Critical Thinking Exercise Why is Terrorism so Hard to Define?

By now, you have seen in your reading that there is not a universally accepted definition of terrorism.  This has been the case throughout human history.  Even though the use of terror as a tactic of war has been with us as long as war, and defining terrorism concisely and specifically has never been easy to arrive at.   According to Laqueur (2001), one of the first modern attempts was Hardman's entry in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, published in the 1930s. This definition was of terrorism as the method (or the theory behind the method) whereby an organized group sought to achieve its goals through the systematic use of violence. 

Sounds easy, right? Yet, the United States has no legal definition of terrorism. There is no organized body of legislation known as the law of terrorism, there is no inherent crime of terrorism, and terrorists are charged with other violations of law (O'Connor, 2006). In addition, within the US government, the State Department, FBI, and Department of Defense all have different formal definitions of terrorism.

So why is there not a standard definition?

Martin (2012) contends that there is an “instinctive understanding” of what comprises terrorism.  But, as we shall see, this “instinctive understanding” is not always shared between different groups of people.  Ganor (2010) discusses some of these differences in perspective from the terms of “national liberation”, innocent targets”, and guerilla warfare.  One standard of defining terrorism lies in the perceived justice of the cause.  Maskaliunaite (2002) gives us the example of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict in which operations targeting civilians are justified by one side while civilian casualties caused by operations of the other side are condemned.  There is a reason that the saying, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”, is used so much. 

In addition, defining terrorism also defines the terms on which it is fought. This is also subject to political difference and manipulation.  See the debate in American politics as to whether the “War on Terror” should be a national security or a criminal justice effort.  By refusing to name some actions as terrorism, politicians do not have to respond with policy they have publicly disavowed or disagreed with.

One standard in defining terrorism has been on “just war” grounds. Defining terrorism becomes difficult considering how there are differences in Christian, Muslim, and Asian approaches to “just war” theory.

The status of noncombatants is the prime reason for the creation and formulation of just war theory. Just war theory has roots in Roman political discussion, but is associated with the Catholic Church through Augustine and Aquinas (Hall, 2010, 78). Just war theory comprises of two components; just cause to go to war (jus ad bellum), and just behavior within war (jus in bello). Even though the Western world has been dominated by the Christian theory of just war, there is contemporary discussion that the technicalities of just war theory are unsuited for the modern age (Hehir, 1992), Kaplan (2002), (Patterson, 2005).  Amjad-Ali (2009) contends that the concepts of war and the conduct of war are central to Islamic theology, jurisprudence, and ethics.  The definition of noncombatants is therefore subject to their classification under Islamic law. In Buddhism (Buddhism is not the only Asian theology, but it does have a great deal of influence in the socialization of East Asian groups), non-violence (ahimsa) is a prime consideration of ethics. Jayasuriya (2009) finds there is a consensus in Buddhism that there is no justification for holy war or just war.  Although individual soldiers are still expected to behave ethically, war itself is not moral. Martzen (2000) simplifies the concept of just war in Hinduism to a tradition of Vedic guidelines adhered to by the warrior caste, and balanced by personal morals based on ahimsa  (there are overlaps in Buddhist and Hindu religious thought).  You should also note that there are doctrinal debates within each of these religions as well regarding the principles of just war.  So we have not only differences in the standards between these religions, but disagreement within the religions themselves.

There are also political views of just war.  Madzen (2000) outlines the Chinese Communist version of just war doctrine; whatever is good for “progress”, as defined by the Communist party, is just.  An overview of Marxist literature, the history of leftist governance, and revolutionary activity by the Left suggests that this view of justice in conflict is not unique to Maoism within leftism.

Hardman’s use of the term “organized” raises other questions. Leong (2004) asks whether the term means “well-planned” or “done by an organization”?  This would be pertinent is defining lone wolf terrorism. Leong also introduces us to the link between terror groups and organized crime.  Martin (2012) contends that it is the factor of “political violence” that differentiates between hate crime, and hate crime as terrorism. Political violence must be a characteristic of terrorism from that perspective, but that does not account for all terrorism. Hutchinson and O’Malley (2007) discuss the use of crime by terrorists to fund their operations.  Building upon that consideration, we can see organized crime often works in terrorist mode, such as the drug cartels.  Hardman did use the term “systematic use of violence”, and that can definitely be used to describe the cartels’ actions against Mexican civilians, for example.

Ask yourself:

Would setting a universal standard of terrorism require some people to re-evaluate their own personal politics or moral viewpoints?

From my own perspective, I had to admit that the Allies use of firebombs against cities in Germany and Japan during WWII was terrorism by my own definition; while I would not have used the tactic had I been directing the war, I do not condemn those ordered it, nor those that carried out the mission.  This moved me to understand terrorism is a tactic of conflict, and not necessarily a morally invalid tactic.

Are there other reasons that people may choose to have different standards by which they judge whether an action should be considered terrorism?

Does setting terrorism as a morally wrong activity change the range of policy options used to counteract terror?

If two entities with different rules of war engage in conflict, should they be expected to adhere to the others’ code, or should they understand the other side’s rules in order to win?

References:

Amjad-Ali, C. W. (2009). Jihad and just war theory: dissonance and truth. Dialog: A Journal of Theology, 48(3), 239–247. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6385.2009.00467.x

Ganor, B. (2010). Defining terrorism - is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter? Retrieved May 8, 2016, from https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1123/Defining-Terrorism-Is-One-Mans-Terrorist-Another-Mans-Freedom-Fighter

Hehir, J. B. (1992). Just war theory in a post-cold war world. Journal of Religious Ethics, 20(2), 237.

Hill, H. (2010). Can just war theory survive the War on Terror? Journal of the Institute of Justice and International Studies, (10), 77–VII.

Hutchinson, S., & O’Malley, P. (2007). A crime-terror nexus? thinking on some of the links between terrorism and criminality. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(12), 1095–1107. http://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701670870

Jayasuriya, L. (2009). Just war tradition and Buddhism. International Studies, 46(4), 423–438. http://doi.org/10.1177/002088171004600403

Kaplan, R. D. (2002). Warrior politics: why leadership demands a pagan ethos (1st ed). New York: Random House.

Laqueur, W. (2001). A history of terrorism. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction.

Leong, A. V. M. (2004). definitional analysis: The War on Terror and organised crime. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 8(1), 19–36.

Martin, G. (2012). Understanding terrorism: challenges, perspectives, and issues, 4th Edition. [VitalSource Bookshelf version]. 

Martzen,E. (2000). Religious and  philosophical  justifications for war:  a synthesis of  selected  literature. Presented at the Critical Issues Forum Conference, Monterey, California. Retrieved from https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/239636.pdf

O'Connor, D. (2006, May 6). The criminology of terrorism: history, law, definitions, typologies. Cults and Terror. Retrieved from http://www.cultsandterror.org/sub-file/TOConnor%20Lecture.htm

Patterson, E. (2005). Just war in the 21st century: reconceptualizing just war theory after September 11. International Politics, 42(1), 116-134. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800100

Your Classroom Goals and Your Simulation Role - Terrorism and Homeland Security

You and the Class:

What is your targeted grade for this class? A, B, or C

How do you want to apply this class to your life? Is this class important to your career goals?

What do you see as the most important thing to learn from this class?

The Simulation:

At this point, we will assign roles for the simulation exercise at the end of the course.  You should research your role throughout the term, and some presentations you will make during the term will be based on your role.

You will not know the nature of the homeland security threat the exercise is built around until the simulation occurs.  At that time, you will bring the research that you have done and the plans you have made to the table, and work in conjunction with your classmates to resolve the issue.  I will create a scenario that involves the roles that you as a class have chosen.

Homeland security is based on the idea that local agencies have responsibility; “Homeland security, regardless of the definition or strategic document, is a combination of law enforcement, disaster, immigration, and terrorism issues. It is primarily the responsibility of civilian agencies at all levels” (Reese, 2012).

What I would like for you to do is to pick a role that has some interest for you at a leadership or management level in an agency with homeland security responsibilities.  You do not need to choose the highest level of responsibility. If you don’t know what you’d like to do in the simulation, let me know what your goals are in life, and I will match you up with a role.

If two people choose the same role, I will make the assignment myself and allow another choice.

The roles should be chosen that appropriate for the Austin area. 

Agencies selected can be Federal, State of Texas, Williamson County, Travis County, Hays County, City of Austin, City of Round Rock; there are also some regional associations that would be appropriate. Some private agencies such as the Red Cross may also be appropriate. My preference is that you choose a role that is functional in the homeland defense system; however, if you are in a profession that is peripheral to these kinds of situations (i.e Red Cross), playing such a role may help you understand your real life responsibilities, and will be allowed.

The following resources should help you identify a role to choose.

The National Response Framework (NRF)

http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf

Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2015-2020

https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director_staff/txHomelandSecStratPlan2015-2020.pdf

The City of Austin Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM)

http://www.austintexas.gov/hsem

References:

Reese, S. (2012). Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

The Overreaction Cycle in American Security History Lecture/Discussion

         

The Overreaction Cycle in American Security History

Lecture/Discussion

Inter arma silent leges

Cicero

Reaction and overreaction come into play when the balance between liberty (personal rights) and security (public safety) is not defined clearly in legal terms (or when clear legal boundaries are not enforced). In America, this balance goes to the heart of what is Constitutional, and what is not. We will go into a full discussion of this balance and its Constitutional interpretations later in the term, but for now, it is necessary to understand that reactions to homeland security events cycle in response to politics.  America is not the only country in which a pattern of reaction and overreaction take place.  Also, consider that overreaction can be in terms that weaken security as well as in terms that weaken liberty.  As we discuss these reactions, we will see that there were security reasons to justify action; whether or not all the actions taken were in line with the security-liberty balance is another question.  Therefore, we will address the reactions chronologically with the overreactions, and leave the floor open as to which actions were overreactions.

1878 - The Alien and Sedition Acts were four distinct laws, enacted in anticipation for war with France. Although the laws were enacted for security, the laws were used by the party in power, the Federalists, to attack the Jefferson Republican Party, also known the Democratic-Republicans (Restrictions on Civil Liberties, 2005).  According to Supreme Court Justice Brennan (1987), enforcement of the Sedition Act led to at least 25 arrests, 15 indictments, and 10 convictions, which were all against Democratic-Republicans, including sitting elected officials and journalists.  Both parties had a specific view of what the American republic was and felt that the other party was a national security threat (Garrison, 2009). The Alien Enemies Acts, one of the four laws, remained in effect at the outset of World War I and was rewritten to be part of national security law (50 USC 21-24). None of the laws were challenged in the Supreme Court, and the Jefferson Republicans used the enforcement of these laws as an election issue.  The Sedition Act expired before the Federalists were voted out of office en mass in 1800.  Krafter (2010) suggests that Federalist use of these acts to silence opposition ended the party as voters took exception to these methods.  Note that zero Frenchmen or potential French saboteurs were arrested under these acts.

1861 - The Civil War led to the suspension of habeus corpus and the use of military tribunals. President Lincoln had already suspended the writ of habeas corpus prior to the act of Congress that legitimized his actions (Fairman 2009).  At least 20,000 people were arrested under these conditions (Brennan, 1987).  These include people arrested for acts of sabotage, and those simply suspected of sabotage.

1870 - Ku Klux Klan terrorism against black Americans leads to the creation of the Justice Department as Congress passes the Enforcement Act of 1870 (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007).  This anti-Klan effort became "America's first federal anti-terrorist intelligence program" (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007).  However, there was no policing agency assigned to the Justice Department, and Congress refused to establish such in fear of creating an "American secret police" (Weiner, 2012). 

1917 - Even prior to America's entry into World War I, German agents had been assigned to perform sabotage operation in the United States.  At this time, there were no federal laws regarding espionage or sabotage (Rafalko, 2011).  This spawned the enactment of the Espionage Act and of the Sedition Act.  900 people were arrested under the Espionage Act, including anti-war activists and leftists (Restrictions on Civil Liberties, 2005).  The Sedition Act included the act of "disloyal" speech. The Justice Department cooperated with the American Protective League (APL), a private organization, to track violators.  Theoharis (2004) notes that American politicians became concerned with the "growth of militant anarchist and socialist movements” (leftists) at this time.

1919 – The "Red Scare" evolved out of these concerns, which were justified by a series of bombings by leftist groups, including a bombing attack on Attorney General Palmer.  The bombings occurred against a background of labor dispute (sometimes violent), race riots across the country, and the communist revolution in Russia.  Palmer initiated a series of raids directed at leftist organizations including the Socialist Party.  In particular, the raids targeted aliens belonging to these groups (Cohen, 2003).  Palmer intended to deport them as he considered this option his only legal means of dealing with a communist conspiracy (Palmer, 1920). 600 aliens were deported.

1934 – As Europe watches growth in the strength of sister ideologies National Socialism and communism, American politicians also take note.  Roosevelt directs the FBI to become the lead agency in domestic security.  Roosevelt targeted the FBI at the Nazis in 1934, and to target the “subversive activities” of both Nazis and Communists in 1936 (O’Reilly, 1982).  Roosevelt also required the agency's use as a secret police, as "by 1935 the White House had begun to solicit bureau reports on the president's critics" as well (O’Reilly, 1982).  The House Un-American Activities Committee is formed to investigate possible citizen ties to the Nazis, and later started looking into possible communist activity (in 1969, the committee's name was changed to the "House Committee on Internal Security”).

1942 – The war that Americans knew was coming arrives.  In arguably the greatest civil liberty violation in American history, Roosevelt orders the internment of over 100,000 residents of Japanese origin.  At least 60,000 of these folks were American citizens.  The authorization of this act wass via Executive Order 9066.  In 1943, the Supreme Court ruled in Hirabayashi v. United States that the use of curfew against members of a minority group is constitutional when America is at war with the country of their origination.  Approximately 1880 Italian nationals (not citizens), and 11,000 Germans (including a few American citizens, but primarily German nationals) were also detained.  The vast majority of citizens of German and Italian descent were not detained.

The Cold War – America began the Cold War with a national will to fight communism.  Truman formalizes the FBI mission to fight subversive groups, in particular Communism; however, subversion is never specifically defined (Keller, 1989).  The McCarran Act (The Internal Security Act) was passed in 1950.  Three events change the national mood from 1946 to 1976: a shifting in judicial opinion towards privacy rights in regards to wiretapping, the debacle of Joseph McCarthy, and revelations of government excesses and abuses under the national security banner.

We will discuss the last two in relation to our subject.  The COINTELPRO (an acronym for ”counter intelligence program”) programs were targeted at various subversive groups including the Communist Party, The Socialist Worker’s Party, the Ku Klux Klan, New Left groups, and the Black Panthers.  Each COINTELPRO program was started after a request by the President for specific action against a group, starting with Truman.

Throughout the 1950s, the FBI assessed that COINTELPRO operations against CPUSA and the SWP were successful, however, the forces of politics began tearing holes in the national consensus.  The biggest driver of this degradation consensus was a Senator by the name of Joseph McCarthy.  McCarthy used the issue of anti-Communism as a platform for self-aggrandizement, and made many charges which he could not verify.  While later revelations from Soviet archives and declassification of VENONA intercepts have proven that the Soviets did indeed have American traitors in government working for them, McCarthy’s reckless and unproven attacks resulted in a backlash of public opinion against him and against the idea of anti-communism of which he had made himself the public face. Klehr (2005) notes that “McCarthy’s allegations marginalized the accurate claims”.

Riots and violent campus takeovers through the 1960s gave incoming President Nixon the impression that FBI efforts were not enough.  In addition, Nixon considered that anti-war movement as a whole to be a threat, not just the New Left elements; when FBI director Hoover did not cooperate with Nixon’s goals in addressing the anti-war movement (see the Huston Plan), Nixon called on other government agencies (Sullivan, 1979).  The CIA and the Army conducted Operation CHAOS.

Summary - An initial overreaction to security concerns can lead to abuses of liberty that lead to a curtailment of the ability of security agencies to perform their function that lead to a spectacular failure that once again result in overreaction.  One example of this involves COINTELPRO.  The Nixon administration felt that anti-war protestors as a whole were subversive, and that FBI efforts (including NEW LEFT) were not enough.  The White House then developed the Huston Plan targeted at the anti-war movement (which was not completely a New Left action, although New Left members often led segments of the anti-war movement). The methods used under this plan were clearly illegal, and the public was made aware of these abuses at roughly the same time as other programs such as the COINTELPRO operations were exposed.  The Church Committee was the catalyst for overreaction in the restriction of security agencies.  Powers (2004) contends that the reforms that were born as a result of that overreaction caused a hesitation to act in FBI agents that may have been a factor in the intelligence failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks.  In the "Homeland Security" reforms that were a response to those attacks, the PATRIOT ACT was composed.  We see the wheel make the complete turn as the mass surveillance of the public in general by the NSA was justified on the basis of the PATRIOT ACT.

We will go into more detail regarding security failures that led to 9/11 later in the term.

Which of these acts are overreactions?  Did the overreactions lead to a loss of liberty or a loss of security?  Which of these actions resulted in abuse of political power?

References:

Brennan, W. (1987, December 22). The quest to develop a jurisprudence of civil liberties in times of security crises. Law School of Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.

Cohen. (2003). The (un)favorable judgment of history: deportation hearings, the Palmer raids, and the meaning of history. New York University Law Review, 78(1431).

Fairman, M.D. (2009).  The restriction of civil liberties during times of crisis: the evolution of America's response to national military threats. Government Honors Papers. Paper 7. http://digitalcommons.conncoll.edu/govhp/7

Garrison, A. H. (2009). The Internal Security Acts of 1798: The Founding Generation and the Judiciary during America’s First National Security Crisis. Journal of Supreme Court History, 34(1), 1–27. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5818.2009.01196.x

Hirabayashi v. United States. (1943). Oyez. Retrieved May 6, 2016, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/320us81

Keller, W. W. (1989). The liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and fall of a domestic intelligence  state. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Klafter, C. (2010, April 20). Sedition and the end of America’s first political party [Text]. Retrieved May 6, 2016, from http://spectator.org/articles/39727/sedition-and-end-americas-first-political-party

        Klehr, H. (2005). Harvey Klehr talks in Raleigh: was Joe McCarthy right? Presented at the Raleigh Spy Conference. Retrieved from http://www.raleighspyconference.com/docs/joe_mccarthy_klehr.pdf

Jeffreys-Jones, R. (2007). The FBI: a history. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Palmer, A. (1920, February). The case against the “Reds.” The Forum, 63. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/history/usa/government/fbi/1920/0200-palmer-redscase.pdf

Powers, R. G. (2004). A bomb with a long fuse. American History, 39(5), 42–47.

O’Reilly, K. (1982). A New Deal for the FBI: The Roosevelt Administration, crime control, and           national security. The Journal of American History, 69(3), 638–658. http://doi.org/10.2307/1903141

Rafalko, F. (Ed.). (2011). A Counterintelligence Reader, Volume I: American Revolution to World War II. National Counterintelligence Center.

Restrictions on Civil Liberties History of U.S. Policy. (2005). Congressional Digest, 84(7), 194–195.

Sullivan, W. C. (1979). The Bureau: my thirty years in Hoover’s FBI (1st ed). New York: Norton.

Theoharis, A. G. (2004). The FBI & American democracy: a brief critical history. Lawrence:   University Press of Kansas.

Weiner, T. (2013). Enemies: a history of the FBI. New York: Random House.