Evolution of community policing

Chicago and Community Policing

How did the changing political landscape in Chicago in the 1970s and 1980s impact the implementation of community policing? Did the increasing cultural variation in the workforce in Chicago law enforcement agencies influence the beginning of the community policing movement? How?

The changing political environment between 1969 and 1991 can be demonstrated by two cases that bookend this era. Both cases involve violence on the part of the Chicago PD, and both have been portrayed as racist. Although an actual examination of these cases show a retaliatory motive for the actions of the policemen involved, the portrayal of these cases as racist damaged relations between the Department and the black community. In addition, the cases muddied the water regarding an objective accounting of the prevalence of truly racist actions taken by members of Chicago PD

The first case was the assassination of Black Panther Fred Hampton on December 4, 1969. As part of the COINTELPRO program, FBI agents had been pressuring CPD into working action against Hampton, newly appointed as the Chief of Staff for the Black Panthers. The agents tried several times to involve CPD without success(Gentry, 1991, p. 620-621)...until the ambush and murder of Chicago Police officers Frank G. Rappaport and John Gilhooly by the Black Panthers, “a racist, radical group that professed the murders of law enforcement officers” (Officers Down Memorial Page, 2012, para. 2, 4). On November 21, the CPD agreed to take a role, and in the early morning of December 4, a combined agency strike force kicked in the door of the apartment in a raid that eliminated two Black Panthers including Hampton and captured five others(Gentry, 1991, p. 621). The term “assassination”can be used, as the layout of the apartment including the bed in which Hampton slept was known, and pictures of the scene show bullet holes in the wall at that location. Due to the reluctance of CPD to participate until the murders of it's own, it is likely that the basis for action was retaliatory as opposed to racist.

The second case can be seen in the 1989 and subsequent trials of Jon Burge for torturing suspects. This case was based on the murders of Patrolmen William P. Fahey and Richard J. O'Brien. “The shootings brought to four the number of officers fatally shot in Chicago that month” (LaPeter, 2004, para. 11). Burge was accused of torturing suspect Andrew Wilson, who went to the hospital for injuries sustained as a result. LaPeters accuses Burge of using torture on suspects for twenty years (2004, para. 4). Burge was never convicted on charges related to torture, but was eventually convicted of perjury and obstruction of justice. Considering the original crime, and that the bulk of other torture allegations were in capitol cases, it is likely that Burge's criminal acts were of a retaliatory nature.

Even so, the charges of racism create an environment in which a community that likely suffers from actual cases of police racism is subjected to propaganda, and not modes of creating harmony between police and the community they serve. One goal of Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), Chicago's community policing project, is to create a “stronger government-community partnership” (Daley & Rodriguez, 1993, p. 12). However, Daley and Rodriguez don't discuss the racial perceptions of that partnership, nor the role that minority officers play in it. The Chicago PD does understand that minority relations are important: in 2000, a meeting was held to discuss what needed to be done to strengthen that partnership, “Strengthening Relations Between Police and Minority Communities: Ensuring accountability for effective policing in Chicago’s diverse neighborhoods” (Chicago Police Department). Even so, minority recruitment onto the force was not brought up as an issue. Perhaps CPD was not sure this was an effective solution. Weitzer, Tuch, and Skogan discuss the perceptions that black communities hold of their local police departments, and did not find a consistent relationship between positive views of police and minority makeup of police forces, but rather suggested further testing on the matter (2008, pp. 421-422).

Chicago Police Department. (2000). Strengthening relations between police and minority communities: Ensuring accountability for effective policing in Chicago’s diverse neighborhoods. Retrieved May 22, 2015 from https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/ portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/Other%20Reports/RaceRelations.pdf

Daley, R. and Rodriguez, M. (1993). A strategic plan for reinventing the Chicago Police Department: Together we can. Chicago Police Department. Retrieved May 22, 2015 from http://www.popcenter.org/library/unpublished/OrganizationalPlans/

37_Together_We_Can.pdf

Gentry, C. (1991). J. Edgar Hoover: the man and the secrets. New York: Norton.

LaPeter, L. (2004, August 29). Torture allegations dog ex-police officer. St. Petersburg Times. Retrieved May 22, 2015 from http://www.sptimes.com/2004/08/29/Worldandnation/Torture_allegations_d.shtml

The Officer Down Memorial Page. (2012).Patrolman Frank G. Rappaport. Retrieved May 22, 2015 from http://www.odmp.org/officer/11010-patrolman-frank-g-rappaport

Weitzer,R., Tuch,S., and Skogan, W. (2008). Police–community relations in a majority-black city. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 45(4). Retrieved May 22, 2015 from http://skogan.org/files/Police_Community_Relations_in_a_Majority_Black_City.pdf

a good point about revenge.  Although such attacks are rare, McGovern found that 51% of targeted revenge attacks against criminal justice professionals took place at their home (2013, p. 2).
Going past that issue, we move into issues of personal liberty.  Individuals in this country can choose where and how they live based upon their means and desires.
And while it is expected that sworn officers are "on duty" 24/7, in reality, we all need down time, and dealing with job related stress I would suggest this is more important to policemen.
On the other hand, considering budget resources, how about the idea of establishing "barracks" in high crime residential areas, with officers are paid extra to live in and be there for emergency situations  ( an officer would not only have to live in the neighborhood, but would have to spend a minimum amount of verifiable hours in the that neighborhood)?  Optimally, you would have several officers sharing a house to minimize revenge risks.

McGovern, G. (2013). Murdered justice: An exploratory study of targeted attacks on the justice community.  Police Chief Magazine.  Retrieved May 23, 2015 from
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/issues/72013/pdfs/MurderedJusticeAnExploratoryStudy.pdf

Although the term "police riot" is often used to describe the CPD's reaction to the rioters at the Democrat National Convention in 1968 it is rarely mentioned that violent confrontation is what the leftists of SDS were seeking to create.  Altough the reforms of the mid-60's had achieved great progess in areas the radicals claimed to support, they resorted to "terror tactics" (Mallin, 1971, p.19).  Many SDS  member found cooperation with NCAAP to be "immoral", for example
(George, 1996), p. 128). .While SDS and other New Left groups were unable to explain exactly what the "imperialism" they fought against was (Varon, 2004, p.51), they had no difficulty in declaring their support for the Marxist position.  In this environment, Leftist assaults on policemen were increasing; by 1970 the number of policemen killed had quadrupled the average rate of the previous years
(Mallin, 1971, p.18). It was in this environment of hatred for America and leftist violence that SDS leaders organized the riot, "they knew that a confrontation in the streets of Chicago...would explode in political shocks..."(Collier & Horowitz, 2006, pp. 144-145).  This type of planned violence is characteristic of a movement (SDS) in which "the rights of the majority are held in derision, and political opponents are prevented from speaking out" (Gerberding & Smith, 1970, p. 25). 

Collier, P., & Horowitz, D. (2006). Destructive generation: second thoughts about the sixties. San Francisco: Encounter Books.

Gerberding, W., & Smith, D. (Eds.). (1970). The radical Left:The abuse of discontent. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

George, J. (1996). American extremists: militias, supremacists, klansmen, communists & others. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books.

Mallin, J. (Ed.). (1971). Terror and urban guerrillas; a study of tactics and documents. Coral Gables, Fla: University of Miami Press.

Varon, J. (2004). Bringing the war home: the Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and revolutionary violence in the sixties and seventies. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Community policing isn't really a new concept, as much as a way to attempt to integrate sometimes conflicting goals of the police mission.   Wilson explains the dilemma from a pre "community policing" perspective.  One one hand, a goal of policework is the maintenance of public order; a goal that members of the community may disagree on how to best achieve, or even on a common definition of order ( apply cultural conflict models here).  The other goal is law enforcement; a goal that some methods of achieving place the police into conflict with the community.
It is interesting that Wilson suggests dividing police forces into components specializing in each function, one group devoted to public order and the other into law enforcement.
On a last note, Wilson discusses the use of intelligence to identify "bad actors" in a neighborhoods years before the ILP model is developed.  Very few of the community policing models are "new", but it seems that some models apply to some situations while others don't, and that these situations change.

Wilson, J. Q. (1968). Dilemmas of Police Administration. Public Administration Review, 28(5).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Challenges to Mission Accomplishment

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Challenges to Mission Accomplishment

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) faces a myriad of challenges in facing the threats presented to the security of the United States. Partisan politics, organizational issues, concerns about civil liberties, and interorganizational law enforcement relations all interfere with the ability of the FBI to serve their mission; since 9/11, the primary responsibility of the FBI is counterterrorism.

Political grandstanding and hackery is nothing new to American politics. One example of this affecting the FBI is in Sen. Leahy's attack on the Bush Administration by proxy of asserted FBI failures (United States Senate, 2006, p.4).

There are three organizational problems that the FBI faces. The first is their responsibility for multiple goals. Svendson notes that “A persistent but frequently overlooked problem for the FBI is balancing multiple roles” (2012, p.376). A GAO report highlights the issues with vacancies in the counterterror mission, partly a result of shifting agents fro the CT mission (2012). Agency turf problems are also an issue; “Federal Bureau of Investigation officials are in a turf battle with other federal law-enforcement agencies over perceived attempts to muscle into what the FBI considers its territory” (Grossman, 2014, para. 1). The third issue is internal security with the issue. A RAND study examines this issue, particularly in the context of mole Robert Hansson (Treverton et al, 2003).

Concerns about civil liberties also raise opposition to FBI methods. Berman contends that “a Federal Bureau of Investigation wielding robust domestic intelligence-collection powers poses a threat to civil liberties” (Berman, 2014, abstract). However, we have also seen the problems that arise when FBI intelligence operations are overly restrictive, and agents find themselves as “risk aversive”, as Powers would explain.(2004, p.47). This is an area in which effort must be made to balance security with freedom.

Other interorganizational issues may arise with the consideration of relations with local law enforcement agencies. The FBI's major contribution is “the ability to communicate and disseminate intelligence through FIGs has proven effective, greatly improving coordination between agencies at the federal, state,and local levels” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006, p. 6). There are those that would call for local agencies to be subordinate to the FBI, however those calls seem to ignore the system of checks and balances to central power that is the American federal system. Kincaid and Cole bring up the point that the major terror attacks on 9/11, in particular, the response of local agencies, “vindicated the values of self-government and the system of federalism” (2002, p.181). Fromme and Schwein use Operation Smokescreen as an example of successful agency cooperation, as opposed to hierarchical command (2007, p. 6).

Other examples of successful agency cooperation can be seen in the use of Intelligence Centers and Joint Task Forces. Each model is best used in the role it was created for, but both models benefit greatly from agency cooperation such as that illustrated in Operation Smokescreen. In the case of drug task forces, they “were designed to combine resources of many local police

departments and provide services across jurisdictions” (Reichert & Sylwestrzak, 2012, p.1). The mission of an intelligence center is to compile, analyze, and disseminate criminal or terrorist data, including public safety threats of all natures, and to support efforts to anticipate and criminal or terrorist activity (National Network  of Fusion Centers, 2014, p. 8). For all practical purposes, the intent and operations of the two models are the same.

References

Berman, E. (2014). Regulating domestic intelligence collection. Washington and Lee Law Review, 71(1), 3–91. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/ docview/1516782598?pq-origsite=summon

FBI oversight hearing before the committee on the judiciary  United states Senate. 109^th Congress Second session. Serial No. J–109–122, § Committee on the judiciary (2006). Washington, D. C.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2006). FBI’s field intelligence groups and police: Joining forces. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 75(5), 1–6. Retrieved October 3, 2014 from http://www2.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2006/may2006/may2006leb.htm

Fromme, R., & Schwein, R. (2007). Operation Smokescreen: A successful interagency collaboration. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 76(12), 20–25. Retrieved April 30, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/215270968?pq- origsite=summon

Grossman, A. (2014, August 26). FBI agents say rivals encroach on their turf. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved August 27, 2014 from http://online.wsj.com/articles/fbi-agents-say-rivals- encroach-on-their-turf-1409095148

Kincaid, J., & Cole, R. L. (2002). Issues of federalism in response to terrorism. Public Administration Review, 62(S1), 181–192. Retrieved September 28, 2014 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/197170960/3D62A896B4E846 83PQ/18?accountid=87314

National Network  of Fusion Centers. (2014). 2014–2017 National strategy  for the  national network of  fusion centers. Retrieved April 24, 2015 from https://nfcausa.org/html/National %20Strategy%20for%20the%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers.pdf

Powers, R. G. (2004). A bomb with a long fuse. American History, 39(5), 42–47. Retrieved September 10, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx? direct=true&db=a9h&AN=14624935&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Reichert, J., & Sylwestrzak, A. (2012). Examining multi-jurisdictional drug task force operations. Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. Retrieved August 22, 2014 from http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/ResearchReports/Examining_multi- jurisdictional_drug_task_force_operations_Aug2012.pdf

Svendsen, A. (2012). The Federal Bureau of Investigation and change: Addressing US domestic counter-terrorism intelligence. Intelligence & National Security, 27(3), 371–397. http://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.668080

Thornburgh, D.(2005). Transforming the FBI progress and challenges: A report by a panel of the National Academy of Public Administration for the U.S. Congress and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: National Academy of Public Adminstration. Retrieved May 20, 2015 from http://www.napawash.org/Pubs/FBI010505.pdf

Treverton, G. F., Darilek, R., Gabriele, M., Libicki, M., & Williams, W. (2003). Reinforcing security at the FBI. Santa Monica, CA. RAND Corporation.

United States General Accountability Office. (2012). FBI counterterrorism vacancies have declined but FBI has not assessed the long-term  sustainability of its  strategy for addressing  vacancies (No. GAO-12-533).

Local Law Enforcement Agencies and Counterterrorism Responsibilities

Local Law Enforcement Agencies and Counterterrorism Responsibilities

The terror attacks on the United States of 9/11 produced a shift in strategic thinking in protecting the American people. “National Security”, is defined the concept that the context of those areas in which the Federal government has sole responsibility (The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, 2003, p. vii).The concept of “Homeland Security” was developed after 9/11 to complement the “National Security” concept. “Homeland Security” is defined as a shared responsibility which requires coordination between Federal, state, and local agencies (The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, 2003, p. vii). How have local agencies responded to these new responsibilities for countering terror?

Reaves finds that nine percent of agencies had counterterror (“anti-terror”) task forces, comprising a nationwide total of 2,700 officers. The likelihood that an agency had a task force or a written terror response policy had a strong tendency to increase as the population of the jurisdiction increased (2010, p.30). In addition, there are approximately 4,000 fulltime intelligence analysts nationwide assigned to counterterror responsibilities (Reaves, 2010, p.30). The employment of these analysts matches the tendency be be more likely as served population increases (Reaves, 2010, Appendix Table 18). This may indicate a budgetary concern, as this tendency is mirrored in other specialized policing functions such as drug, gang, and human trafficking task forces (Reaves, 2010, pp.29-30). A budgetary factor can also be seen in that both minimum training hours and base pay are also affected by the serving population size (Reaves, 2010, p. 12). Of course, this is based on the assumption that larger served population sizes have increased budget resources, and Reaves demonstrates this to be true (2010, Figure 1).

Reaves does not differentiate between type of agency (state, county, municipal, or other) in this compilation. However, it is likely that the type of agency can be linked to the size of the population served. With the exception of major cities, such as those listed in Appendix Table 1 (Reaves, 2010), agency type will reflect population. State agencies will have greater served populations than will county agencies who will in turn have greater served populations than do municipal agencies. In addition, state agencies are likely to have specialized intelligence sections. Carter discusses the growing impetus within the United States throughout the 1960's and 1970's to create intelligence sections in response to organized crime (2005, pp.56-58).

Even so, some local agencies (mostly the smaller agencies) do not have a budget to create a counterterrorism plan, as discussed in the second paragraph above. In addition, an agency with limited resources will have a lesser capacity for an organizational understanding of the homeland security responsibilities as they won't have the time to study the issue. This does not have to be the case; organizers of the “Campus Chaos” training exercises, a Central Texas multi-jurisdictional all-hazards event, discuss the inclusion of smaller agencies into the exercises (Miller et al, 2015). Considering that homeland security is based on cooperation, this is a good model to emulate.

This kind of cooperation becomes necessary considering the transnational threats that globalization has presented towards homeland security. The RAND corporation details some of these threats; weapons proliferation, ethnic violence, cyber attacks, drug trafficking, and the spread of infectious diseases (Davis, 2003, pp. 1-2). The study did not include illegal immigration. Perhaps the most glaring example of a combination of most of these factors is the impact that narcoterror cartels have on the United States. A State of Texas Department of Public Safety study notes that cartel activities are a significant threat to Texas (Department of Public Safety, 2013, p.2).

References

Carter, D. L. (2005). Brief history of law enforcement intelligence: Past practice and recommendations for change. Trends in Organized Crime, 8(3), 51–62. Retrieved September 10, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=17060939&site=ehost- live&scope=site

Davis, L. (2003). Globalization’s Security Implications (No. IP-245-RC). Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Retrieved May 18, 2015 from

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/issue_papers/2005/IP245.pdf

Department of Homeland Security. (2003). The national strategy for the physical protection of critical infrastructures and key assets. Retrieved May 7, 2015 from http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai? verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA413033

Department of Public Safety. (2013). Texas Public Safety Threat Overview 2013. . Retrieved January 15, 2015 from http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director_staff/media_and_communications/threatOverview.pdf

Miller, D., Thomas, J., Faulkner, J., and Kienke, K. (2015, May). Campus Chaos 2014: What were we thinking? Panel Discussion at the Texas 2015 Emergency Management Conference. San Antonio, Texas

Reaves, B. A. (2010). Local police departments (2007). Bureau of Justice Statistics. Retrieved May 17, 2015 from http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf

Contempory threats and American Law Enforcement

Are the concerns of the Director of the FBI valid? Why? Does giving top priority to some crimes distract law enforcement agencies from basic policing?

Any agency with limted resources has to determine how to priortize the use of those resources. Law enforcement agencies perform several different missions as part of their basic policing services. However, the primary function of any law enforcement agency is the protection of their commuity. Gomez sees counterterror operations as “greater sharing of classified domestic national security intelligence with state, local and tribal law enforcement, along with increased classified collection by law enforcement, is necessary to ensure the prompt mitigation of terrorist threats” (2013, p.93). Preventing terrorist actions, in particular, mass caulatity incidents, should definitely be considered as paert of that primary responsibilty. The Director's concerns seem a bit misplaced as far as some agencies are concerned if police have time to shut down children's lemondade stands, as discussed in a Forbes article regarding a “war” on such stands (Kaine, 2011).

Do the contemporary threats to the United States justify a complete or partial transformation of the FBI? Why?

Keller asserts that the amount of autonomy in which the FBI operates is a function of how “political elites” pervcieve the threats confronting the nation (1989, p.8). As the “elites'” perception of threats and FBI reponse to those threats change, so the overall mission and operational framework of the FBI will change as well. Complicating this is that the FBI is not the only agency tasked with security responsibilities.

What are the current threats that local law enforcement agencies face in the contemporary U.S.? What is the impact of these threats on local enforcement agencies? What revolutions in policing have taken place since 9/11? How do local agencies try to ensure that other issues are not ignored while everybody is working for "national security?"

The greatest threat that law enforcement agencies currently face is the propganda war being waged against them in the media.”Former NYPD Commissioner Howard Safir believes there is a 'war on police,' and said the flames are being fanned from the nation's highest office” (Chiaramonte, 2015, para. 7). This is a view supported by Milwaukee County Sheriff David Clarke, “ Obama has created a pathway for the cop hating rhetoric to flourish. He has led the chorus” (2015). Other threats involve mission creep, or the process of overcriminalization as in the case of the lemonade stands discussed above, budget cutbacks, corruption, and racism (actual incidents, not propagandized incidents). All these threasts to agencies prevent LEO's from effectively performing their duties. The largest policing innovation since 9/11 has been the exapnsion of the use of the Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) model. “A major impetus for ILP came shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks” Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2013, p.1). Local agencies need to prioritize the use of limited resources to actual crime. Homeland Security intelligence should be gathered in the course of normal policing activities, or in the knowledge of specific threats.

Most terror threats are local, but the FBI is a national police agency in charge of domestic intelligence. How is the intelligence information filtered down to the local level? What is the role of the FBI in coordinating domestic intelligence efforts at the local level? How does this impact local law enforcement agencies?

Since 9/11, there has been an ongoing debate about whether terrorists should be considered soldiers in a traditional war or international criminals. This has sparked further debate over whether attacks should be considered as "war" or as "crime." How do these two optional definitions of terrorism affect the roles to be played by law enforcement agencies in the U.S.? Support your responses with reasons and examples.

Do you think that the expansion of police authority in the interest of fighting terrorism impacts the local police responses to more traditional domestic crime? How? How do you think the next era of policing will develop as a result of September 11, 2001?

Chiaramonte, P. (2015, May 13).'War on police': Line-of-duty deaths rise amid racially-charged rhetoric, anti-cop climate. Fox News. Retrieved May 15, 2015 from http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/05/13/war-on-police-line-duty-deaths-rise-amid-racially-charged-rhetoric-anti-cop/

Clarke, D. [SheriffClarke].(2015, May 11). I will say it again. Obama has created a pathway for the cop hating rhetoric to flourish. He has led the chorus.[Tweet]. Retrieved May 15, 2015 from https://twitter.com/SheriffClarke/status/597834103556349952

Department of Criminal Justice Services. (2013). Review of the Intelligence-Led Policing model. Retrieved August 10, 2014

Gomez, D. C. (2013, March). Should cops be spies? Evaluating the collection and sharing of national security intelligence by state, local and tribal law enforcement. (Thesis). Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved October 17, 2014 from https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32825

Kain, E. (2011, August 3). The inexplicable war on lemonade stands. Forbes. Retrieved August 8, 2014 from http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/08/03/the-inexplicable-war-on-lemonade-stands/

Keller, W. W. (1989). The liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and fall of a domestic intelligence state. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Fawaz Yunis was not an American citizen.

Should foreigners receive the due process protections that citizens do?

My opinion is no, that legal protections are to protect the security of Americans, not for those that seek to harm Americans (of course, an American citizen seeking to harm other citizens does deserve due process protection as a citizen).

This case also illustrates issues in treating terror as an anti-crime policy.

What types of crime do you think that the Director was referring to when he spoke of a distraction from basic policing?  What is basic policing?

Albanese discusses the different models of policing, and the relationship to how local agencies define thier missions; he discusses thew watchman, legalistic, and service models and how they differ in their definitions of basic policing (2013, pp.190-191).

From my own perspective, keeping the community safe is the greatest priority in police work.

Albanese, J. (2013). Criminal Justice (5th ed.)[Vitabook ed.]. Boston, Ma. Pearson

You make an excellent point regarding Hoover, and his control of the culture of the FBI, and the effect that had on information sharing.

In fact, the separation of overseas and domestic responsibilities  between the CIA and FBI was based almost as much on a personal dispute between Hoover and Wild Bill Donovan and their respective bureaucratic empire building as it did on Constituional grounds.

Due process protections should be extended to citizens (either native OR naturalized) only.  There should be three tiers of due process consideration;  citizen - legal alien -illegal alien.  Illegal aliens should have no due process protections whatsoever.  The way a suspect should be handled should be based upon their legal tier.
Currently, we extend full due process protections to all persons within the U.S.  This is due to a series of Supreme Court cases in the 1870/1880's regarding the 14th Amendment and Chinese railroad workers.  The Supreme Court defined the 14th so that citizens' rights applied to all.  This was, in my opinion, a mistake.  The 14th was created in order to make freed slaves into citizens.

In addition, captured terrorists do not deserve POW status or protections.  The Geneva Convention is very specific about it's definition of legal combatants.  The purpose of the Conventions is for the protection of civilian communities.  Because the nature of terror operations is inconsistent with the goal of protecting civilians, but also because, legally speaking, the terrorists do not fit the definitions of legal combatants, they deserve none of the protections of POW status.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (1949). Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Retrieved May 16, 2015 from
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590006?OpenDocument

Academic Contributions to Homeland Security

Academic Contributions to Homeland Security

As part of the shift in national security after 9/11, the government sought to include academia in the pursuit of meeting security goals. Steward and Vocino assert that “homeland security courses and programs sprang up quickly to meet demand” (2013, p. 14). However, the government set up the Centers for Excellence network under the auspices of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The mandate for establishing the network is:

The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall establish … a university-based center or centers for homeland security. The purpose of this center or centers shall be to establish a coordinated, university-based system to enhance the nation’s homeland security (Homeland Security, n.d (a)., para. 18).

Two examples of such Centers of Excellence are the National Center for Border Security and Immigration (NCBSI) and the The Center for Behavioral and Social Aspects of Terrorism and Counterterrorism (START). What is it that these centers do?

The NCBSI is a collaboration between the University of Arizona and the University of Texas at El Paso. It's mission is to “to develop technologies, tools and advanced methods that

balance immigration and trade with effective border security” (Homeland Security, n.d (b)., para.1).

START is located at the University of Maryland. It's mission is to “to advance science-based knowledge about the human causes and consequences of terrorism and serve as a leading resource for homeland security policymakers and practitioners” (START, 2013, para. 1).

As an example of the work these Centers of Excellence do, we can look at a START study,”Validation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative: Identifying Suspicious Activities from the Extremist Crime Database and the American Terrorism Study”. The purpose of the study was to validate the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), which itself has a purpose of “identifying and reporting terrorism-related suspicious activity in jurisdictions across the country” (START, 2014, p.1). The study had four findings

• Pre-incident activities occurring prior to acts of terrorism crimes do often align with existing SAR indicators.

• SAR indicators with the highest prevalence were weapons discovery, materials acquisition/storage, expressed or implied threats, and observation/surveillance.
• Many of the indicators were observable prior to terrorist attacks, and some indicators were observed by the public.
• Although several non-SAR activities emerged, none of these patterns rose to the level of necessitating a new type of SAR indicator (START, 2014, p.1)

The objective of the study was to validate the SAR process, which the NSI contends is critical to sharing information regarding this activity with a potential nexus to terror acts (NSI, 2015, para. 2). The objective was attained through research into two databases, Extremist Crime

Database (ECDB) and the American Terrorism Study (ATS). Both databases have collected data on pre-incident activities associated with terrorist acts, to which the study compares to the 16 SAR categories (START, 2015, pp. 1-3). The findings have been listed in bullet list above. The study made no recommendations, as it was a validation process, however, the study did note that some SAR indicators are not likely to be noticed by law enforcement as they are of a non-criminal nature, while other indicators were also less likely to be noticed due to their early part in the terror preparation process (START, 2015, p. 14).

Although the study did not examine SAR indicators in the context of foreign terrorism, the insight gained through the validation of the process can be extrapolated and tested against such acts, as well as possible transnational acts. Thus future research could be delved into regarding cartel violence as well as traditionally understood forms of international terror.

References

Homeland Security (n.d)(a). Welcome to the Centers of Excellence. Retrieved May 19, 2015 from http://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/centers-excellence

Homeland Security (n.d)(b).The National Center for Border Security and Immigration (NCBSI). Retrieved May 19, 2015 from http://www.hsuniversityprograms.org/default/assets/File/NCBSI%20Fact%20Sheet- Jan2014-FINAL.pdf

Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative. (2015). About the NSI. Retrieved May 19, 2015 from http://nsi.ncirc.gov/about_nsi.aspx

START. (2013). Mission and vision. Retrieved May 19, 2015 from

http://www.start.umd.edu/about/mission-and-vision

START. (2014). START research brief:Validation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative: Identifying suspicious activities from the Extremist Crime Database and the American Terrorism Study. Retrieved May19, 2015 from

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Homeland Security: The Sworn Duty of Public Officials

Homeland Security: The Sworn Duty of Public Officials

    The United States has a unique position amongst the countries of the world; it has a history of individual rights, legal process, economic success, and cultural inclusion that few other countries can meet. This view of America's place in the world is often called “exceptionalism”. This view, and the listed attributes that contribute towards it, flies in the face of most human governing philosophies which are statist or tribal ( or both) in nature. The concept of America is thus hated by many, who then seek to harm the way of life in the United States, and to harm the Americans who benefit from it. The sworn duty of public official in America is to protect Americans from these threats. Horwitz argues that the Constitution is a "meta-rule of construction" dedicated to "national self-preservation", he stresses the importance of the Presidential Oath as dedicated to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution (2009, pp. 1069-1070). We can see that the oath of every public official derives from the principle of "national self-preservation" based upon the Constitution. These duties include understanding the threats to the United States, developing the proper measures to counter those threats, and ensuring that those measures are effectively pursued. The purpose of this paper is to explore that relationship.

    Understanding the threats posed to America requires understanding both the organized threats, and the threats that occur due to normal circumstances. The three major threats which have faced Americans have been racism, statism in the form of socialism and Islam, and mala in se crime. Racism is a philosophical threat due to it's primary opposition to individual rights and the legal process, but becomes an actual threat when racists use violence to prevent Americans from using their rights. Socialism, also known as leftism, is statist by nature, and threatens the American way of life in all four areas ( individual rights, legal process, economic success, and cultural inclusion. Islam is a religion and political system in one package, sharia, which denies the principle of individual rights. Mala in se crime steals both life and economic success from Americans.

There are other threats, those that arise out of normal circumstances, that play into the way that America can respond to the major threats. Growth complex hurts our ability to defend ourselves when bureaucrats are more concerned with budgets than with achieving their primary mission. Corruption within the system, whether through ideology or through bribery, subverts the ability to defend the nation. Complacency, corruption and growth complex all contribute towards an environment in which “the oath can all too easily become 'a meaningless and perfunctory recitation' rather than an acknowledgment of the high level of responsibility that it is meant to imbue in its takers” (Hundley & Wamsley, 2012, p.644). Economic threats pose a mostly unrecognized danger to America, Nando argues that "National security depends also on soft power, the ability of a country to generate and use its economic power and to project its national values" (2011, summary).

    The Ku Klux Klan and The New Black Panther Party are the most recent forms of organized racist violence in the United States. The Klan has gone through several iterations of organization. Similar to the Klan are Christian identity groups such as the Army of God, and anti-government militias, such as those the FBI took action against in 1996; the Freemen Organization, The Mountaineer Militia, and the Washington State Militia (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1996, pp.7-8).Socialist violence has been limited to “animal rights” and “ecological groups” for the most part since the mid 1980's. Such groups include the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Earth liberation Front (ELF), and Revenge of the Trees (ROTT); these groups committed all terror attacks within the United States in the year 2000 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001, p.2) but the “Occupy Wall Street” movement has brought leftist violence back to Americas streets. Leftists have used less violence as they have subverted influential American institutions such as academia, the media, and the bureaucracy. George notes that “A surprising number of college and university professors...were active in... radical movements...Many critiques of the trend towards authoritarianism on some campuses...charge that these former radicals have played a major part in it's development” (1996, p. 144). Islamist groups include lone wolves. Al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah, who also use crime in America to fund their terror activities. Criminal groups include nacroterror cartels, organized crime syndicates, and street gangs

    There was a “wall” preventing information sharing prior to 9/11. Intelligence services committed many excess in the 1970''s which led to restrictions on their operations; Collier and Horowitz explain that they were ”barred from surveillance of all political groups, even those whose agenda indicated intentions to engage in illegal and violent acts” (2006, p. 217). Powers asserts that this atmosphere led to an environment in which FBI agents were described as “risk-averse, politically correct, an excess of caution, timorous” (2004, p. 47). Although the PATRIOT Act provided for information sharing access, there are still areas in which full information sharing is prevented. Information sharing is vital to homeland security as the GAO acknowledges, “Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge” (United States General Accountability Office, 2004, p. 33).

    Border issues are also an area of security concern. The threat on the largest scale is the economic damage caused by illegal immigration; unemployment of citizens, a lowered wage scale, welfare expenditure not only to citizens cut out of work by illegal immigration but often to those that are here criminally, and by remittances of wages to the homelands of the aliens. As Nardo previously discussed, such economic damage also hurts homeland security. However, there are threats from organized groups as well; the narcoterrorist cartels and the gangs they ally with The DPS report makes the point that “Gangs working with the Mexican cartels are involved in a level of crime that affects the entire state”(DPS, 2013, p.20). The DPS report also points out that DTO's have a history of corrupting public officials in Mexico and that the DTO's “ also seek to corrupt public officials in the US” (DPS, 2013, p.34). Finally, there is the distinct possibility that terror groups use the unprotected nature of our borders to sneak into the country, a possibility Whitfield (2011) discusses at length.

    The United States has attempted to deal with these threats with several mechanisms. The first was the creation of the Department Homeland Security, the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security specifies three primary goals, and a fourth goal of building a foundation to support the first three. The three primary goals are to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; to protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources; and finally to respond to and recover from incidents that do occur (2007, p.1). The PATRIOT Act was passed, with a primary goal of bringing down barriers to effective intelligence sharing.

These initiative are not enough. America needs to take a preemptive attitude towards dealing with those that have publicly declared we are their enemies. In addition, we have not acted fully upon the measures we have set as our goals. Specific recommendations 9/11 commission were not followed up on; The 9/11 Families for a Secure America Foundation in conjunction with Family Security Matters (Gadiel and Dunleavy, 2011) issued a report card on the implementation of the 9/11 Commission's findings at the end of the ten year period after the attack. This report card covered twenty-six of the Commission's forty-one recommendations The majority of these grades were in the “C” to “F” range. (Durchin, 2015, p, 1).

To make the issue worse, our local and Federal agencies have not fully come together to pursue these goals in a cooperative manner. Brig. Gen Wilson described the fusion centers he has worked with as ineffective due to interorganizational conflict (2015).

    The foremost thing that America's security professionals need to do is to remember their oaths, and see to it that all public officials see to their own oaths as well. Williams discusses the concept of “Neglect in Duty” in English common law; a concept which applies to any public officer in any polity; he quotes Stephen to the effect that “Every public officer commits a misdemeanour who willfully neglects to perform any duty which he is bound either by common law or by statute to perform” (Williams, 2010, p. 336). And yet there are myriad examples of public officials failing to perform their sworn duties and failing to be held accountable for their actions. Governor Nixon failed to deploy the National Guard in riot conditions with the result that several business were destroyed (Williams specifically mentions on page 338 a mayor who fails to prevent a riot as an example of “Neglect in Duty”). In Operation Fast and Furious, BATF provided weapons to violent narcoterror cartels in an operation that the OIG of the DOJ found to have “lack of sufficient controls and inadequate attention to public safety” (Department of Justice, 2012, p. 419), and that resulted in the deaths of 3 American lawmen ( and hundreds of Mexican nationals). AG Eric Holder then punished whistle blowers and refused to provide evidence in the matter. The Obama administration traded five known terrorists for one known deserter; CNN discusses the suspicion that the released terrorists may have started terror activity upon release (Starr, 2015, para 1-3). The Obama Administration can not even hold to legal standards on border security; “President Obama’s lawyers admitted to a federal judge late Thursday that they had broken the court’s injunction halting the administration’s new deportation amnesty” (Dinan, 2015, para. 1). There has been no repercussion for these acts of nonfeasance and malfeasance, despite the pattern of their incidence. Davidson and Stone explain that our legal system does not rely on one single agency to punish such acts:

Although the Constitution assigns some responsibilities exclusively to one or another branch of government, in general our legal and political system resists rigid institutional assignments. In evaluating where to lodge responsibility for an inquiry, it is better to think of guideposts rather than barriers or mandated sequences(2000, p. 33).

   It is up to the sworn officer on the line to ensure that the oaths of all public officials are adhered to, elected official or not. Although every jurisdiction has different laws regarding nonfeasance, malfeasance, and misfeasance, in most jurisdictions these are aresstable offenses. Security officials can not be expected to uphold their own oaths when politicians suborn those oaths without punishment.

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