The Effects Of Hoover's
Bureaucratic Tactics On COINTELPRO Operations: A Comparison Between
NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE
Steve Durchin
Abstract
Politics
can have a negative impact on a nation's security. This is
applicable whether the harm is done by expediting the development of
nuclear weapons for religious fanatics to the unsuccessful
degradation of a subversive group. By being able to analyze and
how a subversive group was unsuccessfully confronted, the process of
understanding how political interference can interfere with security
can be extrapolated to explain how other factors can hinder national
security as well. In
the 1960s, the FBI continued a series of intelligence/harassment
programs against violent and subversive groups within the United
States against vastly different groups. How did FBI Director
Hoover's political direction of the agency affect the efficiency of
COINTELPRO operations in dealing with the Ku Klux Klan versus those
dealing with the New Left? A content analysis of the literature
exploring COINTELPRO operations may possibly demonstrate if Hoover's
personal application of the bureaucratic politics model hindered the
success of these counter-subversive operations.
Section
I: Introduction
Background
Politics
has been a driving force in the development and operations of the FBI
throughout its history. The important question is how much effect
has the influence of politics has on the efficiency of operations in
protecting the United States. In the 1960s, the FBI continued a
series of intelligence/harassment programs against violent and
subversive groups within the United States. The programs were a
continuation of COINTELPRO (an acronym for Counter Intelligence
Program) operations in the FBI's long history of addressing the issue
of subversion in the United States. Two specific programs were of
note, as they were targeted at vastly different subversive movements.
These specific programs were COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE, targeted at the
Ku Klux Klan, and COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT, directed at the New Left.
COINTELPRO operations had a
formal start in 1953 targeting the Communist party, but were a
continuation of the FBI's anti-subversive mission. Jeffreys-Jones
(2007) relates that the Justice Department, to which the FBI is
subordinate, was founded as Congress passed the Enforcement Act of
1870 in part as a reaction to Ku Klux Klan subversion. Weiner (2012)
adds that there was no policing agency assigned to the Justice
Department, and Congress refused to establish such in fear of an
"American secret police" though the early 20th Century. In
1908, Congress allowed the creation of what would eventually become
the Bureau of Investigation, however, due to fears that the agency
could be used as a "secret police" and enmeshed in
politics, this new agency was not authorized to make arrests or to
carry weapons (Kessler, 2003). Theoharis (2004) contends that two
factors changed this state of affairs; the first was the growth of
militant leftist groups and the second was the advent of World War I
and German sabotage efforts within the United States.
It was during this period that
J. Edgar Hoover joined the Department of Justice. The growth and the
direction of the FBI can not be explored without understanding
Hoover's central role and how his personality affected it. Powers
(1987) explains that Hoover's work during this period allowed him to
become "known to his superiors as someone who was reliable and
efficient" (p. 54). After World War I, the Department of
Justice continued its war against subversion after a series of
bombings by Leftists included the Attorney General Mitchell Palmer as
a target (Gentry, 1991). The Radical Division of the Bureau of
Investigation, which Hoover was in charge of, was tasked with this
responsibility.
Hoover's work as head of the
Radical Division put him in good standing when Attorney General
Harlan Stone sought to reform the Bureau of Investigation in 1924;
Hoover was selected as Acing Director of the Bureau. Gentry (1991)
contends that Hoover rebuilt the Bureau. In the era prior to World
War II, Hoover's direction of the agency resulted in several
changes, including the sanction to carry weapons, make arrests, and
the new name of the agency...the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
These changes, however, included involving the FBI in internal
politics. O'Reilly (1982) discusses how FDR personally directed the
FBI to target the subversive activities of Nazis and Communists and
legitimized domestic intelligence operations; FDR also required the
agency's use as a political police, and to solicit bureau reports on
the president's critics. In the future, the FBI would provide
political intelligence on political rivals for each and every
President through Hoover's tenure at the FBI.
But it was not until Truman that
a formal legally sanctioned role was for anti-subversion was
designated for the FBI; Keller (1989) discusses how a Truman
directive stated explicitly that the FBI should be responsible for
matters relating to espionage and subversive activities. It was in
this environment that the FBI initiated the first formal COINTELPRO
operation, which was against the Communist Party in the United
States, COINTELPRO: CPUSA. Powers (1987) explains how the FBI's
success in this operation led to the use of these methods against
other subversive groups.
In the 1960s, the political
climate directed COINTELPRO operations against the Ku Klux Klan and
the New Left. J. Edgar Hoover validated the danger of these groups,
whose "verbal assaults are reinforced with violent acts: murder,
assault, arson, bombings" (1969, pp. 289-290). While
COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE and COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT were not public
knowledge, Hoover's history of public relations suggests that he was
aware of the possibility of disclose of the programs and wished to
stress that operations against violent subversive groups was
justified.
It is in examining the
differences in operations between the two groups that the question of
whether or not politics interferes with security operations arises.
Rationale For Study
Politics
can have a negative impact on a nation's security. This is
applicable whether the harm is done by expediting the development of
nuclear weapons for religious fanatics to the unsuccessful
degradation of a subversive group. By being able to analyze and
explain why a subversive group was unsuccessfully confronted, the
process of understanding how political interference can interfere
with security can be extrapolated to explain how other factors can
hinder national security as well.
Research Question
RQ:
How did FBI Director Hoover's political direction of the agency
affect the efficiency of COINTELPRO operations?
IV
= Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics
DV = The successful use of a COINTELPRO program to degrade a subversive group's ability to harm the United States.
DV = The successful use of a COINTELPRO program to degrade a subversive group's ability to harm the United States.
Methodology
The purpose of the methodology
is to clarify what this thesis is asking by explaining how it is
asking those questions. Accordingly, the theory which potentially
explain the differences, the general approach to the study shall be
discussed, the frames of reference will be explained, the rationale
for using these methods will be given, and potential issues in the
study will be highlighted.
The theory which best explains
COINTELPRO operations is the bureaucratic politics model (also known
in variation as growth complex theory, or Pournelle's Iron Law of
Bureaucracy).
The primary method used is
through content analysis of secondary material exploring both
COINTELPRO operations and Hoover's direction of the Bureau. This
includes some use of phenomenological research, as the viewpoints of
Hoover assistants Sullivan and DeLoach will be examined.
Data will be obtained from
secondary sources. These will include academic studies, historical
studies, and biographical sources.
Frames of Reference
What is the mission of the FBI?
The mission of the FBI, under the frame of reference for this study,
is to protect the country from domestic threats.
Should New Left operations be
counted as a subset as counter communist/leftist operations, or on
its own merits? The term “New Left” should be interpreted as
referring specifically to the New Left in America, unless otherwise
stated. It is within reasonable interpretation to interpret
COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT operations in aggregate with other
anti-Communist/anti-socialist operations, but for the purposes of
this thesis, COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT is being considered as a discrete
set of data.
Rationale for Qualitative
Methods
The qualitative approaches
collect nonnumerical data to answer the research question in a
descriptive or exploratory
manner. Tewksbury (2009) asserts that “Qualitative research methods
provide more emphasis on interpretation and providing consumers with
complete views, looking at contexts, environmental immersions and a
depth of understanding of concepts” (p. 39)
Potential
Issues in Study
The covert nature of COINTELPRO
is the primary issue in this study. Although some material has been
made publicly available through the Freedom of Information Act, it is
likely that there is material that needs to be uncovered to fully
explore the nature of the program. Theoharis (1990) contends that FBI
documents released for Freedom of Information Act requests are often
redacted and of limited research value.
Lost material due to time and
destruction. There is an issue based on the passage of time. The
Archives note that the material on hand is from the national FBI
offices, and that most of the operational notes were kept at the
field offices. It is likely that most of this material is now lost.
In addition, Steinwall (1986) recounts that the FBI destroyed over
700,000 cubic feet of records between 1976 and 1978 although this
material has not been specified to include documentation on
COINTELPRO operations.
There may difficulty in
assigning qualitative characteristics when comparing New Left
operations against Leftist groups as a whole. SDS, for example,
evolved from the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID), a
group that the FBI had been monitoring under a different COINTELPRO
program aimed at the Socialist Worker's Party.
Political bias is a serious
issue for studies of this type. Most discussion of the COINTELPRO
program is based on the contention that it was somehow “immoral”
to investigate and harass violent groups that had the goal of
breaking American law; in addition, the vast majority of this
discussion has been conducted by leftists that focused on leftist
groups as “victims” of this program, and ignored completely
COINTELPRO operations against the Klan (not to mention the violent
nature of the crimes committed by the New Left). The majority of the
remainder often brushed off efforts against the Klan as an FBI front
for public relations...in a secret program. There is also the
question of my own personal bias.
While it would be nice if
research was fundamentally unbiased, Sampson (2012) understands that
bias is normal in research and explains how to mitigate it;
“Qualitative researchers contend that bias is inherent, yet can be
described clearly enough to allow the reader to judge if bias has
inappropriately influenced the research” (p. 8). In my own case, I
will be upfront about my hostility towards Leftist ideals, the
reality in results from Leftist programs, the political methods that
Leftists employ, the contempt of Leftists for liberty, and the lack
of honesty in which Leftists engage in public discourse.
Section
II: Literature Review
This
review will provide a limited overview of of the current studies
regarding Director Hoover's involvement in the direction of the FBI,
moving on to a lens regarding Hoover's application of bureaucratic
politics (in the general, not specifically theoretical sense of the
term) in that direction, and finally narrowing down into more detail
on Hoover's involvement in COINTELPRO operations,. Denney and
Tewksbury
(2013) describe different uses of focus in a literature review. The
primary focus relates to the concepts surrounding the research
question, and can take an integrative focus which synthesizes
research based on conclusions, a theoretical focus which contrast the
use of different theories to explain an event
or set of events,
or a methodological focus, which compares the methodological
approaches used in completed research. As qualitative research
explores how actions and situations relate to each other, the
theoretical approach will be used for this study. In particular, the
independent variable in this study relies on examination of the
bureaucratic politics model, and Hoover's personal application of the
model.
Gentry
(1991) and Powers (1987) are in agreement that Hoover's personality
played a large part in his success at the Attorney General's office
which led to his appointment and early preeminence at the Bureau of
Investigation, which soon became the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). They also agree that Hoover's perfectionism and autocratic
leadership style were the key components in that success. Gibson
(1994) reinforces this idea of Hoover as an autocratic leader in that
all FBI information roads led to Hoover's office; Gibson's
description of Hoover's use of margin comments in these memos in
order to direct the agency supports this argument. Underhill (2012)
argues that Hoover's manipulation of the media played a part in
making Hoover, and thus the FBI, a national symbol of heroism. The
public image of the FBI is a theme throughout the literature. Gage
(2012) uses the case of Mark Felt to illustrate Hoover's managerial
control of the agency in addition to his desire to protect and exalt
the public image of the FBI, but most importantly though the prism of
Felt's loyalty to Hoover the institutional culture that Hoover built
in the FBI. The theme that this overview presents is one of
Hoover's domination of the FBI, which comes into play as it ties
Hoover individually to a role as a player in the bureaucratic
politics game.
O'Reilly
(1982) demonstrates Hoover's early use of bureaucratic politics to
adapt to FDR's expansion of Federal power and to gain a sanction for
the continued use of the FBI in addition to expanding the agencies
responsibilities, especially in domestic security concerns.
Bowornwathana and Poocharoen (2010) explain this in the context that
administrative reform in government is a function of politics, not
management direction; they also define the bureaucratic politics
framework. In this framework, government is not a single agency, but
a competing set of bureaus that seek to protect and advance their
segregate agendas. Webb (2004) shows Hoover's impulse to protect the
FBI in domestic security responsibilities while engaged in a turf
battle over control of the FBI's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), a
foreign intelligence service with responsibility for Latin America.
Webb asserts that Hoover's desire to control the SIS went only as far
as his absolute control of the agency, demonstrating not only
Hoover's political infighting ability but reinforcing the idea of
Hoover as an autocratic leader. Keller (1989) discusses Hoover's
political alliances with liberals to formalize (thus protecting) the
domestic security responsibilities that FDR had bestowed upon the
agency. Stockham (2013) discusses Hoover's relationship with members
of Congress and further explores Hoover's use of the media to advance
the goals of the FBI. In concert with Underhill's assertion of media
manipulation, it can be seen that Hoover used public media as an
additional political tool. Keller advances the Liberal Theory of
Internal Security to explain the liberal/Hoover alliance, but also to
describe three levels of domestic security organization based upon a
matrix including the level of autonomy. Keller argues that this
alliance increased the FBI's level of autonomy. As Hoover's
domination of the FBI has been demonstrated, it can be seen that
Hoover's ability to succeed at bureaucratic politics advanced his own
autonomy in directing the FBI, and in specific the FBI's domestic
security responsibilities.
COINTELPRO
operations were the epitome of the FBI response to these domestic
responsibilities. Hoover (1969) presented a public case for the
dangers presented by both the Ku Klux Klan (the targets of WHITE
HATE) and the New Left (the targets of NEW LEFT). This also serves
as an indicator of Hoover's motives in dealing with these subversive
groups. However, it must be noted that both NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE
were only initiated after direct requests from the White House to
resolve specific domestic security concerns. Cunningham (2003)
operationalizes data which allows direct comparison between the two
programs. Sullivan (1979), in his autobiography, discusses the
judgment of senior FBI officials regarding the success of the
operations. The current research, however, does not take into
account the relationship between Hoover's political maneuvers and the
success of the operations. Ergo, Hoover's personality, and its
resultant affects upon his bureaucratic infighting, must be analyzed
in regards to whether or not these COINTELPRO actions were a success.
Section III: Data Collection
Methods
This plan of inquiry discusses
the method used to explore the relationship between Hoover's
direction of bureaucratic politics and whether or not that direction
had any affect on the success of COINTELPRO operations. A comparison
between the COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE and COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT programs
will be made on the basis of two variables: (1) How Hoover used
bureaucratic politics regarding that specific program, and (2)
whether that operation was considered a success or not.
Data Sources
The data sources chosen were
selected for their applicability to the study in several criteria; a
phenomenological approach in which those that participated in the
operations subjectively judged both or either variable, the
identification of themes used in text (used primarily in identifying
the use of Hoover's political maneuvering), statistical information,
and content analysis. The sources were located from a variety of
origination, although most sources were located from
cross-referencing bibliographies once a data source had been
identified. Enough sources were selected to provide a balance
between credibility and validation on one hand, and redundancy on the
other.
Research Design
Data needs to be collected for
both variables. As the bulk of the data collected will be narrative
in nature, Creswell (2012) suggests coding for themes as a method of
analysis. The application of coding for theme is most suited for the
variable of Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics. The level of
success in each program can be weighed on two basis; success against
the Klan can be measured in membership levels and in the narrative of
those that conducted the operations, while success against the New
Left can be measured in the narrative of those that took part in New
Left terror actions, and the narrative of those that conducted the
operations against them.
Data Analysis Strategy
There are five steps in
exploring the relationship between Hoover's use of bureaucratic
politics and whether a given operation could be considered a success.
Data should be analyzed with the purpose of identifying the methods
of politics that Hoover used. Then which methods of political
tactics Hoover used in regards specifically to each program (WHITE
HATE, NEW LEFT) should be classified. At this point, an analysis
must be made as to whether there was a significant difference in
Hoover's maneuvering between the two programs. Both programs must be
judged as to the level of success. Finally, the political method
used must be evaluated against the success or failure of that
operation.
Summary
The
methodology used to explore the relationship between Hoover's
direction of bureaucratic politics and whether or not that direction
had any affect on the success of COINTELPRO operations. A comparison
between the COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE and COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT programs
is based upon the independent variable of Hoover's use of
bureaucratic politics and a dependent vraiable of the level of that
program's success. Data
has been gathered from biographies, histories, interviews and studies
regarding both Hoover and COINTELPRO. This data must be analyzed to
identify the methods of politics used by Hoover, and the data must
also be used to evaluate the success of the two COINTELPRO
operations.
Section
IV: Discussion and Conclusions
Findings
Answering
the question, “What effect did Hoover's bureaucratic politics have
on the success of COINTELPRO operations?”, requires a three step
process. First, the tools of Hoover's maneuvering must be
identified; second, which types of maneuvers affected which operation
in the comparison between WHITE HATE and NEW LEFT must be stated; and
finally, the success of those specific operations must be judged.
These findings are based upon a content analysis of several histories
of the FBI and of biographies of J. Edgar Hoover: Gentry,1991;
Keller, 1989; O'Reilly, 1982; Powers,1987; and Weiner, 2013.
As
the concept of bureaucratic politics is classified into types of
tactic and identified via the percentage of literature in which use
of the tactic is discussed, the usage of the types should be
explained:
-
Acquiescence to a previously resisted policy: Hoover would oppose the use of the FBI in certain situations; as political pressure increased, Hoover would acquiesce to the policy to protect the Bureau's interests.
-
Alliance with a politician (i.e. Congressman or President) or a block of politicians: Hoover would provide public support, provide private information, or would consult with the politician in the creation of policy. These alliances would be conducted outside the normal chain of command. Examples include bypassing the Attorney General in dissemination of information.
-
Implied threat of media use to expose political opponent: Hoover would suggest to a political opponent that people close to the opponent were doing illegal or immoral things, and that the opponent should take steps to protect themselves.
-
Reducing operations or refusing to initiate operations: In contrast to the aforementioned acquiescence, Hoover often refused to take on certain responsibilities for the FBI or reduced operations that the Bureau was already conducting if he felt that the political situation required this to be done in order to protect the Bureau.
-
Retaliation against critics of the FBI: Hoover regarded the public image of the Bureau as necessary to its continued existence. Critics that “attacked” the FBI publicly were subject to retaliation.
-
Use of the media, either via a front or via FBI public affairs: The media was used in several ways; to establish the FBI's position on a policy, to discredit political opponents, to promote the FBI's image, and to bolster public support
-
Using collected data as intelligence rather than to justify criminal charges: Although this tactic was mainly used to perform the Bureau’s intelligence mission rather than as a bureaucratic maneuver, because the data had been collected, it was in the files to support the use of other types of bureaucratic politics.
Table
1 demonstrates the frequency in which these tactics are discussed in
the literature; Appendix 1 lists the supporting reference material.
It
should be noted that Table 1 is a breakdown of the types of
bureaucratic politics that Hoover engaged in as a whole in the
direction of the FBI, not simply those that he used in the guidance
of COINTELPRO programs. The most striking difference in the use of
these tactics in regards to COINTELPRO is that Hoover acquiesced to
committing the FBI against the Klan (WHITE HATE) at the behest of
LBJ, a reversal of Hoover's policy of withholding intervening in
civil rights issues, with Hoover's decision to curtail operations
after the break-in at the Media, Pennsylvania FBI office which could
potentially (and later did in fact) expose extra-legal FBI operations
including COINTELPRO. This reduction in domestic security operations
had the greatest effect on NEW LEFT operations due to the timing of
the decision.
How
then, to measure the success of the COINTELPRO programs individually?
Membership figures are available for the Klan, but not for the New
Left. The ability of these groups to operate in public can be
explored. Finally, the assessment by senior FBI officials of these
operations can be looked into. Drabble's
(2008) demonstration that Klan membership dropped significantly
meshes with Assistant Director Sullivan's (1979) determination that
COINTELPRO: WHITE HATE was a successful program. This is in contrast
to Sullivan's judgment of the decision to end COINTELPRO: NEW LEFT
(indeed, all COINTELPRO programs were ended at this time), which left
Sullivan and other FBI agents upset that their most effective weapon
against subversives had been removed (Weiner, 2013). Indeed, Varon
(2004) notes that the FBI were simply unable to find the Weathermen.
Discussion
For
the most part, these findings confirm the established literature in
describing Hoover's personality, his leadership of the FBI, and how
these factors related to his use of bureaucratic politics. The
interplay between political infighting tactics and selection of
COINTELPRO targets adds some contradictory depth to the image of
Hoover as an inflexible dictator. Hoover curtailed operations
several times during his tenure at the FBI in order to protect the
agency as a whole, and took on operations that he had previously
resisted for the same reason. As the discussion moves into the
conclusion, it will take into
account the relationship between Hoover's political maneuvers and the
success of the operations.
Ensuring
domestic tranquility may have been the task set for the FBI, but
Hoover sought to protect the Bureau politically before committing
fully to that mission. The most glaring example of this lay in the
comparison of political tactics that effectively began WHITE HATE to
the tactics that effectively ended NEW LEFT. Hoover resisted using
the FBI to prevent Klan terror on the grounds of federalism, although
there are enough examples of his own racism to suggest that he did
not hold the civil rights of black Americans as a priority. After
the political desires of the President were made clear to Hoover, his
compliance with this directive bolstered his alliance with the
liberals and advanced the support of the liberals for the Bureau. In
contrast, as Hoover became aware of changing popular and political
support for the methods of the FBI, he limited covert operations. In
response to revelations about FBI wiretapping methods, which were
exposed in the Fred Black case heard before the Supreme Court in
1966, Hoover ended the FBI “black bag” method Bureau -wide. Once
the FBI office in Media had been burglarized (in 1971) and FBI files
at the office disseminated to the press, Hoover ordered an end to all
COINTELPRO operations. Hoover was attempting to protect the public
image of the FBI as opposed to its mission. Thus a full operational
run at the Ku Klux Klan ended their effectiveness as a subversive
group, but an abrupt end of NEW LEFT operations left the New Left
room to run.
Conclusion
The Ku Klux Klan is an active
organization today. How then, can WHITE HATE be portrayed as a
success? The issue lay in human nature. As Durkheim suggests that
crime is a normal function of human society, it can be safe to say
that there is a normal urge to seek power in humans, either legally
through the republican process, or illegally through subversion of
that process. WHITE HATE ended, and the pressures that reduced the
efficiency of the Klan and prevented its further recruitment of
members ended as well. The history of the government's struggles
against the Klan, in the 1870s, the 1920s, the 1960s, the 1980s,
through today can testify to the constant need to fight subversion.
In part, this is why the study
of effective methods of combating subversion is important. It is
necessary to understand what can cause an effective campaign against
a subversive operation and what can cause a failure of such
operations. Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics can illuminate
both how an agency can use such tactics to protect is organizational
integrity, as well as how such tactics can prevent the agency from
performing its mission. It should be emphasized that bureaucratic
politics is only one possible factor that can hinder domestic
security operations.
Limitations
The
selection of bureaucratic politics as a sole independent variable is
just one of many limitations in this study. Since
this is a highly complex research question that relies on
interpreting data from conflicting and often partisan sources, there
are many limitations to the study.
The first limitation is the
context in which the research question was developed. Perhaps it
would have been better to ask a quantitative question; “Was there a
difference in the way that COINTELPRO programs were conducted against
NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE targets?” This is a question that
possibly should be resolved before investigating the relationship
between Hoover's use of bureaucratic politics and the efficiency of
COINTELPRO operations in the two programs.
A second contextual issue
returns to the issue of the bureaucratic
politics model, which as a variable is just one factor in several
that may have affected COINTELPRO success; there is the possibility
that the internal culture of the FBI interfered with the ability of
agents to infiltrate the New Left, the possibility that Sullivan's
attempt to replace Hoover as director and the resultant fall-out from
that situation affected field operations, and the possibility that
political liberals who had no problems in countering the right-wing
terror of the Klan suddenly discovered “Constitutional” concerns
when the terrorists of the Left were targeted, and thus abandoned the
alliance with Hoover.
A
possible limitation involving the sampling design is that the sample
used to generate the content analysis is relatively small compared to
the amount of literature that exists; the sources that also could
have been used include the Church Committee (Intelligence
activities, 1976),
from Theoharis (2004), from Jeffreys-Jones
(2007), from Elliff (1979), and from Cunningham (2003). Material
from Churchill (1990) was excluded due to the extreme level of bias
in that material. While Triola
(2014) warns that a sample size can be too small in statistical
sampling, Krippendorff (2013) explains that the content analysis
method deviates from the representational mode of sampling theory in
that the researcher is seeking to sample texts that can accurately
answer the research question, not to seek to represent the textual
population.
The
research instrument used was a content analysis. The thoroughness
of the manual process used in this content analysis may be
questioned. It is worth the effort to redo this analysis with the
addition of additional source material and a more efficient approach,
perhaps using software designed for content analysis.
There is also the issue in data
collection in estimating the effect that COINTELPRO had on the New
Left. DeLoach (1995) notes this difficulty and briefly mentions
possible factors for the subsequent decline in New Left activity
which do include COINTELPRO.
Another data collection
limitation is the difficulty in separating Hoover's personal
identification with the agency from his direction of the agency for
the Bureau's sake. For instance, Gentry (1991) notes an example in
which Raymond Chandler, the writer, insulted Hoover personally, and
was subjected to the collection of 250 pages of personal data in an
FBI file.
The last data collection issue
is in using data related to Assistant Director Sullivan's statements.
The literature demonstrates that Sullivan had a pattern of telling
his audience what they wanted to hear at any given time. This
applies particularity to data regarding New Left activities;
Sullivan enthusiastically took part in organizing the Huston plan
directed at the New Left, yet in his autobiography claims that the
New Left was not a threat...this, at a time Mark Felt was being
prosecuted for covert FBI operations.
Finally, the
theoretical underpinnings of the study may benefit from additional
theoretical perspective. Bureaucratic politics is a good model to
explain the basics of how Hoover used these particular tactics and
why they succeeded on an organizational advancement basis. Keller's
(1989) Liberal Theory of Internal Security explained the reasons that
liberals allied with Hoover, but was too specific to apply to the
research question, and was also excluded from the study. Finally,
Loewenstein's
(1937) “Militant Democracy” may explain a Republic's need to
combat extremism, but is too general to apply to the research
question, and was excluded.
Future Research
Finally, such a study leads to
additional questions. How does a free society identify security
threats? Is the ideology of socialism an inherent threat to a free
society? Is the ideology of Islam an inherent threat to a free
society? What methods of combating racism are effective and do not
interfere with personal liberty? How does security law get written so
that security operations are legally conducted, effective in nature,
and attain balance between security and liberty?
Policy Implications
Recommendation
1:
The first policy recommendation that springs to mind in regards to
the study derives from Hoover's use of political tactics and his
identification with the Bureau that resulted in a long tenure as
Director; although there have been laws to prevent longevity in such
offices, the political abuse that accompanies such offices does not
occur solely with longevity (see Lerner's use of the IRS to attack
opponents of the Obama administration for a current example). This
abuse is more easily concealed in security agencies. Therefore an
office needs to be established in the judiciary in which all
communications between elected representatives and security officials
are monitored. Of necessity, the monitors would need the appropriate
security clearances. The responsibility of this office would be to
ensure that such communications remain within the bounds of the
respective office, and that breaches in this protocol are punished,
and the nature of those breaches presented to the public when they do
not present security risks.
Recommendation
2:
Individual targets should be legally designated for enhanced
security operations, whether for surveillance or neutralization. A
security agency should be required to go before a security oriented
court (similar to the FISA process, yet with the possibility of
designating a citizen as a security risk), and present a solid case
that the individual in question presents a risk to the security of
the United States. The benefit of this policy is that members of
criminal organizations could be designated as such when involved in
actions that involve subversion of the judicial process such as
intimidation of witnesses or bribery. The reason to focus on
individuals as opposed to movements is based upon the due process
principle. However, membership in organizations that are doctrinally
hostile to America, or the public support of hostile ideologies
should be prima
facie reasons
to focus on an individual.
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Appendix 1: Page References
Used in Content Analysis
