The Department of Homeland Security: It's Component Organizations and Local Support

The Department of Homeland Security: It's Component Organizations and Local Support

The formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was an organizational reaction to the terror attacks of 9/11. Pratt explains that “Before 11 September 2001, when American leaders prepared for war they envisioned enemies using bombs, tanks, guns, military force, and other traditional armaments. The attacks on that fateful day forever changed the way the United States and the world would view the nature of war” (2004, p. 44). The General Accounting Office “advised Congress that the United States needed a national strategy specifically to ensure homeland security” (Caudle, 2009, p.9). Thus DHS was born.
The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security specifies three primary goals, and a fourth goal of building a foundation to support the first three. The three primary goals are to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; to protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources; and finally to respond to and recover from incidents that do occur (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007, p.1). The President has directed the Secretary of DHS to take responsibility for these goals; “The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for domestic incident management” (Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, 2003, p.1)
As of 2014, DHS is comprised of seven agencies, three directorates, and a number of other divisions.. These components are organized in a flat model, with most reporting directly to the Secretary of DHS. The flat model may be a little confusing to some. “From the public’s perspective, partnerships if not clearly defined, risk blurring responsibility for the outcome of public programs” ( GAO-02-899T Homeland security, 2002, p. 8). The seven agencies are the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)(Department Components, 2014). The three directorates are the DHS Management Directorate, the DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate, and the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (Department Components, 2014). Penn examines the literature on homeland security and reiterates one point that the literature makes clear; “that homeland security is a local responsibility”(2007, p.86). We shall examine two of the directorates and their aid to local officials to support this local responsibility, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPDD) and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T).
The NPDD defines it's vision as creating a “safe, secure, and resilient infrastructure where the American way of life can thrive. NPPD leads the national effort to protect and enhance the resilience of the nation’s physical and cyber infrastructure” (About the National Protection and Programs Directorate, 2014, para 1). NPDD is comprised of the following offices; the Federal Protective Service (FPS), the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), the Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA), the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C), and the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) (About the National Protection and Programs Directorate, 2014). One example of NPDD's support for local homeland security is in it's “Work with State and local officials to plan security for large public gatherings, such as Times Square New Year’s Eve, the Presidential Inauguration, and the Super Bowl” (NPPD at a glance, 2014, p.1).
S&T defines it's mission as “to deliver effective and innovative insight, methods and solutions for the critical needs of the Homeland Security Enterprise” (Our Work, n.d, para. 2). One example of the support that S&T provides for the local level has been the development of the Next Generation First Responder (NGFR) Apex program, which “envisions first responders who are protected, connected and fully aware, enabling faster, more efficient and safer response to threats and disasters “ (Apex Program: Next Generation First Responder , n.d., p.1); APEX was developed in conjuction with local agencies, including “over 250 federal, state and local first responders, responder associations” (Apex Program: Next Generation First Responder , n.d., p.1)

References

Caudle, S. L. (2009). National security strategies: Security from what, for whom, and by what means. Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, 6(1), 1–26. Retrieved February 24, 2015 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=i3h&AN=38812015&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Department of Homeland Security. (2007). National strategy for homeland security: Homeland Security Council. Washington, D.C.

Homeland Security. (2014). About the National Protection and Programs Directorate, Retrieved April 20, 2015 from http://www.dhs.gov/about-national-protection-and-programs-directorate

Homeland Security. (n.d.). Apex Program: Next generation first responder. Retrieved April 20, 2015 from http://www.firstresponder.gov/TechnologyDocuments/Next%20Generation%20First%20Responder%20Apex%20Program%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf

Homeland Security. (2014). Department components. Retrieved April 20, 2015 from http://www.dhs.gov/department-components

Homeland Security. (2014).NPPD at a glance. Retrieved April 20, 2015 from http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nppd-at-a-glance-071614.pdf

Homeland Security. (n.d.). Our Work. Retrieved April 20, 2015 from http://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/our-work

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5. (2003). Retrieved February 5, 2015 from http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Homeland%20Security%20Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf

Penn, E. B. (2007). Introduction: Homeland security and criminal justice - five years after 9/11. Criminal Justice Studies, 20(2), 81–89. http://doi.org/10.1080/14786010701396814

Pratt, R. J. (2004). Invasive threats to the American homeland. DTIC Document. Retrieved November 1, 2014 from http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA486594

United States General Accounting Office. (2002). GAO-02-899T Homeland security: Intergovernmental coordination and partnership will be critical to success . Retrieved September 22, 2104 from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02899t.pdf

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My opinion is that the Coast Guard is the most sufficient to do it's assigned roles.  Admiral Loy states that "the Coast Guard--with its multiple missions, maritime expertise, military discipline, and civil law
enforcement authority--is a unique instrument of a broad strategy to ensure our nation's security. And
I believe that in its own way, it has become the harbinger of the future" (2001, para. 15).  I would add to that the Coast Guard has a long history of experience in just those roles.

The Border Patrol would have been my next choice, however, it has been hamstrung by an ideological agenda and prevented from doing it's role in the last few years.

The other agencies suffer from a confusion of roles and blurred responsibilities, as discussed in the GAO report in my original post.  I would assign them all a flat model of "last place" equally.

Loy, J. (2001, December). The Role of the Coast Guard in Homeland Security. Presented at the The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-role-of-the-coast-guard-in-homeland-security

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Narco Cartels as The Greatest Domestic Threat

Narco Cartels as The Greatest Domestic Threat

There are many threats to the domestic security of the United States that go beyond the actions of terrorism. Subversion, corruption of public officials, and high rates of crime all threaten the American citizen. The “group” that constitutes the greatest threat to the United States is the same threat post- 9/11 as it was pre-911, the drug cartels, which are also known as Drug Trading Organizations (DTO's). The larger of these DTO's are the Sinaloa cartel, the Gulf cartel, Los Zetas, the Juarez cartel, the Jalisco New Generation cartel, and Los Cabelleros Templarios.

Although mass casualty terror attacks generate news headlines, the incidence of such attacks within the United States is rare. The persistence, intensity, and scope of cartel activity qualifies them for evaluation as the highest priority security threat. A 2013 Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) report identifies DTO activity as a significant threat to Texas (Texas Public Safety Threat Overview 2013, 2013, p.2). This underscores that domestic threats are not limited to foreign supported ideological enemies, but that there is an overlap in threat between DTO's and specifically terrorist organizations. Longmire and Longmire suggest that such characteristics of the DTO's as “The tactics, strategy, organization, and even (to a limited extent) the goals” are consistent with those of the terrorist organizations(2008, p.35). Björnehed reinforces this idea by identifying that criminal organizations and terrorist organisations “both emphasize secrecy and concealment from law enforcement officials” (2004, p.308). This can be seen in DTO alliances with domestic criminal gangs; The DPS report makes the point that “Gangs working with the Mexican cartels are involved in a level of crime that affects the entire state”(Texas Public Safety Threat Overview 2013, 2013, p.20). An additional reason to view the DTO's as a serious threat involves subversion in destroying law enforcement capability through corruption and violent intimidation; The DPS report also points out that DTO's have a history of corrupting public officials in Mexico and that the DTO's “ also seek to corrupt public officials in the US” (Texas Public Safety Threat Overview 2013, 2013, p.34).

Currently, the United States addresses the cartels under two auspices; the War on Drugs, and as an organized crime issue. A full discussion of the War on Drugs is beyond this paper, but a concept that is not explored fully is that the drug cartels arose as a reaction to the prohibition on drugs. However, the consideration of drug legalization will not provide an option for destroying the DTO's. Their operations have expanded into areas beyond the drug markets, and ”The most brutal dto [drug trafficking organizations] battles are not over customers or suppliers but over ports and trade routes”. (Morris, 2013, p.31).

There are three strategies to combating not just the DTO's, but other violent and subversive groups including organized criminals and ideological terrorists.

The first strategy involves the recognition that violent subversive groups, whether they be criminal or ideological, and whether they be foreign or domestic, present a threat to the security and well being of every American citizen. A legal solution must be created that is both pragmatic regarding the existential threat these groups present and that is efficient in terms of combating them. One issue is the schizophrenic nature of the way that we deal with even foreign sponsored terror groups. Clarke demonstrates that we have combated terrorist organizations with a “blend between a war-fighting approach (GWOT) ..., including the use of military trials for prosecution, and a law enforcement approach...)”( 2013, p. 57) . This dual approach is complicated by the diffuse command structure for operations. Crenshaw discusses this issue; “Responsibility for dealing with terrorism is widely distributed, and lines of jurisdiction tend to be blurred and overlapping, with no clear institutional monopoly of the issue” (2001, p.330). Without a clear and legal framework to operate within, our legal system has been equally ambivalent towards setting constant operational guidelines. Breinholt examines the constantly changing legal framework of anti-terror operations in the context of “...American courts, which operate on the basis of historical precedent, remain available and are willing, when necessary, to redraw the lines between collective security and personal liberty” (2004, p.141).

The second strategy lies in effective intelligence regarding threat groups. Intelligence gathering and sharing has been hindered by self-imposed restrictions, some based on Constitutional protections and others based on political pandering. However, Davis asserts that the “need for improved sharing of intelligence information between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies was recognized as early as the 1964 Warren Commission report” (2010, p. 39). In a callous disregard for the lives of Americans, reforms of the 1970's were “based on a presumption that domestic terrorism could be handled by investigating crimes after they were committed rather than preventing them” (Powers, 2004, p. 45). Without effective intelligence, the third strategy cannot be employed.

The final strategy lies in targeted, or decapitation methods. The most effective method of addressing terrorism is also the most direct; the targeted elimination, through killing or capture, of terrorist leaders and facilitators. Wilner concludes that “The literature on targeted killings suggests that their use diminishes the coercive and operational capability of violent, non-state groups in a number of ways”(2010, p. 312). This is where effective intelligence comes into play. Barba discusses the futility of undirected force, “The undiscerning use of force in terrorism can be as productive as cutting off one of hydra’s heads”(2014, p.62). Targets under consideration for these tactics should include those that commit acts of terror, those that directly support terrorist acts, and those that plan or coordinate terrorist acts. Levitt asserts that “Individuals who provide such support must be recognized as terrorists of the same caliber as those who use that support to execute attacks” (2004, p.33). Zussman, Zussman, & Yisrael found that the use of assassination was valuable to the Israeli counterterror strategy; however, this conclusion was qualified by the selection of the targeting; “It is reasonable to assume that an assassination would be most effective in reducing the capabilities of a terrorist organization if the target is a senior leader with specialized knowledge and skills”(2005, p.4).

In conclusion, DTO's are the most significant threat to America, but have not been combated effectively. In oder to deal with DTO's and other violent, criminal, terrorist, and subversive groups, the underlying security framework must recognize the threat these groups present and be configured in a way to effectively deal with them while remaining on Constitutional grounds. The proper intelligence must be created and shared efficiently to identify the critical points at which the third strategy must be employed. The third strategy is to destroy the effectiveness of these organizations by decapitation leadership and removing their support structure.

References

Barba, P. E. S. (2014, June). Breaking terrorists’ will to fight (Thesis). Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved from https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/42721

Björnehed, E. (2004). Narco-Terrorism: The merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. Global Crime, 6(3-4), 305–324. doi:10.1080/17440570500273440

Breinholt, J. (2004). How about a little perspective: The USA PATRIOT Act and the uses and abuses of history. Texas Review of Law & Politics, 9(1), 17–61.

Clarke, D. A. (2013, September). Making U.S. security and privacy rights compatible (Thesis). Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved October 17, 2014 from https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/37603

Crenshaw, M. (2001). Counterterrorism policy and the political process. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24(5), 329–337. doi:10.1080/105761001750434204

Davis, L. M. (2010). Long-term effects of law enforcement’s post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism and homeland security. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. Retrieved September 22, 2014 from http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=669776

Levitt, M. (2004). Untangling the terror web: Identifying and counteracting the phenomenon of crossover between terrorist groups. The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 24(1), 33–48.

Longmire, S. M., & Longmire, J. P. (2008). Redefining terrorism: Why Mexican drug trafficking is more than just organized crime. Journal of Strategic Security, 1(1), 35–52. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.1.1.4

Morris, E. K. (2013). Think again: Mexican drug cartels. Foreign Policy, (203), 30–33,8.

Powers, R. G. (2004). A bomb with a long fuse. American History, 39(5), 42–47.

Texas Public Safety Threat Overview 2013. (2013). Texas Department of Public Safety. Retrieved January 15, 2015 from http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director_staff/media_and_communications/threatOverview.pdf

Wilner, A. S. (2010). Targeted killings in Afghanistan: Measuring coercion and deterrence in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(4), 307–329. doi:10.1080/10576100903582543

Zussman, A., Zussman, N., & Yisrael, B. (2005). Targeted killings: Evaluating the effectiveness of a counterterrorism policy. Banḳ Yiśraʼel, Maḥlaḳat ha-meḥḳar. Retrieved Retrieved January 24, 2015 from http://boi.gov.il/deptdata/mehkar/papers/dp0502e.pdf

The Unending Terror of the Weathermen

The Unending Terror of the Weathermen

The late 1960's and 1970's saw an unprecedented attack on American institutions by leftist groups. Perhaps the most well known of these groups was the Weathermen. The Weathermen were a break-off group from the SDS (Students for a Democratic Society). The SDS were the largest of the New Left groups formed in the 1960's. The Weathermen carried the leftist impulse of the SDS to it's logical conclusion. Glazer describes the New Left doctrine; “the rights of the majority are held in derision, and political opponents are prevented form speaking or being heard” (Gerberding & Smith, 1970, p.25). SDS, for the most part, set up situations in which law enforcement could be portrayed as “oppressive”, but violence has never been rejected as a leftist tactic; in fact, SDS violence has been documented as early as 1965, in which SDS protestors ”broke through a police cordon and laid siege to” the Pentagon (Varon, 2004, p. 148). In 1966, SDS leader Tom Hayden “outlined a future for the New Left that anticipated violence without apparent qualms”(Collier and Horowitz, 2006, p. 289 ). In the years 1968, 1969, and in the first half of 1970, there were 216 ambushes and snipings against LEO's and facilities, a total of 359 assaults, including bombings, 23 deaths and 326 injuries to police officers. (Mallin, 1971, p. 52). It was in this atmosphere of leftist violence that the Weathermen split off from SDS for an even more violent program. The big split with the SDS occurred at the 1969 convention (George, 1996, pp.133-134).

In May of 1970, the Weatherman issued a “declaration of war” against America (George, 1996, p.137). In 1974, the Weathermen issued their dogma, Prairie Fire. “PRAIRIE FIRE is written to communist-minded people” (1974, preface), reiterating the Left's hostility to liberty, republic, and capitalism. The Weathermen further describe the type of society they would inflict upon America..”Socialism is the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the eradication of the social system based on profit” (1970, pp. 40-42). Larry Grathwohl, an FBI infiltrator of the Weathermen, reports that one goal of the Weathermen was to “eliminate” 25 million Americans (“counter-revolutionaries”, in leftist-speak) in “re-education camps” (Ayers To Eliminate 25 million Capitalist Americans, 2008, 1:20).

The primary method of terror conducted by the Weathermen was bombing of buildings associated with the government. Thankfully out of line with their rhetoric, Weathermen bombing attacks were not designed to inflict mass casualties. In the one exception, the Weathermen planned to conduct a mass casualty attack against a dance, in this instance,the bombers blew themselves up in the 1970 Wilkerson townhouse explosion (Varon, 2004, p.173). The Weathermen manifesto Prairie Fire details many of the group's bombing through it's publication in 1974 (pp4-5). Although the tactical targets were buildings, the intended target was the American system itself. The 2 key attacks were the failure at the Wilkerson townhouse, and the organization of the Days of Rage, a pre-planned assault on police in conjunction with anti-war protests.

There were several factors involved with the dissolution of the Weathermen. One reason had to do with the “ for public consumption” reasons that the Weathermen claimed as justification.. The Vietnam war ended. Passage of civil rights legislation made much of the racial rhetoric history. However, ”the extremists who chose to remain extremists resorted to terror tactics” (Mallin, 1971, p. 19). Another factor was the loss of three of their fellow travelers who had been hoist upon their own petard at the Wilkerson townhouse. Finally, internal stresses within the group caused issues. The formal end of the Weathermen came when the group collapsed in late 1976 in a “torrent of recriminations” (Varon, 2004, p. 298). Some turned themselves in while others continued leftist terror attacks under new banners such as the May 19^th Communist Organization and the United Freedom Front. Charges were dropped against many of these children of the affluent. Even worse, these terrorists no longer has to resort to violence to achieve their aims as they were allowed to join the educational and political systems:

A surprising number of college and university professors...were active in the DSDS and other radical movements...Many critiques of the trend towards authoritarianism on some campuses...charge that these former radicals have played a major part in it's development (George, 1996, p. 144).

These “radicals” include former terrorists Bill Ayers, Bernadine Dohrn, and Cathy Boudin of the Weathermen.

However, the despite the claim that COINTELPRO and other law enforcement operations had an effect on Weathermen; law enforcement efforts were not all that effective. Hoover ended most COINTELPRO operations as a bureaucratic tactic to protect the FBI before many of the Weatherman attacks were carried out.. The FBI was never as successful at infiltrating the New Left as it had been at infiltrating the Ku Klux Klan even while COINTELPRO was operating. As a result of the publication of overreaching government operations such as CHAOS and (arguably) COINTELPRO, reforms in security law changed law enforcement capabilities so that “the FBI was barred from surveillance of all political groups, even those whose agenda indicated intentions to engage in illegal and violent acts” (Collier and Horowitz, 2006, p. 217). Another issue was that the FBI focused on trying to prove a foreign connection, which would have given “intelligence agencies greater latitude in investigating and acting against” the terrorists (Varon, 2004, p. 358). This was a strategic error as one of the major differences in the Old Left and the New Left was the New Left's hostility to foreign control. Bill Sullivan, the FBI's point man on domestic security, claims the Columbia riot caught the FBI by surprise and that the FBI did not consider the New Left as a threat up to that point(1979, p. 147)

There are two policy goals that should be implemented to combat terror groups that move between terror and subversion on the political terror matrix. The first is that we need to define specific calls to action associated with specific philosophies (in particular, those that are categorically opposed to American liberties) as illegal and subject to different legal standards than simple dissent. For example, a protestor should be able to say that the war in Vietnam is illegal, but should be subject to surveillance once he advocates violent leftist policies. Secondly, government representatives need to confront dishonest propaganda by the defenders of such subversives/terrorists. For years, COINTELPRO has been represented solely as a method of silencing dissent as opposed to a method of tracking violent subversives.

References

Ayers To Eliminate 25 million Capitalist Americans. (2008). Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPLkf8GaUGA&feature=youtube_gdata_player

Collier, P., & Horowitz, D. (2006). Destructive generation: second thoughts about the sixties. San Francisco: Encounter Books.

Gerberding, W., & Smith, D. (Eds.). (1970). The radical Left:The abuse of discontent. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

George, J. (1996). American extremists: Militias, supremacists, Klansmen, communists & others. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books.

Mallin, J. (Ed.). (1971). Terror and urban guerrillas; a study of tactics and documents. Coral Gables, Fla: University of Miami Press.

Prairie Fire. (1974). San Fransisco, Ca. Prairie Fire Distributing Committee

Sullivan, W. C. (1979). The Bureau: my thirty years in Hoover’s FBI (1st ed). New York: Norton.

Varon, J. (2004). Bringing the war home: the Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and revolutionary violence in the sixties and seventies. Berkeley: University of California Press.

The Kerner Report's Lack of Impact on Effective Law Enforcement

The Kerner Report's Lack of Impact on Effective Law Enforcement

The three major areas of change in law enforcement since 1970 are; technology driven efficiency, process oriented policing changes (such as community policing, problem oriented policing, “hot spot” targeting, and intelligence led policing), and finally the increased diversity of police forces. Some of this change has been driven by presidential commission recommendations. Although the Kerner Commission has been cited as a factor in the support for political changes, the effect of it's recommendations has not played a significant part in improving law enforcement efficiency.

Technology driven change has been the biggest factor in increased effectiveness for protecting America's security in a law enforcement context. Communications, data collection, data storage, data analysis, data sharing, and surveillance have all made policing more effective in reporting crime, in responding to crime, in solving crime, and in preventing crime. The impetus for improvements in technology came from another commission established by President Johnson, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, in response to the doubling of crime rates between 1940 and 1965 (The National Committee on Criminal Justice Technology National Institute of Justice Technology, 1998, Part One, para. 6). As part of the Commission's recommendations, 11 specific improvements regarding the use of technology were embraced by the Johnson administration, which began providing “massive” federal technology assistance to local policing agencies (The National Committee on Criminal Justice Technology, 1998, Part One, para. 6-7). Byrne and Marx identify two types of technological change, information-based and material-based, and suggest that both have caused “dramatic changes” in law enforcement (2011, p.17).

Changes in the strategies and methods of policing have also taken place in the law enforcement community since 1970. While the efficiency of these changes may not have been fully evaluated, the direction in considering and testing potentially beneficial adjustments bodes well for the future of law enforcement. He, Zhao, and Lovrich contend that “only time will tell whether the sustained effort to promote COP will result in the widespread adoption of a new paradigm in policing”(2005, p.311). Other researchers put more confidence in such programs. Jackson and Brown assert that the Intelligence Led Policing “paradigm, once it has thoroughly addressed its shortcomings, will prove to be a viable policing model for a post-9/11 world”(2007, p.127). In discussing the potential benefits of using scientifically studied process changes to law enforcement, Willis concludes that “Advancing reform in ways that police administrators, officers, researchers, and ordinary citizens all care about requires that we focus on what can be gained by strengthening this union” (2013, p. 12).

Diversity in policing is another change which may not result in objectively measurable reductions in crime, but may create non measurable benefits for the community at large and it's relationship with the local police. Raymond discusses the increase of diversity of police force compositions; “Although sworn police officers across departments are still predominantly white males, rates of racial and ethnic minorities and females have increased over the past few years... The proportions of both minorities and females among sworn personnel are larger in larger cities than in cities with smaller populations” (2005, p.12). However, Brown and Benedict suggest that community relations are not always improved by adding officers that can relate to local communities; “A commonly proposed tactic for reducing blacks’ negative perceptions of the police is hiring more black officers, but there is no empirical support for such programs”(2002, p.568). This may be due to a culture conflict issue where it is the uniform itself, rather than from a survey of personal interactions.

The Kerner Commission was created by President Johnson in reaction to urban riots from 1965 to 1967. According to Lupo, the commission had to answer three basic questions; “what happened, why, and what can be done to prevent it from happening again and again” (2010, p. 125). The composition of the commission was bipartisan, and despite claims to the contrary was interracial, with 2 out of 11 Commissioners being black men(or 18% of the board as compared to 13% of the general population at the time). Bulmer identifies “ideological bias” as an impediment to the use of social science research in commission findings. (1983, p. 655). Unfortunately, The Commission staff demonstrated such a bias in that “the report was the work of hundreds of staffers, largely social scientists whose mind-sets reflected the leftist orthodoxy of the time”(Miller, 2000, para. 2). The first report generated was so extremist that the Commission itself, “appointed by President Lyndon Baines Johnson largely to reflect commitments to his Great Society programs”, rejected it in toto (Miller, 2000, para. 2). This bias manifested itself in the Commission's findings.

The Kerner Report had two major conclusions to the “why” and the prevention questions, both of which were wrong. The first conclusion was that conditions in the black community were caused by “white racism”. “White racism is essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has been

accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II” (The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, p.9). The second conclusion was that poverty caused by this racism was the cause of the riots. While “white racism” cannot be discounted as a factor in “black poverty”, there are certainly other contributing factors the Kerner Commission neglected to account for in it's conclusions. One factor that the Commission denied was the influence of outside agitators; “The urban disorders of the summer of 1967 were not caused by, nor were they the consequence of, any organized plan or 'conspiracy'"(The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, p.8). This is indicative of the ideological bias in which the Commission operated. In 1968, a Congressional Hearing had no problem finding documentation of SDS/SNCC activity which targeted Newark and other “cities where SNCC hopes 'to translate its black power philosophy into an outlet for frustration' “ (Subversive influence in riots, looting, and burning, 1968, p.1856) Other findings of the Hearing included documentation of SDS rhetoric rejecting the “bringing ghetto residents into the mainstream of competitive society” (Subversive influence in riots, looting, and burning, 1968, p.1855). Bean asserts that “Black militants and their white sympathizers considered the 'rebellions' a form of political violence designed to force concessions from governmental authorities” (Bean, 2000, p. 165). The Kerner Report does not consider other factors such as deviation from a middle-class value system, high rates of illegitimacy, or cultural rejection of education and entrepreneurship. Woodson argues that “the advocates of civil rights had to abandon publications that discussed the strength of black communities in order for them to have civil rights laws applied to them. With these demands, we entered a 'grievance period' in which we reported only on our shortcomings and our failings' (1998, Para 22.)

This leads to the Commission's conclusion that poverty itself is a cause for crime, to be remedied by higher levels of government spending (and of course, higher taxes). This fallacy can be considered as the “poverty pitfall”. However, we return to Miller's contention that the staffers on the Commission held the common social science view of the day, which was influenced by the Chicago schools of sociology and criminology. This ideological bias ignores a critical point in addressing poverty, which Siegel makes in regards to the riots, that “welfare replaced work for low-income people who were ready to move up the job ladder”(1998, para 15).

Due to bias in the generation of the Kerner Report, and the conclusions reached due to that bias, there was not consideration given to the causes of urban riots; without a solid understanding of a problem, there can not be an effective approach to a solution. However, the Kerner Report did have an impact on how criminologists defined political solutions. Ren, Zhao, and Lovrich define the liberal position on crime control as a matter of social support and the use of the Kerner Report as a basis in that line of thought. “The key to liberal propositions regarding crime control was the concept of social support in contrast to the conservative's social control focus” (Ren, Zhao, & Lovrich, 2008, p.318) . The major problem in this framing is that it ignores the conservative position that social support must be based on the individuals' socialization to correct behavior, that teaching a man to fish is superior to giving him a fish for a day. It should also be noted that “white racism” and “black crime” are irresponsible uses of language; not all whites are racist, nor all blacks criminal. Racism and criminal activity are resultant from cultural influence, not skin color.

References

Bean, J. (2000). “Burn, Baby, Burn”: Small business in the urban riots of the 1960s. The Independent Review, 5(2).

Byrne, J., & Marx, G. (2011). Technological innovations in crime prevention and policing. A review of the research on implementation and impact. Journal of Police Studies, 20(3), 17–40.

Bulmer, M. (1983). An Anglo-American comparison: Does social science contribute effectively to the work of governmental commissions?The American Behavioral Scientist, 26(5)

He, N., Zhao, J., & Lovrich, N. P. (2005). Community Policing: A Preliminary Assessment of Environmental Impact With Panel Data on Program Implementation in U.S. Cities. Crime & Delinquency, 51(3), 295–317. http://doi.org/10.1177/0011128704266756

Jackson, A. L., & Brown, M. (2007). Ensuring Efficiency, Interagency Cooperation, and Protection of Civil Liberties: Shifting from a Traditional Model of Policing to an Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) Paradigm. Criminal Justice Studies, 20(2), 111–129. http://doi.org/10.1080/14786010701396855

Lupo, L. (2010). Flak-catchers: One hundred years of riot commission politics in America. Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Lexington Books.

Miller, A. H. (2000). Myths the Kerner Commission created. The World & I, 15(8), 300–309.

Raymond, B. (2005). Police personnel challenges after September 11: anticipating expanded duties and a changing labor pool. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.

Ren, L., Zhao, J., & Lovrich, N. P. (2008). Liberal versus conservative public policies on crime: What was the comparative track record during the 1990s? Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(4), 316–325. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2008.06.010

Subversive influence in riots, looting, and burning. 90^th Congress. 1851 (1968).

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. (1968). Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder: Summary of report. Washington, D. C. Retrieved April 13, 2015 from http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf

The National Committee on Criminal Justice Technology. (1998). The evolution and development of police technology. Washington, D. C. Retrieved April 13, 2015 from http://www.police-technology.net/id59.html

Threnstrom, S., Siegel, F., & Woodson, R. (1998, March). The Kerner Commission Report. The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved April 13, 2015 from http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-kerner-commission-report

Willis, J. J. (2013). Improving police: What’s craft got to do with it? Ideas in American Policing, 16.

This is going to be a long "answer" that doesn't really answer the question; it just raises more questions.

The simplest and most common answers are in opposition to each other; the first is that white racism is the primary cause for every bad thing that happens in the black community, and the other is that due to culture conflict reasons, black folks distrust and therefore don't join the police, leading to a cycle of culture conflict.  Both answers neglect a host of other contributing factors that have neither been fully addressed or measured.

1. Racism - Statistically speaking, racism has to have some affect on racial relations.  From my own experience, I know that there are white people with racist views of blacks (and vice versa, and Hispanics with racist views of both whites, and blacks, and vice versa).  In this situation, though, the question is how much affect the racism of white folks affects the opportunities of black folks, with a corollary question is how much black folks perceive racism to have such an affect.

For example, at one point in my life, I marketed pizza coupons door-to-door (meaning that I put them on the door, and moved on).  More than once, I would walk across the street to avoid talking to a black person.  Was this racist?  No, because I always crossed the street to avoid social contact with all people I encountered, as I was dysfuntcionally shy at the time.  But how many of the people that I avoided had the perception that I did so because they were black?

2. Culture conflict - There are several versions of culture conflict that can be in play here, but I will simplify to the major ones.  Middle class culture is the culture which primarily define our mala prohibita laws.  Drug use in some minority cultures is not the same as it is in middle lass/lower upper middle class culture.The legal status of drug use/possession is what drives a large percentage of police/minority contact ( and thus arrest and use of force incidents). On the other hand, a "snitches get stitches" view of police interaction, and the accusation of "acting white" for blacks that attempt to succeed on the terms of middle class values also play into culture conflict.  I am unaware of studies which measure these factors in regards to racial relations.

3.Police socialization - Policemen have certainly committed racist acts in the past.  The acceptance of these acts was part of the police culture.  Things have changed to some point, partly due to diversity within police forces. Mark Baker's Cops, compiled in the mid/late 80's, was a collection of monologues by policemen discussing police work, returns over and over again to some policemens' perceptions of race and the changing view of policemen towards racial relations.  In turn, a history of police abuses will certainly affect the perception of police by minority cultures, whether or not current practice is still racist.  There have been examples of continued discrimination within some departments.  The question here is how many policemen are racist, and how many allow racism to affect professionalism.

4. Profiling - Profiling can be a valuable law enforcement tool.  How profiling is conducted can be a matter of debate.  Profiling can be considered as "racial profiling" when race or ethnicity is either used or perceived to be used as a basis for the stop; Reiman suggests that "terms of the definition
are satisfied if race is used in addition to other factors such as behavior" (Reiman, 2011, p.4).  This can increase the negative perception that minority communities hold of the police.  If the police stop minority suspects based on the wearing of certain clothes, is the stop based upon those clothes being gang colors, or of a style worn by gang members?  If the clothes are of a certain style, is it non-gang members following fashion set by gang members, or vice versa?

5. Anti-police propaganda -  Both the Washington Post and the New York Times recently admitted that "hands up, don't shoot" was a lie.  Of course, this admission was not on the same front pages that months of the lie were repeated over and over, nor was the lie admitted to until after several businesses had been destroyed in the riots.  In Austin, the main newspaper ran a headline "Police shoot unarmed black man in the back twice", notwithstanding the autopsy report that showed the wounds were in the suspect's side, not back, nor that the suspect's gun was dropped close to his body during the pursuit/shooting.  90% of journalists identify as Democrats.  I will return to this point.

6. Sabotage of the black community - Policies undertaken with the public justification of improving conditions in the black community have the opposite effect.  Ebonics and the new policy of not disciplining problem students do nothing to raise the educational level of underprivileged students.  Higher minimum wages result in fewer jobs.  As a side issue, there is little study done about the positive effects that churches in minority communities have on people in those communities.

7. Political Opportunism - There is a term for the Jews that fed other Jews into the Nazi's ovens in the concentration camps in order to live a little longer.  This term is "Sonderkommando".  The Democratic Party needs to recieve from 85% to 90% (depending on location) of the black vote to win elections.  Considering that Democrats control the cities and locales where black poverty rates are the greatest and arrest rates for black folks are the highest, that Democrats control the educational systems and unions that are tasked for education in the communities, and that Democratic influence in the media that dominates public discourse has a single narrative supporting policies that do not work, is it possible that the "Sonderkommando" term has a parallel meaning?

Of course, even the theory that the Democratic Party sabotages the black community for the purpose of maintaining  a stable voting count can not be the only factor in the conditions that drive racial conditions in this country.  Each possible factor must be examined as fully as possible.  Some are impossible to quantify.  For an example, if a policeman holds both racist and professional values, and has the self-control necessary to conduct his job professionally, how would we measure the effect of his racism...at a value of 0 because he is not acting on racist impulse, or at a 10 for being a racist at all?  Racism (and the issues that relate to it) is a hard subject to tackle, not just because many of the factors are hard to objectively measure, but because the issue of race is a very personal and emotional matter.  No white person wants to be a priori as racist, no black person wants to be judged a priori as criminal.  No cops wants to be judged a priori as a thug with a badge. In fact, no person at all wants to be judged by the actions of others.


References

Baker, M. (1989). Cops: Their lives in their own words. New York, NY. Pocket Books.

Kroll Government Services. (2007). Review of an  Internal Affairs Investigation  into the Officer Involved  Shooting of June 3, 2007.

Reiman, J. (2011). Is Racial Profiling Just? Making Criminal Justice Policy in the Original Position. The Journal of Ethics, 15(1-2), 3–19. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1007/s10892-010-9096-5

Another factor in Johnson's decision to ignore the Kerner Report was the vast amount of money that he was spending on the Great Society. 
To be upfront, I have an ideological bias of my own, in that I don't believe that social spending has long term benefits for the communities it is directed towards.  Keeping that in mind, my assumption was that the Great Society was already dumping huge amounts of money on underprivileged communities.  Returning to our organizational planning course, it seems that there was no assessment of the impact that these Great Society programs were having before requesting additional spending.

The changes in scientifically studied processes of policing are the most import of the changes in law enforcement.  Although the technological changes have had the most objectively measurable and positive actual changes to law enforcement efficiency, the potential improvements to public safety can come from anticipating and preemptively striking against criminal behavior.  For example. if police can predict where the next in a series of bank robberies will occur, they can be on site when the robbery occurs.

Terrorism in American Cities

Terrorism in American Cities

A commonly agreed upon facet of defining terrorism is that the goal of an attack is to spread terror. One method of achieving this goal is by creating mass casualties. Mass casualties are easier to create in a city environment. Cities have been targeted repeatedly by terrorists; New York City in 1993 and 2001, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and Boston in 2013. The United States, as the principal symbol of liberty in the world, will be targeted again. Can American cities be protected by taking away the rights of American citizens?

Perhaps it would be better to to predict and preempt terror attacks. The capabilities for analyzing terrorist data and using that to predict terrorist activity is growing constantly. The use of statistical analysis and relationship mapping software technologies had advanced, but a true leap forward has been made in using the internet to build a human analysis network;“social forces that are propelling network intelligence – namely citizen groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around the

world – are formidable and continue to grow” (Deibert, 2003, p. 175). This prevents data from being "stovepiped”, “which means they keep much of the immediate results of their intelligence collection activities within their own institutional structure” (Lee & Schwartz, 2005, p. 1473). Once terrorists have been identified they can be killed or captured, preemptively ending their attacks. Terror attacks can never be fully prevented, especially in a country that tolerates extremist anti-American views and is open to free movement.

Local law enforcement must be involved in American counter terror efforts. This “need for improved sharing of intelligence information between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies was recognized as early as the 1964 Warren Commission report” (Davis, Rand Corporation, & National Institute of Justice (U.S.), 2010, p. 39). The attacks of 9/11 further confirmed such a need. Legislative reforms of the security community and the intelligence institutions removed some of the barriers for intelligence sharing. Many of the reforms of the 1970's were “based on a presumption that domestic terrorism could be handled by investigating crimes after they were committed rather than preventing them” (Powers, 2004, p. 45). Barriers of this type are not conducive to developing sound counterterror policy, and must be avoided.

It is not necessary for Americans to give up personal freedom for improved security. By using effective intelligence to target actual terrorists and preempting their attacks, there is no need for a mass data collection, “shotgun” approach to surveillance. Indeed, Americans are hostile to the idea of an all encompassing police state.“American legal traditions, cultural norms, and a deeply-ingrained minimalist philosophy regarding the size and capacity of the state make a heavy-handed approach both undesirable and politically unacceptable” (Clutterbuck & Rosenau, 2009, p.5). Americans may not be able to prevent large scale attacks on our cities, but we wouldn't be able to do so even with a security state.

References

Clutterbuck, L., & Rosenau, W. (2009). Subversion as a facet of terrorism and insurgency the case for a twenty-first century approach. Strategic Insights: v.8, issue 3 . Retrieved October 17, 2014 from https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/25445

Davis, L. M., Rand Corporation, & National Institute of Justice (U.S.). (2010). Long-term effects of law enforcement’s post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism and homeland security. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. Retrieved September 22, 2014 from http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=669776

Deibert, R. J. (2003). Deep probe: The evolution of network intelligence. Intelligence & National Security, 18(4), 175–193. doi:10.1080/02684520310001688925

Lee, R. D., & Schwartz, P. M. (2005). Beyond the “war” on terrorism: Towards the new intelligence network. Michigan Law Review, 103(6), 1446–1482. Retrieved September 10, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=17240839&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Powers, R. G. (2004). A bomb with a long fuse. American History, 39(5), 42–47. Retrieved September 10, 2014 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=14624935&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Effective Counter Terror Operations

• How effective are elite counterterrorism units? What impact do elite units have on international terrorism? Discuss.

Special operations units have been extremely effective against terrorism. From the assassination of Osama Bin Laden to the raid on Entebbe, units of highly trained men have performed key missions against terrorists. “the Sayeret Mat'kal (the General Staff's own reconnaissance commando unit) mobilized, rehearsed its plans, flew 2,500 miles, and struck at the Entebbe airport, rescuing more than 100 passengers and crew with a minimum loss of life”(Henriksen, 2007, p.18)

• What counterterrorism or combating terrorism measures work most effectively with the elite counterterrorism units, and which measures work least effectively for missions like hostage rescues, punitive strikes, abductions, and reconnaissance operations? Provide reasons and examples to support your answers.

The most effective counterterror measures that elite units can undertake are leadership decapitation tactics and reconnaissance missions. “targeted killings, whether conducted by Israel, the United States, Great Britain, or other nations, are more frequently the result of action un-dertaken not by conventional military forces, but rather by specialized troops, such as special operations forces (Sof)” (Hunter, 2009, p. 3). Hostage rescues have been the least effective, but they are also a potent tool in public relations/propaganda. One area that is overlooked in the context of elite unit operations is the role of training foreign, allied agencies to carry out operations that benefit the U.S.; elite units “have historically specialized in enabling partner nation foreign military capacity through the teaching of technical fighting and military administration skills “(Grespin, 2014, p.38)

• What are the challenges of creating a counterterrorism policy? Counterterrorism measures and policies are being created and implemented internationally. Do you think that counterterrorism policies are effective and can help control and combat terrorism? Why/why not? In what ways do they control and combat terrorism and in what areas are they weak? Explain.

The major challenge to designing, implementing, and maintaining a counterterrorism policy is that it can be likened to shoveling sand back into the sea, as it is a task that will never end. “Counterterrorism should be seen not as an effort to rid the world of terrorism, but as an ongoing struggle to constrict the operating environment in which terrorists raise funds, procure documents, engage in support activities, and conduct attacks” (Levitt, 2004, p.33). A secondary challenge to creating counterterror policy is the political consideration. Is there a political party willing to lie about national security in order to win votes? A country in which politicians conduct propaganda operations against their own defenders can not expect to create an effective counterterror policy. “a culture of denial exists on the left about the problem of Islamic terrorism. This takes four key forms: mystification (the failure or refusal to acknowledge its true character); displacement (the transformation of the perpetrators into avengers and the victims into wrong-doers); evasion (the reluctance or unwillingness to recognize its significance);and minimization (the unwillingness to recognize the scope of the problem)(Cottee, 2005, p.119).

Once these challenges have been recognized, effective counterterrorism policy requires operational bases. Roberts discusses these as “ three components of any government that must come together to form an alliance of shared capabilities, risk analysis, and political resolve” (2011, p. 125).

• Examine the current counterterrorism policy of the U.S. and discuss its effectiveness. In the light of the current counterterrorism policy in the U.S., how easy or how difficult is it for terrorist groups to execute acts of terror in the U.S.? Why?

The effectiveness of American counterterror policy has certainly reversed direction over the last six years. Iraq was abandoned despite the protestations of the security community, who were proven to be proven right; military capabilities have been cut severely; terrorists were traded for a known deserter; the current administration can't even be honest about naming the ideology that the majority of terrorists we are fighting follow. “We are at a point in our history where 'timidity' will prove an undesirable and fatal flaw in the defense of this nation”(Hughbank, 2009, p.49). However, it is not the failure to pursue the enemy in his own lair that opens America up as an easy terrorist target. We are an open society and we choose not to be hindered by onerous security restrictions. Terrorists, foreign and domestic, can use our freedom to move to attack us.

Which is why it is critical that we recognize and make war against ideologies that are hostile to the American ideals of freedom and capitalism, whether those enemies be foreign or domestic. This is reflected in the oath of service:
"I, (state name of enlistee), do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God" (Army Regulation 601-210).

• Do you agree that the U.S. counterterrorism policy is a just policy and protects the privacy rights of the citizens? Why/why not? What do you think should be given precedence—security of citizens or privacy rights of citizens? Why?

The domestic security history of the United States has been taken up with the argument between citizen rights and security needs from our inception as a country, and this debate can seen in such examples as The Alien and Sedition Acts up through the publicly contested NDAA. Privacy concerns have been around as long as the technology itself. “telephone surveillance is as old as telephony itself, dating back to the nearly simultaneous commercialization of the telephone and phonograph” (Agur, 2013, abstract). One thing to remember is that security and privacy concerns do not need to clash. “The balance between civil liberties and security is not a zero-sum game” (The Heritage Foundation, 2004, p. 7). By restricting surveillance methods to those who espouse anti-American ideologies instead of using mass collection techniques, we can maintain the balance.

Agur, C. (2013). Negotiated order: The fourth amendment, telephone surveillance, and social interactions, 1878-1968. Information & Culture, 48(4), 419-447. Retrieved from February 17, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1492199073?accountid=87314

Cottee, S. (2005). The culture of denial: Islamic terrorism and the delinquent Left. Journal of Human Rights, 4(1), 119–135. doi:10.1080/14754830590947653

Grespin, W. (2014). From the ground up: The importance of preserving SOF capacity building skills. Journal of Strategic Security, 7(2), 37–47. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.7.2.5

Henriksen, T. H. (2007). Security lessons from the Israeli trenches. Policy Review, (141), 17–31. Retrieved February 17, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/216454496?pq-origsite=summon

Hughbank, R. J. (2009). Guerilla warfare & law enforcement: Combating the 21st century terrorist cell within the U.S. Journal of Strategic Security, 2(4), 39–52. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.2.4.4

Hunter, T. B. (2009). Targeted Killing: Self-defense, preemption, and the war on terrorism. Journal of Strategic Security, 2(2), 1–52. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.1

Levitt, M. (2004). Untangling the terror web: Identifying and counteracting the phenomenon of crossover between terrorist groups. The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 24(1), 33–48. Retrieved January 24, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/231348224?pq-origsite=summon

Roberts, J. Q. (2011). Building a national counterterrorism capability: A Primer for operators and policymakers alike. Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 10(2), 125–138. Retrieved February 17, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1290416673?pq-origsite=summon

The Heritage Foundation. (2004). The Patriot Act reader: Understanding the law’s role in the  Global War on Terrorism. Retrieved February 14, 2015 from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/09/the-patriot-act-reader

I think targeted killings are a vital part of CT strategy; of course if we can bag a terrorist leader it is better than killing him, but you have to take the shots you're given. But targeted killings must be directed at targets that will have an impact on terrorist operations.  These should be either leaders or members of the support network.  It does not make sense to spend resources on an easily replaced "line" terrorist.  Targeting leaders is known as decapitation or kingpin tactics.“Kingpin strategies can effectively disrupt and fragment an illicit network, whether it be insurgent or profit-seeking“(Jones, 2013, p.170).  An overlooked strategy would be to assassinate or capture those members of terror networks that provide financial, logistical, propaganda, or recruiting services. I may have missed something, but my reading of the 2001 AUMF led me to believe that it authorized ops against terrorists involved with the 9/11 attacks.  I still haven't looked at the NDAA material to see if the scope of the domestic legalities has changed. As far as international law is concerned, terrorists have very few legal rights, as they do not respect the laws and customs of war.  Article 4 of the 3rd Convention is very clear about who is allowed the protection of the laws of war. People that target civilians do not apply. American law may not permit it, but under the Geneva Convention we could torture terrorists to death in broad daylight and it would be kosher. Thanks for the CFR reference; I haven't done a lot of study on the use of drones yet (institutional prejudice at play), and this looks like a good place to start. Convention (III) relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War. (1949). International Committee of the Red Cross. Retrieved February 18, 2015 from https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=2F681B08868538C2C12563CD0051AA8D Jones, N. (2013). The unintended consequences of kingpin strategies: kidnap rates and the Arellano-Félix Organization. Trends in Organized Crime, 16(2), 156–176. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1007/s12117-012-9185-x

I don't have a lot of faith in the ability of the UN to do much past bloviating.  I wont go into it, but my base objection is allowing terror supporting and /or tyrannical nations on the Security Council, which kind of defeats the purpose.  There are other criticisms of the UN from both Left and Right.

Wiki is not a valid reference, but here is a link to a Wiki page which outlines some criticism and some effectiveness evaluation of the UN to start searching
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_United_Nations

Make sure to use the references at the bottom of the page, and check out the "Talk" tab to see argumentation about what is or isn't included on the main page.

"We should not be constrained by Boy Scout ethics in an immoral world." (Kenneth Adelman)

That is a great quote.  It fits squarely with Kaplan's argumentation in Warrior Politics.

Intelligence, as we all have seen in this course, is the most important facet of counterterror (or almost ALL human endeavor).  O'Connor's point re: identifying the terrorists with the skills fits perfectly with Walt's discussion on targeted killings.

Kaplan, R. (2002) Warrior politics: Why leadership demands a pagan ethos. New York, New York. Vintage Books

I still haven't read enough of the USA PATRIOT Act, criticism of it, and defense of it, to make a judgement on it yet.

I was trying to find a definite answer on whether the NSA surveillance revealed by Snowden was legal or not.  I don't see how it could be, but I haven't been able to parse through the information I've read so far.

Most importantly though, I don't think it's necessary for the general public to lose any amount of liberty to gain security.  We should focus our attention on the people that promote anti-American ideology, not just Islamic but Leftist and racist ideologies as well.  We can analyze their relation networks to determine who they know that we need to know, and who not to bother with.  It is a waste of resources to use the shotgun approach in addition to a violation of American liberty.  Why should folks that hate our way of life get any benefit or protection from it?

I keep going back to this point.  The NSA was keeping tab on American porn habits, while the Tsarnaev brothers (the ones that Russian security told us about) planned their attack."The FBI said in a statement: 'The request stated that it was based on information that he was a follower of radical Islam and a strong believer, and that he had changed drastically since 2010 as he prepared to leave the United States for travel to the country’s region to join unspecified underground groups"  (The Huffington Post, 2013, para. 4)

Great counter-intelligence technique here:
FBI, "Sir, are you a terrorist?"
Tsarvaev, "No"
FBI, " OK, have a nice day!"

Boston Bombing suspect Tamerlan Tsarnaev questioned by FBI In 2011, after suspicions raised about radical Islamism. (2013, April 21). The Huffington Post UK. Retrieved February 18, 2015 from http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/04/21/boston-bombing-suspect-ta_n_3125896.html

I would contest the judgement that Delta Force erred in Operation Eagle Claw.  My opinion is that the JCS did not plan the op well at all.  There were not enough aircraft for redundancy, intelligence was poor, and using units from all services without training together first was asking for something bad to happen. "The involvement of multiple units - Sea Stallion helicopters, C-130 transport aircraft, Marine Corps pilots, Army Rangers and Delta Force operators ­ and stages in the mission makes it highly complex" (Fong, 2002, para .19)  Bureaucratic politics, in that all the services wanted to be represented, sabotaged the mission.

The good thing is that the services recognized this, and implemented some changes addressing those issues.

Fong, C. (2002). Operation Eagle Claw, 1980: A case study in crisis management and military planning. Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces V28, N2. Retrieved February 18, 2015 from
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2002/Vol28_2/5.htm