Fixing the research question

Revised Question:

RQ: How did  FBI Director Hoover's political direction of the agency affect the efficiency of COINTELPRO operations?

IV = Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics
DV = The successful use of a COINTELPRO program to degrade a subversive group's ability to harm a nation.

Problem:

Politics can have a negative impact on a nation's security.  This is applicable whether the harm is done by expediting the development of nuclear weapons for religious fanatics to the unsuccessful degradation of a subversive group.  By being able to analyze and explain why a subversive group was unsuccessfully confronted, the process of understanding how political interference can interfere with security can be extrapolated to explain how other factors can hinder national security as well.

Underlying theory:

Bureaucratic Politics

OK, I think that I have a better understanding of the difference between the qualitative and quantitative  processes.    In this case, the IV can be differentiated in that Hoover pushed the FBI in the WHITE HATE program in order to win over continuing political support;  in the NEW LEFT program, Hoover terminated operations in the fear that COINTELPRO had been exposed and this exposure could harm the capability of the FBI to operate independently.  FBI personnel considered WHITE HATE to be successful and did not think NEW LEFT was successful.

The bureaucratic politics model applies more to this perspective than did the Liberal Theory of Internal Security, which I tried to shoehorn into the complex question I was trying to ask earlier.  By narrowing the "political factors" down to one specific factor, I have better "control" in explaining the IV of Hoover's political infighting.

Contemporary Challenges and Changes in American Law Enforcement

    There are three critical issues in contemporary law enforcement. The first is the war on police. The second is the failure of police to address politicians violating their oaths to serve the public, and the third is the use of evidence based policing to make changes to police operations. The war on police can be recognized by dishonest and deceptive media coverage of police actions; examples can be seen in the Ferguson and McKinney cases in which key facts were left out of the coverage. However, this is a propaganda war generaled from the highest levels of the Democratic Party, as “Obama has created a pathway for the cop hating rhetoric to flourish” (Clarke, 2015)..Another example can be seen in the prosecution of six policemen in Baltimore related to a death in custody; not only were the investigators surprised by the severity of the charges, but the prosecutor has gone to great lengths to prevent the facts of the case from being made public by using a gag order (“Baltimore prosecutor seeks”, 2015, para. 1). This leads into the failure of law enforcement agencies and line officers to bring politicians to account for their crimes. In Ferguson and Baltimore, politicians made the choice to ignore their sworn duty to protect the community and instead, “gave space to destroy”, to violent rioters. Another example would be in the Fast and Furious gunrunning case, in which the Obama administration provided weapons to violent narco-terror cartels, in violation of treaty with Mexico and in violation of the duty to protect. Third, evidence based policing is the trend that has continued from Vollmer through today, in which using the scientific method improves both the professionalism and efficiency of the police. Carter contends that “ we learned that experimental research could be effectively performed in a police agency without posing undue threats to public safety” (1995, p. 3)

    Not all of these challenges generate controversy. Although there is controversy regarding the war on police within the law enforcement community, but discussion in the public is limited due to lack of media focus... from the same media driving the war on police. Even so, "rank-and-file brethren in police departments nationwide, says police feel under siege and demoralized by the bias against them" (Bello, 2014, para. 4) Regarding the second issue, there is very limited discussion which is restricted to right wing viewpoints, and there is ambiguity as far as local laws (nonfeasance, misfeasance, malfeasance) and Constitutional responsibilities for dealing with such ssues. There is some academic dispute about which evidence policies have worked and which haven't. These disputes carry over into the political sphere. Three strikes sentencing and broken windows policing are two examples in which studies can be at odds with each other regarding results. Foe example, Bowling asserts that New York's drop in crime was more a result of a decline in the use of crack cocaine (1999).

    Evidence based policing has created the most change of the three issues. The war on police has not driven a formal change in police departments, but line officers are showing a trend towards not wanting to do their duty if doing so will place their careers and potentially their lives at risk , as the police are afraid of getting arrested for performing their duty” (CNN, 2015) The second has not driven any change. Although the concepts are based upon basic adherence to the law of the land, and duty of public office holders and sworn law enforcement officers , the consideration of this issue is considered to be extremist. Evidence based policing has driven many changes, although the debate and politics muddle he water regarding the efficiency of the changes. Levitt (2004) discusses several possible reasons, not including “Broken windows” policing, that may have been factors in New York's declining crime rate.

    The changes driven by these issues cab be either temporary or permanent. In the first, these are recent changes and may be temporary depending on how the war on cops is dealt with. There are no changes on the second. In the third, both. Some changes like the shift to community policing have been more permanent, while we can see that the broken windows approached has been discarded due to politics; New York's Mayor DiBlasio ended broken windows policing for political reasons, and we have already seen the rise in crime in New York (Celona, 2015).

    These changes reflect a shift in our society as a whole. The country has shifted leftward with control of the media (Groseclose & Milyo, 2005), education (Yancey, 2012), and the bureaucracy into the hands of liberals. This shift has left the country less educated, less patriotic, and more susceptible to propaganda and malfeasance by politicians and bureaucrats.

References

Baltimore prosecutor seeks gag order in Freddie Gray case. (2015, May 15). Fox News. Retrieved June 20, 2015 from http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/05/15/baltimore-prosecutor-seeks-gag-order-in-freddie-gray-case/

Bello, M. (n.d.). “It can be fearful”: Police feeling under siege. USA Today. Retrieved June 7, 2015, from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/22/police-reactshootings/20773395/

Bowling, B. (1999, Autumn). The rise and fall of New York murder: Zero Tolerance or crack’s decline? British Journal of Criminology: VOL. 39 NO. 4. Retrieved April 15, 2014 from www.umass.edu/legal/Benavides/Fall2004/397G/.../7%20Bowling.pdf

Carter, D. L. (1995). Reflections on the move to community policing: Regional Community Policing Institute. Retrieved August 10, 2014 from http://webs.wichita.edu/depttools/depttoolsmemberfiles/rcpi/Policy%20Papers/Reflections%20on%20Comm%20Pol.pdf

Celona, L. (2015, May 26). You’re 45% more likely to be murdered in de Blasio’s Manhattan.  The New York Post. Retrieved May 27, 2015 from http://nypost.com/2015/05/26/youre-45-more-likely-to-be-murdered-in-de-blasios-manhattan/

Clarke, D. [SheriffClarke].(2015, May 11). I will say it again. Obama has created a pathway for the cop hating rhetoric to flourish. He has led the chorus.[Tweet]. Retrieved May 15, 2015 from https://twitter.com/SheriffClarke/status/597834103556349952

CNN. (2015, May 28). Baltimore union: 'Police are under siege'. Retrieved June 7, 2015 from http://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2015/05/29/exp-baltimore-police-freddie-gray-crime-marquez-dnt-erin.cnn

Groseclose, T., & Milyo, J. (2005). A Measure of Media Bias. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4), 1191–1237. http://doi.org/10.1162/003355305775097542

Levitt, S. (2004). Understanding why crime fell in the1990s: Four factors that explain the decline and six that do not. Journal of Economic Perspectives, (18)1.

Yancey, G. (2012). Recalibrating Academic Bias. Academic Questions, 25(2), 267–278. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1007/s12129-012-9282-y

Academic Contributions to Homeland Security

Academic Contributions to Homeland Security

As part of the shift in national security after 9/11, the government sought to include academia in the pursuit of meeting security goals. Steward and Vocino assert that “homeland security courses and programs sprang up quickly to meet demand” (2013, p. 14). However, the government set up the Centers for Excellence network under the auspices of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The mandate for establishing the network is:

The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall establish … a university-based center or centers for homeland security. The purpose of this center or centers shall be to establish a coordinated, university-based system to enhance the nation’s homeland security (Homeland Security, n.d (a)., para. 18).

Two examples of such Centers of Excellence are the National Center for Border Security and Immigration (NCBSI) and the The Center for Behavioral and Social Aspects of Terrorism and Counterterrorism (START). What is it that these centers do?

The NCBSI is a collaboration between the University of Arizona and the University of Texas at El Paso. It's mission is to “to develop technologies, tools and advanced methods that

balance immigration and trade with effective border security” (Homeland Security, n.d (b)., para.1).

START is located at the University of Maryland. It's mission is to “to advance science-based knowledge about the human causes and consequences of terrorism and serve as a leading resource for homeland security policymakers and practitioners” (START, 2013, para. 1).

As an example of the work these Centers of Excellence do, we can look at a START study,”Validation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative: Identifying Suspicious Activities from the Extremist Crime Database and the American Terrorism Study”. The purpose of the study was to validate the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), which itself has a purpose of “identifying and reporting terrorism-related suspicious activity in jurisdictions across the country” (START, 2014, p.1). The study had four findings

• Pre-incident activities occurring prior to acts of terrorism crimes do often align with existing SAR indicators.

• SAR indicators with the highest prevalence were weapons discovery, materials acquisition/storage, expressed or implied threats, and observation/surveillance.
• Many of the indicators were observable prior to terrorist attacks, and some indicators were observed by the public.
• Although several non-SAR activities emerged, none of these patterns rose to the level of necessitating a new type of SAR indicator (START, 2014, p.1)

The objective of the study was to validate the SAR process, which the NSI contends is critical to sharing information regarding this activity with a potential nexus to terror acts (NSI, 2015, para. 2). The objective was attained through research into two databases, Extremist Crime

Database (ECDB) and the American Terrorism Study (ATS). Both databases have collected data on pre-incident activities associated with terrorist acts, to which the study compares to the 16 SAR categories (START, 2015, pp. 1-3). The findings have been listed in bullet list above. The study made no recommendations, as it was a validation process, however, the study did note that some SAR indicators are not likely to be noticed by law enforcement as they are of a non-criminal nature, while other indicators were also less likely to be noticed due to their early part in the terror preparation process (START, 2015, p. 14).

Although the study did not examine SAR indicators in the context of foreign terrorism, the insight gained through the validation of the process can be extrapolated and tested against such acts, as well as possible transnational acts. Thus future research could be delved into regarding cartel violence as well as traditionally understood forms of international terror.

References

Homeland Security (n.d)(a). Welcome to the Centers of Excellence. Retrieved May 19, 2015 from http://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/centers-excellence

Homeland Security (n.d)(b).The National Center for Border Security and Immigration (NCBSI). Retrieved May 19, 2015 from http://www.hsuniversityprograms.org/default/assets/File/NCBSI%20Fact%20Sheet- Jan2014-FINAL.pdf

Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative. (2015). About the NSI. Retrieved May 19, 2015 from http://nsi.ncirc.gov/about_nsi.aspx

START. (2013). Mission and vision. Retrieved May 19, 2015 from

http://www.start.umd.edu/about/mission-and-vision

START. (2014). START research brief:Validation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative: Identifying suspicious activities from the Extremist Crime Database and the American Terrorism Study. Retrieved May19, 2015 from

http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTResearchBrief_NationalSARInitiative_March2015

.pdf

START. (2015). Validation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative:

Identifying Suspicious Activities from the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) and the American Terrorism Study (ATS). May 19, 2015 from https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/ START_ValidationofNationwideSARInitiative_Feb2015.pdf

Stewart, K. B., & Vocino, J. (2013). Homeland security in higher education: The state of affairs. Journal of Public Affairs Education, 13–29. Retrieved May 19, 2015 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/23608932

Academics in homeland security

Universities in Protection (1 of 2)

In addition to the laboratories, DHS collaborates with several universities with centers of excellence in academia in order to secure the nation. These centers are involved in academic research and development regarding homeland protection. DHS centers of excellence bring together the nation's best experts and researchers to examine a variety of threats that include agricultural, chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological, explosive, and cyber terrorism, as well as the behavioral aspects of terrorism. The research on homeland protection varies from analyzing the economic risk of terrorism to developing methods of agrosecurity to dealing with the sociology of terrorism and bioterrorism. The prominent university-based centers of excellence are as follows:

The Homeland Security Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE)

The Homeland Security National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense (FAZD)

The National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD)

The Center for Behavioral and Social Aspects of Terrorism and Counterterrorism (START)

The Center of Excellence for Border Security and Immigration (COE BSI)

CREATE, established in 2004 and funded by the DHS, began at the University of Southern California. Today, CREATE universities, USC, and the University of Wisconsin are partnering with two new national DHS centers of excellence at Texas A&M University and University of Minnesota. These universities are considered among the country's top engineering schools and pioneers of distance education. CREATE is dedicated to modeling and analysis in risk assessment, economic assessment, and risk management. By developing models, experts are attempting to evaluate the risks, costs, and consequences of terrorism to protect the homeland.

CREATE also provides educational and training programs in homeland security and antiterrorism procedures. The aim of these programs is to augment the number of qualified professionals in the field of homeland security in public and private organizations. The educational programs focus on developing professionals through research, certificate courses, and short-term professional courses. The training programs enhance the knowledge of these professionals and develop homeland security leaders.

Universities in Protection (2 of 2)

In addition to CREATE, the FAZD in Texas is another academic center dedicated to homeland security and protection. FAZD primarily focuses on the threats posed by zoonotic diseases, which are passed to humans from animals and diseases carried into the country by foreign animals. The center also develops new vaccines and new methods of preventing and recovering from disease outbreaks and is involved in educational programs.

Another university-based center of excellence is NCFPD. Located at the University of Minnesota, NCFPD focuses on the prevention of deliberate contamination of the country's food supply. It also contributes to the detection of such contamination. Although the focus of the center's research is towards business or information technology (IT) approaches to supply chain management, it also investigates methods to improve response to public health epidemiology.

START, located at the University of Maryland, conducts research on the sociological perspectives of domestic terrorism. The center is involved in profiling research, which looks into the usefulness of demographic indicators. It also conducts research on developing geospatial, cultural, linguistic, and political indicators. These indicators are used to predict terrorist activity at the earliest point in time.

In 2004, DHS started providing undergraduate and graduate-level scholarships and fellowships to college students.

COE BSI was established in 2007 as a collaborative effort between DHS, University of Arizona, and University of Texas at El Paso. The University of Arizona leads the research component of COE BSI and the University of Texas at El Paso leads its educational components.

COE BSI focuses on technologies such as surveillance, screening, data fusion, and situational awareness using sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other technologies. COE BSI promotes research on the following:

Population dynamics

Administration of immigration, immigration policy, and enforcement of immigration laws

Operational analysis

Control and communications

Civic integration and citizenship

Homeland security - final discussion

Identified and described what local law enforcement should be doing to protect U.S. citizens from future criminal attacks or terror attacks.

The sworn duty of public official in America is to protect Americans from these threats. Horwitz argues that the Constitution is a "meta-rule of construction" dedicated to "national self-preservation", he stresses the importance of the Presidential Oath as dedicated to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution (2009, pp. 1069-1070). In America this oath is adhered to at the line level throughout the nation; DeShon contends that a “police officer's oath originates within the United States

Constitution” (2000, p. 6) and Amerson et al reiterate this at the level of sheriff; “ a sheriff should always perform his or her duties in accordance with the Constitution of the United States” (n.d., p.2). They key to the oath is "national self-preservation". To protect the citizens of this country, law enforcement officers must be aware of political interference, and be prepared to counter it. National security should not be allowed to be suborned by political pandering. Note that the oath is to the Constitution, not to any given law that may be unconstitutional, and especially not to any law that threatens national security.

Described how law enforcement agencies can identify terrorists living on the U.S. soil.

Terror suspects can be identified through information sharing from other agencies and through community policing as “The local law enforcement officer is the one the community member sees on a daily basis” (Angeles, 2013, p. 52). The cop on the beat will be the one to notice out of ordinary patterns. One issue that must be considered is that terror organizations often use the crime techniques of organized crime to generate funds. Sanderson states that” Transnational organized crime and international terrorism increasingly share both organizational and operational characteristics, and at times even partner with one another” (2004, p.49). Therefore law enforcement should be aware of crossover activity.

Identified and described the methods to be used to monitor terrorist activities.

LE agencies need to be careful while monitoring terrorists, as “They [terrorists] are on constant alert for people who might be monitoring their activities” (Dyson, 2008, p. 57). Dyson discusses a variety of surveillance tools and techniques (2008). Specific methods include monitoring cell phone calls and visual observation.

Explained how the United States can gain the support of other nations in combating terrorism.

Political entities, including the United States, act for their own survival and benefit. Diplomatic efforts should include the common threat that terrorists pose to all entities. Even in the case of Islam, terror groups are not always religiously,culturally, or politically in line with local communities. One of the factors of success of “The Surge” in Iraq in 2007 was the participation of local Sunni militias hostile to Al Qaeda barbarities One will note that Al Qaeda successor ISIS began taking hold in Iraq after the Iraqi (and Shi'ite) Prime Minister disbanded the local militias.

Analyzed whether foreign suspects should be brought to trial in the same manner as U.S. Citizens.

By the enacted laws of the United States and treaty participation, some would have us do so. However, remembering that the Constitution is an instrument of national self-preservation, there are arguments against doing so. Guiora compares the American, Israeli, Russian, Indian, and Spanish models of terrorist detention and trial (2007), while Elsea defends the American model of trying terrorists under a military tribunal (2001).

I wanted to thank everybody for the discussion, this has been a good class.

I'm on LinkedIn for those interested in networking.

www.linkedin.com/in/stevedurchin

Amerson, L., Champagne, G., Hodson, R., & Weintraub, R. (n.d.). Legal meaning of oath of office. National Sheriff's Association. Retrieved May 18, 2015 from http://www.sheriffs.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Legal%20Meaning%20of%20Oath%20of%20Office.pdf

Angeles, T. (2013, September). Maximizing intelligence sharing within the Los Angeles Police Department (Thesis). Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved October 17, 2014 from https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/37580

DeShon, R. W. (2000). Police officers oath of office and code of ethics a question of knowledge. Retrieved August, 20, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.dejurerepublicformichigan.org/files/OATH_ETHICS.pdf

Dyson, W. E. (2008). Terrorism: an investigator’s handbook (3rd ed). Newark, NJ: LexisNexis/Anderson Pub.

Elsea, J. (2001). Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying terrorists as war criminals before military commissions. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA452888

Guiora, A. N. (2007). Where are terrorists to be tried. Catholic University Law Review, 56.

Horwitz, P. (2009). Honor’s constitutional moment: The oath and presidential transitions. Northwestern University Law Review, 103(2), 1067–1080. Retrieved May 12, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/233344356?pq-origsite=summon

Sanderson, T. M. (2004). Transnational terror and organized crime: Blurring the lines. SAIS Review, 24(1), 49–61. Retrieved April 27, 2015 from http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v024/24.1sanderson.html

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Cole had an interesting point re: treating aliens with full rights.  I was unaware of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights that he asserts the U.S. signed in 1985 (p.372). I would also suggest that any Senator that ratified that treaty should be charged with treason.  Basically, as a signatory, we would have to give due process rights under American law to illegal combatants captured overseas.

On the other hand, were we to establish a legal category for known threats to the security of the country, whther citizen or not, then we would still be abiding by the terms of the treaty.

You are absolutely correct about our political correctness interfering with our security.  When the Clinton Administration failed to target and destroy Al Qaeda after their first attack on the World Trade Center, it created an atmosphere where attacking America was permitted.  Bin Laden stated that "When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like the strong horse" (Ajami, 2011, para. 5).  Writing arrest warrants for people that expect to die in the course of their terror attacks just does not deter their behavior; preemptively destroying their ability to attack, on the other hand, does deter it.

Ajami, F. (2011, May 3). Osama Bin Laden, weak horse. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved February 15, 2015 from http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704436004576299110143040714

that Ernst article suggests there may be from 20,000 to 30,000 known terrorist already within our borders?  That's scary. particularly when you consider that when a terrorist attack occurs, the media brushes it off. Or even worse, suggests it is the victim's fault and that American's should not criticize tyrannical philosophies.

I think the "ring of steel" would be a good idea theoretically, but the budgets of the cities that use it would have to be modified. The major issue people have with this type of system is that they don't understand the issue of public versus private.  People object to public surveillance systems because they think such systems violate their privacy.  Perhaps the easiest way to demonstrate the difference between public and private is the notion that you can't run around naked in public. Another issue is related to efficient use of the systems;  I'll link an article which focuses on how badly the "ring of steel" has been managed in London: Lewis, J. (2010, February 27). Police terror budget cut by millions after Ring of Steel blunder. Retrieved May 20, 2015 from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1254353/Police-terror-budget-cut-millions-Ring-Steel-blunder.html

Terrorism in American Cities

Terrorism in American Cities

A commonly agreed upon facet of defining terrorism is that the goal of an attack is to spread terror. One method of achieving this goal is by creating mass casualties. Mass casualties are easier to create in a city environment. Cities have been targeted repeatedly by terrorists; New York City in 1993 and 2001, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and Boston in 2013. The United States, as the principal symbol of liberty in the world, will be targeted again. Can American cities be protected by taking away the rights of American citizens?

Perhaps it would be better to to predict and preempt terror attacks. The capabilities for analyzing terrorist data and using that to predict terrorist activity is growing constantly. The use of statistical analysis and relationship mapping software technologies had advanced, but a true leap forward has been made in using the internet to build a human analysis network;“social forces that are propelling network intelligence – namely citizen groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around the

world – are formidable and continue to grow” (Deibert, 2003, p. 175). This prevents data from being "stovepiped”, “which means they keep much of the immediate results of their intelligence collection activities within their own institutional structure” (Lee & Schwartz, 2005, p. 1473). Once terrorists have been identified they can be killed or captured, preemptively ending their attacks. Terror attacks can never be fully prevented, especially in a country that tolerates extremist anti-American views and is open to free movement.

Local law enforcement must be involved in American counter terror efforts. This “need for improved sharing of intelligence information between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies was recognized as early as the 1964 Warren Commission report” (Davis, Rand Corporation, & National Institute of Justice (U.S.), 2010, p. 39). The attacks of 9/11 further confirmed such a need. Legislative reforms of the security community and the intelligence institutions removed some of the barriers for intelligence sharing. Many of the reforms of the 1970's were “based on a presumption that domestic terrorism could be handled by investigating crimes after they were committed rather than preventing them” (Powers, 2004, p. 45). Barriers of this type are not conducive to developing sound counterterror policy, and must be avoided.

It is not necessary for Americans to give up personal freedom for improved security. By using effective intelligence to target actual terrorists and preempting their attacks, there is no need for a mass data collection, “shotgun” approach to surveillance. Indeed, Americans are hostile to the idea of an all encompassing police state.“American legal traditions, cultural norms, and a deeply-ingrained minimalist philosophy regarding the size and capacity of the state make a heavy-handed approach both undesirable and politically unacceptable” (Clutterbuck & Rosenau, 2009, p.5). Americans may not be able to prevent large scale attacks on our cities, but we wouldn't be able to do so even with a security state.

References

Clutterbuck, L., & Rosenau, W. (2009). Subversion as a facet of terrorism and insurgency the case for a twenty-first century approach. Strategic Insights: v.8, issue 3 . Retrieved October 17, 2014 from https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/25445

Davis, L. M., Rand Corporation, & National Institute of Justice (U.S.). (2010). Long-term effects of law enforcement’s post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism and homeland security. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. Retrieved September 22, 2014 from http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=669776

Deibert, R. J. (2003). Deep probe: The evolution of network intelligence. Intelligence & National Security, 18(4), 175–193. doi:10.1080/02684520310001688925

Lee, R. D., & Schwartz, P. M. (2005). Beyond the “war” on terrorism: Towards the new intelligence network. Michigan Law Review, 103(6), 1446–1482. Retrieved September 10, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=17240839&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Powers, R. G. (2004). A bomb with a long fuse. American History, 39(5), 42–47. Retrieved September 10, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=14624935&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Effective Counter Terror Operations

• How effective are elite counterterrorism units? What impact do elite units have on international terrorism? Discuss.

Special operations units have been extremely effective against terrorism. From the assassination of Osama Bin Laden to the raid on Entebbe, units of highly trained men have performed key missions against terrorists. “the Sayeret Mat'kal (the General Staff's own reconnaissance commando unit) mobilized, rehearsed its plans, flew 2,500 miles, and struck at the Entebbe airport, rescuing more than 100 passengers and crew with a minimum loss of life”(Henriksen, 2007, p.18)

• What counterterrorism or combating terrorism measures work most effectively with the elite counterterrorism units, and which measures work least effectively for missions like hostage rescues, punitive strikes, abductions, and reconnaissance operations? Provide reasons and examples to support your answers.

The most effective counterterror measures that elite units can undertake are leadership decapitation tactics and reconnaissance missions. “targeted killings, whether conducted by Israel, the United States, Great Britain, or other nations, are more frequently the result of action un-dertaken not by conventional military forces, but rather by specialized troops, such as special operations forces (Sof)” (Hunter, 2009, p. 3). Hostage rescues have been the least effective, but they are also a potent tool in public relations/propaganda. One area that is overlooked in the context of elite unit operations is the role of training foreign, allied agencies to carry out operations that benefit the U.S.; elite units “have historically specialized in enabling partner nation foreign military capacity through the teaching of technical fighting and military administration skills “(Grespin, 2014, p.38)

• What are the challenges of creating a counterterrorism policy? Counterterrorism measures and policies are being created and implemented internationally. Do you think that counterterrorism policies are effective and can help control and combat terrorism? Why/why not? In what ways do they control and combat terrorism and in what areas are they weak? Explain.

The major challenge to designing, implementing, and maintaining a counterterrorism policy is that it can be likened to shoveling sand back into the sea, as it is a task that will never end. “Counterterrorism should be seen not as an effort to rid the world of terrorism, but as an ongoing struggle to constrict the operating environment in which terrorists raise funds, procure documents, engage in support activities, and conduct attacks” (Levitt, 2004, p.33). A secondary challenge to creating counterterror policy is the political consideration. Is there a political party willing to lie about national security in order to win votes? A country in which politicians conduct propaganda operations against their own defenders can not expect to create an effective counterterror policy. “a culture of denial exists on the left about the problem of Islamic terrorism. This takes four key forms: mystification (the failure or refusal to acknowledge its true character); displacement (the transformation of the perpetrators into avengers and the victims into wrong-doers); evasion (the reluctance or unwillingness to recognize its significance);and minimization (the unwillingness to recognize the scope of the problem)(Cottee, 2005, p.119).

Once these challenges have been recognized, effective counterterrorism policy requires operational bases. Roberts discusses these as “ three components of any government that must come together to form an alliance of shared capabilities, risk analysis, and political resolve” (2011, p. 125).

• Examine the current counterterrorism policy of the U.S. and discuss its effectiveness. In the light of the current counterterrorism policy in the U.S., how easy or how difficult is it for terrorist groups to execute acts of terror in the U.S.? Why?

The effectiveness of American counterterror policy has certainly reversed direction over the last six years. Iraq was abandoned despite the protestations of the security community, who were proven to be proven right; military capabilities have been cut severely; terrorists were traded for a known deserter; the current administration can't even be honest about naming the ideology that the majority of terrorists we are fighting follow. “We are at a point in our history where 'timidity' will prove an undesirable and fatal flaw in the defense of this nation”(Hughbank, 2009, p.49). However, it is not the failure to pursue the enemy in his own lair that opens America up as an easy terrorist target. We are an open society and we choose not to be hindered by onerous security restrictions. Terrorists, foreign and domestic, can use our freedom to move to attack us.

Which is why it is critical that we recognize and make war against ideologies that are hostile to the American ideals of freedom and capitalism, whether those enemies be foreign or domestic. This is reflected in the oath of service:
"I, (state name of enlistee), do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God" (Army Regulation 601-210).

• Do you agree that the U.S. counterterrorism policy is a just policy and protects the privacy rights of the citizens? Why/why not? What do you think should be given precedence—security of citizens or privacy rights of citizens? Why?

The domestic security history of the United States has been taken up with the argument between citizen rights and security needs from our inception as a country, and this debate can seen in such examples as The Alien and Sedition Acts up through the publicly contested NDAA. Privacy concerns have been around as long as the technology itself. “telephone surveillance is as old as telephony itself, dating back to the nearly simultaneous commercialization of the telephone and phonograph” (Agur, 2013, abstract). One thing to remember is that security and privacy concerns do not need to clash. “The balance between civil liberties and security is not a zero-sum game” (The Heritage Foundation, 2004, p. 7). By restricting surveillance methods to those who espouse anti-American ideologies instead of using mass collection techniques, we can maintain the balance.

Agur, C. (2013). Negotiated order: The fourth amendment, telephone surveillance, and social interactions, 1878-1968. Information & Culture, 48(4), 419-447. Retrieved from February 17, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1492199073?accountid=87314

Cottee, S. (2005). The culture of denial: Islamic terrorism and the delinquent Left. Journal of Human Rights, 4(1), 119–135. doi:10.1080/14754830590947653

Grespin, W. (2014). From the ground up: The importance of preserving SOF capacity building skills. Journal of Strategic Security, 7(2), 37–47. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.7.2.5

Henriksen, T. H. (2007). Security lessons from the Israeli trenches. Policy Review, (141), 17–31. Retrieved February 17, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/216454496?pq-origsite=summon

Hughbank, R. J. (2009). Guerilla warfare & law enforcement: Combating the 21st century terrorist cell within the U.S. Journal of Strategic Security, 2(4), 39–52. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.2.4.4

Hunter, T. B. (2009). Targeted Killing: Self-defense, preemption, and the war on terrorism. Journal of Strategic Security, 2(2), 1–52. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.1

Levitt, M. (2004). Untangling the terror web: Identifying and counteracting the phenomenon of crossover between terrorist groups. The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 24(1), 33–48. Retrieved January 24, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/231348224?pq-origsite=summon

Roberts, J. Q. (2011). Building a national counterterrorism capability: A Primer for operators and policymakers alike. Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 10(2), 125–138. Retrieved February 17, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1290416673?pq-origsite=summon

The Heritage Foundation. (2004). The Patriot Act reader: Understanding the law’s role in the  Global War on Terrorism. Retrieved February 14, 2015 from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/09/the-patriot-act-reader

I think targeted killings are a vital part of CT strategy; of course if we can bag a terrorist leader it is better than killing him, but you have to take the shots you're given. But targeted killings must be directed at targets that will have an impact on terrorist operations.  These should be either leaders or members of the support network.  It does not make sense to spend resources on an easily replaced "line" terrorist.  Targeting leaders is known as decapitation or kingpin tactics.“Kingpin strategies can effectively disrupt and fragment an illicit network, whether it be insurgent or profit-seeking“(Jones, 2013, p.170).  An overlooked strategy would be to assassinate or capture those members of terror networks that provide financial, logistical, propaganda, or recruiting services. I may have missed something, but my reading of the 2001 AUMF led me to believe that it authorized ops against terrorists involved with the 9/11 attacks.  I still haven't looked at the NDAA material to see if the scope of the domestic legalities has changed. As far as international law is concerned, terrorists have very few legal rights, as they do not respect the laws and customs of war.  Article 4 of the 3rd Convention is very clear about who is allowed the protection of the laws of war. People that target civilians do not apply. American law may not permit it, but under the Geneva Convention we could torture terrorists to death in broad daylight and it would be kosher. Thanks for the CFR reference; I haven't done a lot of study on the use of drones yet (institutional prejudice at play), and this looks like a good place to start. Convention (III) relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War. (1949). International Committee of the Red Cross. Retrieved February 18, 2015 from https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=2F681B08868538C2C12563CD0051AA8D Jones, N. (2013). The unintended consequences of kingpin strategies: kidnap rates and the Arellano-Félix Organization. Trends in Organized Crime, 16(2), 156–176. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1007/s12117-012-9185-x

I don't have a lot of faith in the ability of the UN to do much past bloviating.  I wont go into it, but my base objection is allowing terror supporting and /or tyrannical nations on the Security Council, which kind of defeats the purpose.  There are other criticisms of the UN from both Left and Right.

Wiki is not a valid reference, but here is a link to a Wiki page which outlines some criticism and some effectiveness evaluation of the UN to start searching
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_United_Nations

Make sure to use the references at the bottom of the page, and check out the "Talk" tab to see argumentation about what is or isn't included on the main page.

"We should not be constrained by Boy Scout ethics in an immoral world." (Kenneth Adelman)

That is a great quote.  It fits squarely with Kaplan's argumentation in Warrior Politics.

Intelligence, as we all have seen in this course, is the most important facet of counterterror (or almost ALL human endeavor).  O'Connor's point re: identifying the terrorists with the skills fits perfectly with Walt's discussion on targeted killings.

Kaplan, R. (2002) Warrior politics: Why leadership demands a pagan ethos. New York, New York. Vintage Books

I still haven't read enough of the USA PATRIOT Act, criticism of it, and defense of it, to make a judgement on it yet.

I was trying to find a definite answer on whether the NSA surveillance revealed by Snowden was legal or not.  I don't see how it could be, but I haven't been able to parse through the information I've read so far.

Most importantly though, I don't think it's necessary for the general public to lose any amount of liberty to gain security.  We should focus our attention on the people that promote anti-American ideology, not just Islamic but Leftist and racist ideologies as well.  We can analyze their relation networks to determine who they know that we need to know, and who not to bother with.  It is a waste of resources to use the shotgun approach in addition to a violation of American liberty.  Why should folks that hate our way of life get any benefit or protection from it?

I keep going back to this point.  The NSA was keeping tab on American porn habits, while the Tsarnaev brothers (the ones that Russian security told us about) planned their attack."The FBI said in a statement: 'The request stated that it was based on information that he was a follower of radical Islam and a strong believer, and that he had changed drastically since 2010 as he prepared to leave the United States for travel to the country’s region to join unspecified underground groups"  (The Huffington Post, 2013, para. 4)

Great counter-intelligence technique here:
FBI, "Sir, are you a terrorist?"
Tsarvaev, "No"
FBI, " OK, have a nice day!"

Boston Bombing suspect Tamerlan Tsarnaev questioned by FBI In 2011, after suspicions raised about radical Islamism. (2013, April 21). The Huffington Post UK. Retrieved February 18, 2015 from http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/04/21/boston-bombing-suspect-ta_n_3125896.html

I would contest the judgement that Delta Force erred in Operation Eagle Claw.  My opinion is that the JCS did not plan the op well at all.  There were not enough aircraft for redundancy, intelligence was poor, and using units from all services without training together first was asking for something bad to happen. "The involvement of multiple units - Sea Stallion helicopters, C-130 transport aircraft, Marine Corps pilots, Army Rangers and Delta Force operators ­ and stages in the mission makes it highly complex" (Fong, 2002, para .19)  Bureaucratic politics, in that all the services wanted to be represented, sabotaged the mission.

The good thing is that the services recognized this, and implemented some changes addressing those issues.

Fong, C. (2002). Operation Eagle Claw, 1980: A case study in crisis management and military planning. Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces V28, N2. Retrieved February 18, 2015 from
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2002/Vol28_2/5.htm