The
Kerner Report's Lack of Impact on Effective Law Enforcement
The
three major areas of change in law enforcement since 1970 are;
technology driven efficiency, process oriented policing changes (such
as community policing, problem oriented policing, “hot spot”
targeting, and intelligence led policing), and finally the increased
diversity of police forces. Some of this change has been driven by
presidential commission recommendations. Although the Kerner
Commission has been cited as a factor in the support for political
changes, the effect of it's recommendations has not played a
significant part in improving law enforcement efficiency.
Technology
driven change has been the biggest factor in increased effectiveness
for protecting America's security in a law enforcement context.
Communications, data collection, data storage, data analysis, data
sharing, and surveillance have all made policing more effective in
reporting crime, in responding to crime, in solving crime, and in
preventing crime. The impetus for improvements in technology came
from another commission established by President Johnson, the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, in response to the doubling of crime rates between 1940 and
1965 (The National Committee on Criminal Justice Technology National
Institute of Justice Technology, 1998, Part One, para. 6). As part
of the Commission's recommendations, 11 specific improvements
regarding the use of technology were embraced by the Johnson
administration, which began providing “massive” federal
technology assistance to local policing agencies (The National
Committee on Criminal Justice Technology, 1998, Part One, para. 6-7).
Byrne and Marx identify two types of technological change,
information-based and material-based, and suggest that both have
caused “dramatic changes” in law enforcement (2011, p.17).
Changes
in the strategies and methods of policing have also taken place in
the law enforcement community since 1970. While the efficiency of
these changes may not have been fully evaluated, the direction in
considering and testing potentially beneficial adjustments bodes well
for the future of law enforcement. He, Zhao, and Lovrich contend that
“only time will tell whether the sustained effort to promote COP
will result in the widespread adoption of a new paradigm in
policing”(2005, p.311). Other researchers put more confidence in
such programs. Jackson and Brown assert that the Intelligence Led
Policing “paradigm, once it has thoroughly addressed its
shortcomings, will prove to be a viable policing model for a
post-9/11 world”(2007, p.127). In discussing the potential
benefits of using scientifically studied process changes to law
enforcement, Willis concludes that “Advancing reform in ways that
police administrators, officers, researchers, and ordinary citizens
all care about requires that we focus on what can be gained by
strengthening this union” (2013, p. 12).
Diversity
in policing is another change which may not result in objectively
measurable reductions in crime, but may create non measurable
benefits for the community at large and it's relationship with the
local police. Raymond discusses the increase of diversity of police
force compositions; “Although sworn police officers across
departments are still predominantly white males, rates of racial and
ethnic minorities and females have increased over the past few
years... The proportions of both minorities and females among sworn
personnel are larger in larger cities than in cities with smaller
populations” (2005, p.12). However, Brown and Benedict suggest
that community relations are not always improved by adding officers
that can relate to local communities; “A commonly proposed tactic
for reducing blacks’ negative perceptions of the police is hiring
more black officers, but there is no empirical support for such
programs”(2002, p.568). This may be due to a culture conflict
issue where it is the uniform itself, rather than from a survey of
personal interactions.
The
Kerner Commission was created by President Johnson in reaction to
urban riots from 1965 to 1967. According to Lupo, the commission had
to answer three basic questions; “what happened, why, and what can
be done to prevent it from happening again and again” (2010, p.
125). The composition of the commission was bipartisan, and despite
claims to the contrary was interracial, with 2 out of 11
Commissioners being black men(or 18% of the board as compared to 13%
of the general population at the time). Bulmer identifies
“ideological bias” as an impediment to the use of social science
research in commission findings. (1983, p. 655). Unfortunately, The
Commission staff demonstrated such a bias in that “the report was
the work of hundreds of staffers, largely social scientists whose
mind-sets reflected the leftist orthodoxy of the time”(Miller,
2000, para. 2). The first report generated was so extremist that the
Commission itself, “appointed by President Lyndon Baines Johnson
largely to reflect commitments to his Great Society programs”,
rejected it in toto (Miller,
2000, para. 2). This bias manifested itself in the Commission's
findings.
The
Kerner Report had two major conclusions to the “why” and the
prevention questions, both of which were wrong. The first conclusion
was that conditions in the black community were caused by “white
racism”. “White racism is essentially responsible for the
explosive mixture which has been
accumulating
in our cities since the end of World War II” (The National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, p.9). The second conclusion was
that poverty caused by this racism was the cause of the riots. While
“white racism” cannot be discounted as a factor in “black
poverty”, there are certainly other contributing factors the Kerner
Commission neglected to account for in it's conclusions. One factor
that the Commission denied was the influence of outside agitators;
“The urban disorders of the summer of 1967 were not caused by, nor
were they the consequence of, any organized plan or 'conspiracy'"(The
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, p.8). This is
indicative of the ideological bias in which the Commission operated.
In 1968, a Congressional Hearing had no problem finding
documentation of SDS/SNCC activity which targeted Newark and other
“cities where SNCC hopes 'to translate its black power philosophy
into an outlet for frustration' “ (Subversive influence in
riots, looting, and burning, 1968, p.1856) Other findings of the
Hearing included documentation of SDS rhetoric rejecting the
“bringing ghetto residents into the mainstream of competitive
society” (Subversive influence in riots, looting, and burning,
1968, p.1855). Bean asserts that “Black militants and their white
sympathizers considered the 'rebellions' a form of political violence
designed to force concessions from governmental authorities” (Bean,
2000, p. 165). The Kerner Report does not consider other factors
such as deviation from a middle-class value system, high rates of
illegitimacy, or cultural rejection of education and
entrepreneurship. Woodson argues that “the advocates of civil
rights had to abandon publications that discussed the strength of
black communities in order for them to have civil rights laws applied
to them. With these demands, we entered a 'grievance period' in which
we reported only on our shortcomings and our failings' (1998, Para
22.)
This
leads to the Commission's conclusion that poverty itself is a cause
for crime, to be remedied by higher levels of government spending
(and of course, higher taxes). This fallacy can be considered as the
“poverty pitfall”. However, we return to Miller's contention
that the staffers on the Commission held the common social science
view of the day, which was influenced by the Chicago schools of
sociology and criminology. This ideological bias ignores a critical
point in addressing poverty, which Siegel makes in regards to the
riots, that “welfare replaced work for low-income people who were
ready to move up the job ladder”(1998, para 15).
Due
to bias in the generation of the Kerner Report, and the conclusions
reached due to that bias, there was not consideration given to the
causes of urban riots; without a solid understanding of a problem,
there can not be an effective approach to a solution. However, the
Kerner Report did have an impact on how criminologists defined
political solutions. Ren, Zhao, and Lovrich define the liberal
position on crime control as a matter of social support and the use
of the Kerner Report as a basis in that line of thought. “The key
to liberal propositions regarding crime control was the concept of
social support in contrast to the conservative's social control
focus” (Ren, Zhao, & Lovrich, 2008, p.318) . The major problem
in this framing is that it ignores the conservative position that
social support must be based on the individuals' socialization to
correct behavior, that teaching a man to fish is superior to giving
him a fish for a day. It should also be noted that “white racism”
and “black crime” are irresponsible uses of language; not all
whites are racist, nor all blacks criminal. Racism and criminal
activity are resultant from cultural influence, not skin color.
References
Bean, J. (2000). “Burn, Baby, Burn”:
Small business in the urban riots of the 1960s. The Independent
Review, 5(2).
Byrne,
J., & Marx, G. (2011). Technological innovations in crime
prevention and policing. A review of the research on implementation
and impact. Journal of Police Studies, 20(3), 17–40.
Bulmer,
M. (1983). An Anglo-American comparison: Does social science
contribute effectively to the work of governmental commissions?The
American Behavioral Scientist, 26(5)
He,
N., Zhao, J., & Lovrich, N. P. (2005). Community Policing: A
Preliminary Assessment of Environmental Impact With Panel Data on
Program Implementation in U.S. Cities. Crime & Delinquency,
51(3), 295–317. http://doi.org/10.1177/0011128704266756
Jackson,
A. L., & Brown, M. (2007). Ensuring Efficiency, Interagency
Cooperation, and Protection of Civil Liberties: Shifting from a
Traditional Model of Policing to an Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP)
Paradigm. Criminal Justice Studies, 20(2), 111–129.
http://doi.org/10.1080/14786010701396855
Lupo,
L. (2010). Flak-catchers: One hundred years of riot commission
politics in America. Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Lexington Books.
Miller,
A. H. (2000). Myths the Kerner Commission created. The World &
I, 15(8), 300–309.
Raymond,
B. (2005). Police personnel challenges after September 11:
anticipating expanded duties and a changing labor pool. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corp.
Ren,
L., Zhao, J., & Lovrich, N. P. (2008). Liberal versus
conservative public policies on crime: What was the comparative track
record during the 1990s? Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(4),
316–325. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2008.06.010
Subversive
influence in riots, looting, and burning. 90th
Congress. 1851 (1968).
The
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. (1968). Report of
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder: Summary of
report. Washington, D. C. Retrieved April 13, 2015 from
http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf
The
National Committee on Criminal Justice Technology. (1998). The
evolution and development of police technology. Washington, D. C.
Retrieved April 13, 2015 from
http://www.police-technology.net/id59.html
Threnstrom,
S., Siegel, F., & Woodson, R. (1998, March). The Kerner
Commission Report. The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved April 13,
2015 from
http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-kerner-commission-report
Willis,
J. J. (2013). Improving police: What’s craft got to do with
it? Ideas in American Policing, 16.
This is going to be a long "answer" that doesn't really answer the question; it just raises more questions.
The simplest and most common answers are in opposition to each other; the first is that white racism is the primary cause for every bad thing that happens in the black community, and the other is that due to culture conflict reasons, black folks distrust and therefore don't join the police, leading to a cycle of culture conflict. Both answers neglect a host of other contributing factors that have neither been fully addressed or measured.
1. Racism - Statistically speaking, racism has to have some affect on racial relations. From my own experience, I know that there are white people with racist views of blacks (and vice versa, and Hispanics with racist views of both whites, and blacks, and vice versa). In this situation, though, the question is how much affect the racism of white folks affects the opportunities of black folks, with a corollary question is how much black folks perceive racism to have such an affect.
For example, at one point in my life, I marketed pizza coupons door-to-door (meaning that I put them on the door, and moved on). More than once, I would walk across the street to avoid talking to a black person. Was this racist? No, because I always crossed the street to avoid social contact with all people I encountered, as I was dysfuntcionally shy at the time. But how many of the people that I avoided had the perception that I did so because they were black?
2. Culture conflict - There are several versions of culture conflict that can be in play here, but I will simplify to the major ones. Middle class culture is the culture which primarily define our mala prohibita laws. Drug use in some minority cultures is not the same as it is in middle lass/lower upper middle class culture.The legal status of drug use/possession is what drives a large percentage of police/minority contact ( and thus arrest and use of force incidents). On the other hand, a "snitches get stitches" view of police interaction, and the accusation of "acting white" for blacks that attempt to succeed on the terms of middle class values also play into culture conflict. I am unaware of studies which measure these factors in regards to racial relations.
3.Police socialization - Policemen have certainly committed racist acts in the past. The acceptance of these acts was part of the police culture. Things have changed to some point, partly due to diversity within police forces. Mark Baker's Cops, compiled in the mid/late 80's, was a collection of monologues by policemen discussing police work, returns over and over again to some policemens' perceptions of race and the changing view of policemen towards racial relations. In turn, a history of police abuses will certainly affect the perception of police by minority cultures, whether or not current practice is still racist. There have been examples of continued discrimination within some departments. The question here is how many policemen are racist, and how many allow racism to affect professionalism.
4. Profiling - Profiling can be a valuable law enforcement tool. How profiling is conducted can be a matter of debate. Profiling can be considered as "racial profiling" when race or ethnicity is either used or perceived to be used as a basis for the stop; Reiman suggests that "terms of the definition
are satisfied if race is used in addition to other factors such as behavior" (Reiman, 2011, p.4). This can increase the negative perception that minority communities hold of the police. If the police stop minority suspects based on the wearing of certain clothes, is the stop based upon those clothes being gang colors, or of a style worn by gang members? If the clothes are of a certain style, is it non-gang members following fashion set by gang members, or vice versa?
5. Anti-police propaganda - Both the Washington Post and the New York Times recently admitted that "hands up, don't shoot" was a lie. Of course, this admission was not on the same front pages that months of the lie were repeated over and over, nor was the lie admitted to until after several businesses had been destroyed in the riots. In Austin, the main newspaper ran a headline "Police shoot unarmed black man in the back twice", notwithstanding the autopsy report that showed the wounds were in the suspect's side, not back, nor that the suspect's gun was dropped close to his body during the pursuit/shooting. 90% of journalists identify as Democrats. I will return to this point.
6. Sabotage of the black community - Policies undertaken with the public justification of improving conditions in the black community have the opposite effect. Ebonics and the new policy of not disciplining problem students do nothing to raise the educational level of underprivileged students. Higher minimum wages result in fewer jobs. As a side issue, there is little study done about the positive effects that churches in minority communities have on people in those communities.
7. Political Opportunism - There is a term for the Jews that fed other Jews into the Nazi's ovens in the concentration camps in order to live a little longer. This term is "Sonderkommando". The Democratic Party needs to recieve from 85% to 90% (depending on location) of the black vote to win elections. Considering that Democrats control the cities and locales where black poverty rates are the greatest and arrest rates for black folks are the highest, that Democrats control the educational systems and unions that are tasked for education in the communities, and that Democratic influence in the media that dominates public discourse has a single narrative supporting policies that do not work, is it possible that the "Sonderkommando" term has a parallel meaning?
Of course, even the theory that the Democratic Party sabotages the black community for the purpose of maintaining a stable voting count can not be the only factor in the conditions that drive racial conditions in this country. Each possible factor must be examined as fully as possible. Some are impossible to quantify. For an example, if a policeman holds both racist and professional values, and has the self-control necessary to conduct his job professionally, how would we measure the effect of his racism...at a value of 0 because he is not acting on racist impulse, or at a 10 for being a racist at all? Racism (and the issues that relate to it) is a hard subject to tackle, not just because many of the factors are hard to objectively measure, but because the issue of race is a very personal and emotional matter. No white person wants to be a priori as racist, no black person wants to be judged a priori as criminal. No cops wants to be judged a priori as a thug with a badge. In fact, no person at all wants to be judged by the actions of others.
References
Baker, M. (1989). Cops: Their lives in their own words. New York, NY. Pocket Books.
Kroll
Government Services. (2007). Review of an Internal Affairs
Investigation into the Officer Involved Shooting of June
3, 2007.
Reiman,
J. (2011). Is Racial Profiling Just? Making Criminal Justice Policy
in the Original Position. The Journal of Ethics, 15(1-2),
3–19.
http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1007/s10892-010-9096-5
Another factor in Johnson's decision to ignore the Kerner Report was the vast amount of money that he was spending on the Great Society.
To be upfront, I have an ideological bias of my own, in that I don't believe that social spending has long term benefits for the communities it is directed towards. Keeping that in mind, my assumption was that the Great Society was already dumping huge amounts of money on underprivileged communities. Returning to our organizational planning course, it seems that there was no assessment of the impact that these Great Society programs were having before requesting additional spending.
The
changes in scientifically studied processes of policing are the most
import of the changes in law enforcement. Although the
technological changes have had the most objectively measurable and
positive actual changes to law enforcement efficiency, the potential
improvements to public safety can come from anticipating and
preemptively striking against criminal behavior. For example.
if police can predict where the next in a series of bank robberies
will occur, they can be on site when the robbery occurs.
