliable information about the broader class, but it may be useful in the preliminary stages of an investigation since it provides hypotheses, which may be tested systematically with a larger number
of cases. (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1984, p. 34)

Flyvbjerg (2006) contends that this definition is misleading, and that there are five major misconceptions regarding the use of case studies, and these misconceptions can lead one to question the reliability and validity of their use.  These misunderstandings are:
  General, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge.
  One cannot generalize on the basis of an individual case; therefore, the case study cannot contribute to scientific development.
  The case study is most useful for generating hypotheses; that is, in the first stage of a total research process, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building.
  The case study contains a bias toward verification, that is, a tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions.
   It is often difficult to summarize and develop general propositions and theories on the basis of specific case studies (p. 221)

While Flyvbjerg defends the use of the case study by challenging these perceptions, Seawright and Gerring (2008) explain how to choose cases to study to achieve two objectives; random sampling, and variation within the parameters of theoretical interest.  They further explain that choosing cases randomly without stratification does not necessarily provide for a random sample.  They stress "purposeful" sampling while warning of the danger of selection bias.  The types and contexts of use of case studies that Seawright and Gerring suggest include: the typical case, the diverse case, the extreme case, the deviant case, the influential case, and the most similar/most different cases.

It is necessary for me to understand the use of the case study fully as my own research is based upon its use.





Abercrombie, N., Hill, S., & Turner, B. S. (1994). Dictionary of sociology (3rd ed.). Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.

Cunningham, D. (2003). The patterning of repression: FBI counterintelligence and the New Left. Social Forces, 82(1), 209–240.

Drabble, J. (2008). The FBI, COINTELPRO-WHITE HATE, and the decline of Ku Klux Klan organizations in Alabama. Alabama Review, 61(1), 3–47.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qualitative Inquiry, 12(2), 219–245. http://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405284363

Gentry, C. (1991). J. Edgar Hoover: the man and the secrets. New York: Norton.

George, J. (1996). American extremists: militias, supremacists, klansmen, communists & others. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books.

Kessler, R. (2003). The bureau: the secret history of the FBI (St. Martin’s Paperbacks ed). New York: St. Martin’s Paperbacks.

Powers, R. G. (1987). Secrecy and power: the life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York; London: Free Press ; Collier Macmillan.

Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case selection techniques in case study research: A menu of qualitative and quantitative options. Political Research Quarterly, 61(2), 294–308. http://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077

Varon, J. (2004). Bringing the war home: the Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and revolutionary violence in the sixties and seventies. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weiner, T. (2013). Enemies: a history of the FBI. New York: Random House.







Kessler (2003),  Weiner (2013), Gentry (1991), and Powers (1997).

purpose of study
who studied
how data were collected
statistics used
findings
limitations


Followup #1 – Bureaucratic politics sources

Kessler, a former Washing Post reporter, has written more than 10 books concerning the FBI and other security agencies of the United States,  His work has earned an award from the American Political Science Association.  His work has been criticized for being partisan, but only after a book containing interviews from Secret Services agents that detailed the activities of the Clinton family was published. However, he is the editor of Newsmax, a conservative news source.

Kessler's The bureau: The secret history of the FBI, is not a study, but a history based upon the interview method and using other historical sources.  Kessler did not compile statistics or reach a conclusion.  Even though this is not a study, it could be classified as a process of ethnographic interviewing as defined by Marshall and Rossman (2006), in which a system of questions is asked of insiders and organized in such a way that the cultural knowledge is brought forth.  Kessler did not have a purpose of study: he simply wanted to reveal the things that FBI agents uncovered (“Q&A with author”, n.d.).

As opposed to findings, Kessler's writing about Hoover and the FBI provide information regarding Hoover's personality and it's effect on the way that he utilized politics to advance the FBI's interests.

In a similar fashion, Weiner is a national security reporter for the New York Times; he has won the National Book Award for his work on the CIA, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.  There is no controversy regarding his work that I was able to find.

Weiner based his research on Freedom of Information requests and 208 oral histories that had been compiled by retirees; “It's a society of former FBI agents that did this and they started on this program about 10 years ago” (Q&A with Tim Weiner, n.d).  Like Kessler, this is not a study, but rather a history. And again like Kessler, Weiner's information can be utilized to gather data regarding Hoover's bureaucratic politics.

Gentry is best known for his co-authorship with the Charles Manson prosecutor of Helter-Skelter; his biography of Hoover has been judged as the “most thoroughly researched, comprehensive, and balanced study” (Goldstein, 1994, p. 109).  Although Gentry's work was a biography of Hoover as opposed to a history of the FBI, the information he provides perspective on how Hoover operated in protecting the FBI.

Power's biography of Hoover is the most controversial of those listed as sources. Powers, a professor of history at the College of Staten Island, specializes in American security issues and the FBI.  O'Reilly (1993) characterized Power's portrayal of Hoover as “revisionist”.   Powers does not give in to the widespread academic position (O'Reilly, Theoharis, Jeffries-Jones, Cunningham, Drabble) that the FBI was a “Gestapo” organization indulging itself in “oppression”.

However, Power's biography is not a study.  There is not a testable hypothesis or statistical comparison. Even so, the information he provides contributes to the theme of bureaucratic politics that comprises the independent variable of my research question.

The histories and biographies used  as sources on this side of the question fall into a category of narrative analysis.  Roberts (2002) makes the argument that while biographical research has been considered as less valid and less reliable in the social research field, that because individuals create the meanings of life which they then act upon, the interpretive analysis of these “subjective realities” places biographical research clearly into the category of qualitative method.

Goldstein, R. J. (1994). Book reviews. Perspectives on Political Science, 23(2), 109.

Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (2006). Designing qualitative research (4th ed). Thousands Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

O’Reilly, K. (1993). J. Edgar Hoover and civil rights. Policy Studies Journal, 21(3), 609. http://doi.org/10.1111/1541-0072.ep9410121504

Roberts, B. (2002). Biographical research. Buckingham, UK. Open University Press.

Q&A with author Ronald Kessler. (n.d.). Amazon.com. Retrieved August 20, 2015 from http://www.amazon.com/The-Secrets-FBI-Ronald-Kessler/dp/0307719707

Q&A with Tim Weiner. (n.d.). Retrieved August 21, 2015, from http://www.c-span.org/video/?304522-1/qa-tim-weiner


Cunningham (2003), Drabble (2008),  George (1996), and Varon (2004).

purpose of study
who studied
how data were collected
statistics used
findings
limitations

Followup #2 Measuring Operational Success

This assessment requires more data to analyze as a judgment on whether a subversive group has been neutralized or not.  A cynical observer can note that there is still a Klan presence in this country, and that many of the New Left terrorists now hold positions in academia and influence this country's politics and educational process.  So how can success in this regard be measured?

Cunningham is a professor of sociology at Brandies University.  His work has centered on the FBI's response to subversive groups (referred to by Cunningham as “dissidents”).  In this study, his purpose was to demonstrate how organizations “allocate repression” (p. 210).  Cunningham performs a content analysis on 2,487 COINTELPRO NEW LEFT in which he coded background information, type, and target.  Cunningham asserts that the FBI generated a system for “repression of an abstract class of target” (p. 234).  The major problem with Cunningham's work is a lack of awareness of the actual terror that NEW LEFT targets were engaged in.

Drabble's work has focused specifically on COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE.  He is a professor who teaches Human Rights at the University of California at Berkeley.  Drabble provides a historical narrative that relies primarily on internal FBI memos and contemporary news reports, although he also sources Keller and O'Reilly.  He does conclude that FBI action against the Klan caused a loss in membership.

George is a professor in the Political Science department at the University of Central Oklahoma.  American Extremists was written in order to describe the characteristics of extremism.  The book is a historical analysis that relies on a variety of sources; histories, news reports, and academic journals.  The information they provide regarding the extremist New Left and Klan can provide a measure of success.

Varon is an assistant professor of history at Drew University.  His book is another history.  His purpose in writing the book was to compare the violence committed by the New Left in America versus the New Left in Germany.  His sources range from ethnographic interviews with the terrorists themselves to government reports to histories and news reports.  I will use his information in guaging the success of COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT