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Showing posts with label Hezbollah. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hezbollah. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 2, 2016

The arrest of Ali Khalil Mehri

The arrest of Ali Khalil Mehri demonstrates another source of terrorist funding, which is the sale of counterfeit products. Shelley argues that terrorists use such sales due to the “low risks” and “high profits” of the counterfeit trade (2012, abstract). In the case of Mehri, Paraguayan authorities arrested him in the course of investigating two terror attacks, and found Hezbollah propaganda and evidence of foreign money transfers (Arena, 2006, pp. 459-460). Levitt states that Mehri was arrested for “selling millions of dollars in pirated software and funding Hezbollah” (2005, p.9). Hudson notes that Mehri was arrested in the same building in which Paraguayan authorities later found over 4,000 counterfeit CD's and 80 machines capable of creating such counterfeits (2010, p. 30). Hudson also suggests that Mehri was able to escape from Paraguay to Syria based on his contributions to Paraguayan Deputy Angel Ramón Barchini (2002, p. 37).
The arrest of Mehri brings to attention how American authorities may detain a terror suspect within the United States. Should such suspects be held under criminal law, or should these cases be approached as a matter of national security? It must be noted that Mehri was a” a newly naturalized Paraguayan citizen” (2002, p. 37). In a hypothetical question of “how would this be handled in America, had this situation be handled here?”, we note that as an American citizen, Mehri would have had the full range of Constitutional rights had he been arrested in the United States. Of course, USCIS would have fallen short of it's mission if a person like Mehri was allowed to become a citizen. Of course, the younger Tsarnaev brother ( one of the Boston Bombers) had become a citizen (Ng,2013, factoid), so we do see that sometimes USCIS does fail in it's mission.
So why is it important that American citizens be given full protection under due process? Etter says:
“It is through a constitutional prism that American courts view all legal actions in the United States. Thus when those that have attempted to achieve their political and personal ambitions by means of force plotted against the government and their plots failed they were put before the American civil justice system to face trial for their actions” (2008, p.99).
Once we have abandoned our legal system, we are no longer Americans. However, that does not mean we can not set different legal standards for non-citizens , or take better care of who we extend citizenship to.







Arena, M. P. (2006). Hizballah’s global criminal operations. Global Crime, 7(3/4), 454–470. http://doi.org/10.1080/17440570601073186

Etter, G. W. (2008). Prosecuting Domestic Terrorists in the American Court System: A Study of Three Cases. Journal of the Institute of Justice and International Studies, (8), 99–119. Retrieved May 11, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/213962107?pq-origsite=summon

Hudson, R. A. (2002). A global overview of narcotics-funded terrorist and other extremist groups. Federal Research Division Library of Congress. Retrieved May 11, 2015

Hudson, R. A. (2010). Terrorist and organized crime groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America. Federal Research Division Library of Congress. Retrieved May 11, 2015 from http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf

Levitt, M. (2005). Hezbollah: Financing terror through criminal enterprise. Testimony given to Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC, 25. Retrieved April 13, 2015 from http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/313.pdf

Ng, Christina. (2013, April 19). Boston bomb suspect became a U.S. citizen on 9/11 last year. ABC News. Retrieved May 11, 2015 from http://abcnews.go.com/US/boston-marathon-bombing-suspected-tsarnaev-brothers/story?id=19000426

Shelley, L. I. (2012). The diverse facilitators of counterfeiting: A regional perspective. Journal of International Affairs, 66(1), 19–XV. Retrieved May 11, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1243043417?pq-origsite=summon


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Considering that Islam is both a political and religious  system, in which community laws (sharia) are the direct word of g*d, it is trickier to make a decision that would be "politically correct"...

and what about Muslims fleeing Islamic tyrannies?  I recognize that not all Muslims are 100% religiously faithful.

It is a hard question.  But I think I would err on the side of caution when it comes to America's safety

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Let' suppose you have 3 people; A, B, and C.

A is a known terrorist, B & C are not.
If A communicates with B; I think we should be able to spy on that communication because A is a terrorist.  But if B then communicates with C, we should not be able to spy on that communication.

...unless the communication between A and B establishes that B is a terrorist as well.






Good point re: Mehri's escape through corruption.  Angel Ramón Barchini was denied entry to the United States due to his ties with Islamist terrorists.

It was Barchini all along  (sorry, couldn't help myself lol)



Sunday, February 28, 2016

The Hammoud Facilitator Cell: Can the National Strategy Stop Similar Cells in Texas?

The Hammoud Facilitator Cell: Can the National Strategy Stop Similar Cells in Texas?

Homeland security is a different animal than national security. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Asset defines homeland security as a shared responsibility which requires coordination between Federal, state, and local agencies, the private sector and individual citizens. In contrast, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Asset defines national security in the context of those areas in which the Federal government has sole responsibility (2003, p vii).
The National Strategy for Homeland Security specifies two goals in the course of the strategy in dealing with terrorism
  • Identify and locate terrorists and uncover terrorist activity (2007, p.19)
  • Disrupt terrorists and their activities and networks (2007, p. 20)

The National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes that terrorist organizations and their facilitators use “financial systems to raise, store, and transfer funds that serve as the lifeblood of their operations” (2007, p.21). The cigarette smuggling crime ring of the Hammoud brothers serves as an example of the type of terrorist cell that operates within the United States, providing financial support for Hezbollah. Levitt discusses the Hammoud case in the context of financing Hezbollah (2005, p.8).
One method of achieving these goals in accordance with the shared responsibility for homeland security is through the creation of fusion centers. In the 2014–2017 National Strategy for the National Network of Fusion Centers, the vision is defined as connecting the diversity of public safety organizations “in a way that creates a national information sharing asset” (2014, p. iv). However, Gottschalk warns that “More than half of the strategies devised by organizations are never actually implemented” (2009. p.274).
The State of Texas avoids Gottschalk's pitfall and contributes to this national strategy. In 2003, The State of Texas established the Homeland Security Council. One of the duties delegated to the Governor is specifically to “detect and deter threats to homeland security” (Texas Homeland Security Council Overview, n.d, pp. 1-2). Texas recognizes that Hezbollah and Hamas are terror organizations with a network of supporters within the state (Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2010-2015, n.d, p.21). In Texas's strategic plan, there is also the awareness of the financial support that facilitators can provide to terrorists, and the crimes committed in the course of those activities; “Terrorists use criminal activities to accrue money needed to pay for recruiting and training, and to buy
false documents, weapons, explosives, and munitions” (n.d., p. 23). As an example of the information sharing necessary to fulfill the obligation of homeland security, in 2006 the Texas Fusion Center became part of “a memorandum of understanding” between the states of Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California to share intelligence regarding border security (Lee, Logan, Mitchell, and Trella, 2007, p. 55).
Clunan suggests that the fight against terrorist financing requires collective action between government agencies (2006, pp. 570-571). The United States and Texas have committed to this as a foundation of their homeland security strategies. Information sharing has proven to work in countering terrorist financing. The Hammoud case, which was opened before these strategies were formalized, serves as an example of how the process can succeed, and especially as an example of how local law enforcement is key in homeland security (Fromme & Schwein, 2007, p. 25).
Levitt's testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs regarding this should be read by everyone interested in or responsible for homeland security. The major concepts involve the the internal terror threat, the methods of terror finance, and how local agencies cooperated to counter these threats.









References

Clunan, A. L. (2006). The fight against terrorist financing. Political Science Quarterly (Academy of Political Science), 121(4), 569–596. Retrieved October 9, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=23680300&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Department of Homeland Security. (2007). National strategy for homeland security: Homeland Security Council. Retrieved September 22, 2014 from http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0iVf7NP4wz8C&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=%22make+sure+that+America+is+safer,+stronger,+and+better%22+%22end,+we+have+strengthened+our+homeland+security+through+foreign+partnerships,+and%22+%22our+Nation+is+safer,+but+we+are+not+yet+safe.+Since+September+11,+2001,+we+have+made%22+&ots=GnRBHMNVyi&sig=MDMhNrXEp4VHY_KC_HzgRqkiIfQ

Department of Homeland Security. (2003). The national strategy for the physical protection of critical infrastructures and key assets. Retrieved May 7, 2015 from http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA413033

Fromme, R., & Schwein, R. (2007). Operation Smokescreen: A successful interagency collaboration. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 76(12), 20–25. Retrieved April 30, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/215270968?pq-origsite=summon

Gottschalk, P. (2009). Law enforcement strategy implementation: The case of police intelligence strategy. Criminal Justice Studies, 22(3), 273–280. http://doi.org/10.1080/14786010903166981

Lee, E., Logan, C., Mitchell, J. T., and Trella, J. (2007). A governor’s guide to homeland security. Washington, D.C.: National Governors’ Association, Center for Best Practices. Retrieved 9/22/14 from http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0703GOVGUIDEHS.PDF

Levitt, M. (2005). Hezbollah: Financing terror through criminal enterprise. Testimony given to Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC, 25. Retrieved April 13, 2015 from http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/313.pdf

National Network of Fusion Centers. (2014). 2014–2017 National strategy for the national network of fusion centers. Retrieved April 24, 2015 from https://nfcausa.org/html/National%20Strategy%20for%20the%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers.pdf

Office of the Governor. (n.d.). Texas homeland security strategic plan 2010-2015. Retrieved May 7, 2015 from http://gov.texas.gov/files/homeland/HmLndSecurity_StratPlan2015.pdf

Texas Homeland Security Council. (n.d.). Texas homeland security council overview. Retrieved May 7, 2015 from http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/documents/HomelandSecurityCouncilOverview.pdf




Thursday, February 25, 2016

Operation Smokescreen

Operation Smokescreen

In 1995, West Virginia State Trooper Paul Koener stopped Chawki Hammoud with a van load of cigarettes with the tax stamps missing; in 1996 Trooper Koener stopped Chawki's brother Mohammed carrying $40,000 in cash on the same road (Lemon, 2014, p.1). During the same period of time, Detective Robert Fromme, working in a cigarette outlet store as a second job, observed the bulk purchase of cigarette on an almost daily basis (McCormack, 2009, p.4). Fromme documented this activity and brought it to the attention of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) in 1996, which in turn bought the matter to the FBI (McCormack, 2009, p.4). From 1996 to 1999, Fromme worked with the STF on smuggling charges. The FBI set up a case in 1999 which became known as Operation Smokescreen; investigating the ties between this cigarette smuggling ring and support for the terrorist group Hezbollah. Detective Fromme put aside pending indictments against the group of cigarette smugglers to cooperate with Operation Smokescreen (Fromme & Schwein, 2007, p.20). However, Fromme's work was not lost as the Iredell County Sheriff's Department that Fromme served was one of the law enforcement agencies that took part in the conclusion to Operation Smokescreen in 2000, arresting over 18 suspects in the terror supporting cell of criminals (CNN, 2000, para. 4).
McCormack contends that the most common encounter with terrorist suspects is via traffic stop (2009, p. 5). This can be seen in the case of Trooper Koener. A second method of tracking the terrorists was via Fromme's observation and documentation of the group's activities over a period of months.
Although the lead agency in Operation Smokescreen was the FBI, the case could not have been solved without the involvement of many agencies. The case originated with the Iredell County Sheriff's Department, who brought in the FBI. Intelligence developed by the FBI became the basis for involvement by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). The Canadian CSIS was also involved as some connections led to Hezbollah activity in Canada.(An assessment of the tools needed to fight the financing of terrorism, 2002, p.8) Fromme & Schwein discuss the roles of these agencies; ICSD and ATF worked the smuggling angle, INS and DSS worked the immigration fraud aspect of the case, while the FBI proceeded on the terror related and RICO elements of the case (2007, p. 22). Even the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department had a role to play, participating in the arrests (CNN, 2000, para. 4).
McCormack suggests that local police are the are “the eyes and ears of the community and nation” (2009, p.2). It is the work of law enforcement officers such as Koener and Fromme that brings the actions of terrorists to the point where they can be tracked and captured. This information benefits from collaboration of law enforcement agencies to share and collate this information; information that does not get to where it is needed is of no use. Carter suggests that “intelligence and information sharing can be effective in preventing terrorism and organized crime”(2004, p.4). Operation Smokescreen is a prime example of the responsibilitiy of law enforcement agencies to commit to information sharing.






















References

An assessment of the tools needed to fight the financing of terrorism, § Committee on the Judiciary (2002). United States Senate. Retrieved April 30, 2015 from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg88867/pdf/CHRG-107shrg88867.pdf

Carter, D. L. (2004). Law enforcement intelligence: A guide for state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. US Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Washington, DC. Retrieved April 24, 2015,from http://www.riskintel.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/07/Carter_Intelligence_Guide.pdf

CNN.com . Breaking news: Federal and state authorities in North Carolina announce “Operation Smokescreen”. (2000, July 20.). CNN. Retrieved April 30, 2015 from http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0007/21/bn.01.html

Fromme, R., & Schwein, R. (2007). Operation Smokescreen: A successful interagency collaboration. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 76(12), 20–25. Retrieved April 30, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/215270968?pq-origsite=summon

Lemon, J. (2014). How a hybrid anti-terrorist approach  could have prevented millions of dollars from  flowing to overseas terrorist organizations: A case study of the Hammoud terror cell (SAS White Paper). Retrieved April 27, 2015 from http://www.sas.com/resources/whitepaper/wp_40679.pdf

McCormack, W. (2009). State and local law enforcement: Contributions to terrorism prevention. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 78(3), 1–7. Retrieved April 30, 2015 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=i3h&AN=37599847&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Wednesday, February 24, 2016

Document Analysis II: Lebanon and Iran



Document Analysis II: Lebanon and Iran

Lebanon plays a part in the history of Hezbollah as the place of it's birth; Hezbollah can trace it's roots back to the Amal militia, created by Musa al-Sadr (Arena, 2006, p.456). Musa is the cousin of Muqtada al-Sadr, the one-time leader of the Mahdi Army in Iraq. The Amal militia was created by the Lebanese Shi'a during the Civil War of 1975. After the Israeli invasion of 1982, Iran sent 1500 “Revolutionary Guard to...infiltrate organizations such as Amal and train Lebanese Shia” (Arena, 2006, p. 457). Hezbollah was formed in these efforts. However, Iran has has been a major contributor to the growth of Hezbollah. Szekely asserts that “From its inception, its most important foreign relationship was with Iran, based on both a shared ethno-communal identity and a shared ideology” (2012, p. 115). In addition, Lebanon may be the birthplace of Hezbollah's drug smuggling activities. Arena suggests that Hezbollah may have first started smuggling opium and hashish out of the Bi’qa Valley (2006, p. 462).

Rudner lists the three major sources of income for Hezbollah; assistance from Iran and Syria, levies upon business in the area under Hezbollah's control, and income derived from the expatriate Lebanese community (2010, pp. 700-101). Levitt breaks down the sources comprising expatriate funding; foreign remittances, charities/front organizations, and criminal enterprises (2005, p.5). Arena states that Iran is the “chief finnancial sponsor” of Hezbollah (2006, p. 455). Updating Levitt's 2005 estimates, Levitt and Jacobson content that Iran provides $200 million a year to Hezbollah (2008, p. 75). Levitt and Jacobson further contend that, as a sovereign state, Iran has direct access to the international banking system (2008, p. 68). The Lebanese government also supports Hezbollah by financing projects initiated by Hezbollah in areas under Hezbollah control (Rudner, 2010, p. 704). This is addition to the tax levies that Hezbollah places upon it's controlled territory.

It is in the criminal enterprises arena that we return our discussion to the Hammoud brothers; were they just running a crime ring, or were they acting as facilitators to fund Hezbollah's terrorist activity?In United States vs. Hammoud, testimony indicates that money generated from the criminal operations was given by direct intermediary to Hezbollah (2004, para. 7) In addition, Lemon cites “Ominous photos of Hammoud and his band training with assault rifles and grenade launchers on rooftops in Beirut” (2014, p.1). It is clear that this criminal operation was indeed one of the sources of foreign income used to support Hezbollah.





Arena, M. P. (2006). Hizballah's Global Criminal Operations. Global Crime, 7(3/4), 454-470. doi:10.1080/17440570601073186

Lemon, J. (2014). How a Hybrid Anti-Terrorist Approach  Could Have Prevented Millions of Dollars From  Flowing to Overseas Terrorist Organizations A Case Study of the Hammoud Terror Cell (SAS White Paper). Retrieved April 27, 2015 from http://www.sas.com/resources/whitepaper/wp_40679.pdf

Levitt, M., & Jacobson, M. (2008). The U.S. campaign to squeeze terrorists' financing. Journal of International Affairs, 62(1), 67-XI. Retrieved April 27, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com/docview/220695733?accountid=87314
Levitt, M. (2005). Hezbollah: Financing terror through criminal enterprise. Testimony given to Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC, 25. Retrieved April 13, 2015 from http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/313.pdf

Rudner, M. (2010). Hizbullah terrorism finance: Fund-raising and money-laundering. Studies In Conflict & Terrorism, 33(8), 700-715. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2010.494169

Szekely, O. (2012). Hezbollah’s survival: Resources and relationships. Middle East Policy, 19(4), 110–126. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00564.x

United States v. Hammoud. (2004.). Retrieved April 28, 2015 from http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-4th-circuit/1235846.html


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.  Stronger border and immigration control, including an in-depth verification of all marriages between foreigners and Americans, with priority on marriages with those from primarily Muslim populated countries.
2. The seizure of all funds related to the Iranian government; if we can forego due process in drug possession cases, then we need to do it in security cases
3. The seizure of all funds in charities directed to the Islamic world.
4.  The capture and enhanced interrogation of all known terrorists facilitators; this includes those suspected of being such.  Persons due the rights of citizens will be treated on a legal basis.
4.  War against Iran; targeted strikes against all Revolutionary Guard and Qods installations.
5. War against Hezbollah' targeted strikes against all centers of organized activity.
6.  Cutting off aid and trade to all countries that do not mirror our actions.

Of course, "taking" these actions is easy when I can do them on my keyboard.  But I will say this, half-measures and compromises do not solve problems against those that intend us harm.

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You make an excellent point about hitting close to home.  It's not just that terrorists are funding their operations locally, it's that they are training with weapons too.  Islamic terror attacks tend to be targeted at creating mass casualties against civilians...Mumbai, the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, the attacks on schools in Nigeria

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Speaking of striking close to home:
Two gunmen (most probably Islamist) were killed attacking a cartoon contest in Garland tonight.  The contest had a theme critical of Islam.

http://www.breitbart.com/texas/2015/05/03/officer-and-two-suspects-down-in-gunfight-at-islamic-cartoon-contest-in-texas-possible-explosives-found/

Tuesday, February 23, 2016

Hezbollah's monetary terror

In 2005, Dr. Matthew Levitt with The Washington Institute for Near East Policy gave testimony to the United States Senate to the effect that Hezbollah is not only a terrorist threat to the United States, but that criminal enterprises run by Hezbollah within the United States play a part in financing Hezbollah’s activities (2005). Levitt argues that Hezbollah also recieves between $100 million and $200 million a year in funding from Iran (2005, pp. 3-4). Finally, Levitt asserts that Hezbollah recieves unspecified totals in funding from foreign expatriates and “charitable” front groups (2005, pp. 5-6)

Perhaps one reason that totals from expatriate remittances are hard to specify is the use of alternate remittance systems. Danziger explains the hawala system as an informal system thast is based on trust, the use of brokers, and the minimal use of recorded documentation. (2012, p. 213). Danziger concludes that the use of such remittance systems is hard to track due to this lack of documentation (2012, p. 214). Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan discuss the use of front groups; front groups use legal methods of transferring funds and are often otherwise legitmate organizations, making the detection of transferrence of funds used for supporting terrorism harder to detect (2012, pp. 297, 299). Clunan specifies that such legitimate operations can be both “humanitarian and business organizations” (2006, p. 570). Levitt asserts that such fronts include some Western Union offices (pp. 5, 11).

Hezbollah uses it's funding to pay for information on Israeli infrastructure, even by bribing Israeli security personnel (Levitt, 2005, p.10). Hezbollah’s ability to pay for intelligence regarding our own infrastructure becomes a dangerous consideration when factoring in George Tenet's testimony that "Hezbollah, as an organization with capability and worldwide presence, is [al-Qaeda's] equal, if not a far more capable organization” (Levitt, 2005, pp. 2-3).

The Hamoud brothers, Mohammed and Chawki, could be considered as “facilitators” for Hezbollah. Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan explain that a “facilitator”'s main role is the “raising, storing and distributing” of terrorist support finances (2012, p. 295). Levitt discusses the Hamoud case, in which the brothers were convicted for providing funding for Hezbollah; funds that were raised through criminal cigarette smuggling in the United States (2005, p.8). Realuyo discusses another facilitator, Ayman Joumaa, a “drug kingpin” whose smuggling activities were considered “critical” support for Hezbollah (2014, p.123).

The Hamouds and Joumaa represent a fraction of the types of crime conducted by Hezbollah’s facilitators. Among the crimes beyond smuggling listed by Levitt are; the theft and resale of goods, welfare fraud, financial instrument fraud, counterfeiting, import-export fraud, the sale of unlicensed goods, and extortion of Arabs under the pretense of barakat (2005, pp. 8-9). Myres reiterates this list and adds to it the diamond trade (also discussed by Levitt) and autombile theft (2012, p.696).

Myres discussion of the diamond trade highlights that Hezbollah’s criminal enterprises are a worldwide phenomenon. Joumaa did his drug business throught South and Central America...indeed, his major trading partner in Mexico was los Zetas, a narcoterrorist cartel (Realuyo, 2014, p.123). However, the full range of criminal actions in the United States is followede throughotu the world.





Clunan, A. L. (2006). The fight against terrorist financing. Political Science Quarterly (Academy of Political Science), 121(4), 569–596. Retrieved October 9, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=23680300&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Danziger, Y. (2012). Changes in methods of freezing funds of terrorist organisations since 9/11. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 15(2), 210–236. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1108/13685201211218234

Levitt, M. (2005). Hezbollah: Financing terror through criminal enterprise. Testimony given to Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Washington, DC, United States Senate, Retrieved April 13, 2015 from http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/313.pdf

Myres, G. (2012). Investing in the market of violence: Toward a micro-theory of terrorist financing. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35(10), 693–711. http://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.712031

Raghavan, S. V., & Balasubramaniyan, V. (2012). Financial facilitators: an important component of terror networks. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 15(3), 294–303. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1108/13685201211238043

Realuyo, C. B. (2014). The terror-crime nexus: Hezbollah’s global facilitators. Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations, 5(1), 116–131. Retrieved January 24, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1566203785?pq-origsite=summon

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By targeting the facilitators for enhanced interrogation or for assassination..  Wilner asserts that “The literature on targeted killings suggests that their use diminishes the coercive and operational capability of violent, non-state groups in a number of ways”(2010, p. 312).  Primarily,  these discussions are directed towards the leaders of terrorist groups., but the effectiveness of "decapitation" strategy would certainly apply to any person conducting critical support to a terror group.

Obviously, you can't use this strategy against U.S. citizens or legal residents because due process applies; we need to consider better ways to deal with security threats under due process, but this is an old argument (all the way back to the Alien and Sedition Acts).
Wilner, A. S. (2010). Targeted killings in Afghanistan: Measuring coercion and deterrence in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(4), 307–329. doi:10.1080/10576100903582543

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It would be hard to determine if funding terrorists through the re-routing of "charity" is a new phenomenon; once the money leaves our country, it is almost impossible to account for.

I know there have been cases in which some of these front "charities" have been caught .  Although not tied to Hezbollah, five leaders of the Holy Land Foundation were convicted of providing material support to Hamas in 2008.  The FBI had been investigating them since 1994 (
No Cash for Terror:Convictions Returned in Holy Land Case, 2008, para. 1,4,8)

I guess I have to reverse my comment in the first paragraph...it looks like the use of "charity" fronts is a long used tactic of terrorist facilitators.
No Cash for Terror:Convictions Returned in Holy Land Case. (2008, November 25).  Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Retrieved April 27, 2015 from http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/november/hlf112508

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I agree that we should not hate fellow Americans, but we do need to recognize that there are many Americans, particularly in areas of influence such as politics, the media,  academia, and even a few in our national security community, that deny there is a problem with Islamic based terrorism.  Cottee refers to this as a "culture of denial" (2005, p.119).  Cottee also discusses the history of an anti-American ideology in the community that practices this modern "culture of denial" (2005, pp. 129-131).  From my own studies in COINTELPRO operations against subversives and terrorists, I will tell you that quite a few of those that are influential today were in those anti-American subversive and terrorist groups in the 1960's/'70's. 
I also think that there is a normal human tendency to stick one's head in the sand and to ignore problems; this is evidenced by a strong strain of isolationism in American politics.  People don't want to roll up their sleeves and get work done to avoid problems, but they will react once those problems get big enough to bite them on the posterior.
Cottee, S. (2005). The Culture of Denial: Islamic Terrorism and the Delinquent Left. Journal of Human Rights, 4(1), 119–135. http://doi.org/10.1080/14754830590947653
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Roberts states that Hezbollah is the terrorist group responsible for the deaths of more Americans up until 9/11 (2013, p.109).  Although Hezbollah denies responsibility for the terror attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in Beriut in 1983, a 2003 court case found them guilty; "
U.S. District Judge Royce C. Lamberth said the suicide truck bombing was carried out by the group Hezbollah with the approval and funding of Iran's senior government officials" (CNN, 2203, para. 2).  This goes back to my and x's contention that Hezbollah is a front group for Iran.


CNN.com - Iran responsible for 1983 Marine barracks bombing, judge rules - May. 30, 2003. (2008, December 6). Retrieved April 29, 2015, from https://web.archive.org/web/20081206151021/http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/05/30/iran.barracks.bombing/

Roberts, M. (2013). Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God. By Matthew Levitt, Ph.D. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013. ISBN 978-1-62616-013-2. Bibliography. Sources cited. Index. Pp. xv, 407. $32.95. Journal of Strategic Security, 6(4), 109–111. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.6.4.8