Challenges to long term vision in disaster planning

What are the challenges agencies in both the public and private sector must consider when constructing a long-term vision in preparation for major natural disasters? How can the agencies address these issues? Provide an analysis supporting your response.

Budgeting will be a major factor in constructing long term vision, as “emergency management

agencies and programs have not received the political and fiscal support that they

should have” (Choi, 2008, p. 3).

There is also the issue of public awareness versus public expectations. “The success of government in meeting this [emergency management] need has led to increasingly higher public expectations” (Choi, 2008, p. 4). Unfortunately, “in a world of finnite resources, achieving ideal performance in such situations will almost never be possible” (Jackson, 2008, p. vii). Adding to this issue is a lack of public awareness on dealing with emergencies;“FEMA surveys indicate that many Americans are still not

prepared” (GAO, 2010, p. 21)

Another issue to consider while building the long term vision is the lack of accurate foresight, such as “the breakdowns that occurred after Katrina and Rita [and] demonstrated not only capability and effectiveness shortfalls, but also that we did not know how prepared we actually were as a country”(Jackson, 2008, p. 2)

The next challenge to long term vision is collaboration with agencies that don't share the long-term vision. “Overall, the existing governmental response system is more accurately described as disarrayed, disconnected, uncoordinated, underfunded, and discredited” (Choi, 2008, p. 4).

All these challenges underly the uncertainty involved with creating a consistent plan to build the vision for, and “future policy mandates should recognize that there are factors beyond the control of those designing the policy that will impact the extent to which the policy is implemented as well as the policy's performance and output”(Jensen, 2010, p .114).

How does agency address these challenges? Choi suggests that agencies “should have the following in place prior to attempting implementation: a powerful and effective process sponsor; a strategic planning team; a willingness to be flexible concerning what constitutes a strategic plan; and a willing to construct and consider arguments geared to many different criteria” (2008, p. 6). This coincides with our week 4 discussion of how leaders sponsor implementation during every component of the process. Leaders need to be able to adapt to these changes, and define the ability to adapt as part of their vision. Indeed, one principle that is part of FEMA's vision is flexibility (FEMA, 2007, p. 4).

Choi, S. (2008). Emergency management: implications from a strategic management perspective. Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, 5(1), 1–21. Retrieved February 24, 2015 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=i3h&AN=31195725&site=ehost-live&scope=site

FEMA. (2007). Emergency management definition, vision, mission, principles. Retrieved February 24, 2015 from www.training.fema.gov/hiedu/08conf/emergency%20management%20principles%20monograph%20final.doc

GAO. (2010). Emergency preparedness: FEMA faces challenges integrating community preparedness programs into its strategic approach. DIANE Publishing. Retrieved January 28, 2015 from http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=yUYS9m5HSV4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=%22DHS+concurred%22+%22practices+for+implementing+programs,+FEMA+would+be%22+%22Jr.+at+(202)+512-8777%22+%22more+information,+contact+William%22+%22completing+these+strategies.+By+doing+so,+consistent+with%22+&ots=ej_ToyIv8g&sig=VTTrs--JD_-Iw7PDhHI2BDuPYAQ

Jackson, B. A. (2008). The Problem of measuring emergency preparedness: The need for assessing “response reliability” as part of Homeland Security planning. Santa Monica, California, Rand Corporation.

Jensen, J. A. (2010). Emergency management policy: predicting National Incident Management System (NIMS) implementation behavior(dissertation). North Dakota State University. Retrieved February 3, 2015 from https://cms-devel.ndsu.nodak.edu/fileadmin/emgt/Final_Dissertation_Complete.pdf

Disaster Resilience

What are the characteristics of an ideal long-term vision in preparation for major natural disasters?
Although our class notes state that the vision component is not mandatory in the strategic-change cycle, an examination of the component shows how much of a role the proper vision can play in strategic management and change. “Strategic management is characterized as a long-term process for developing a continuing commitment to the mission and vision of an organization” (Choi, 2008, p. 1). This is due to the effect that the proper vision can play. “New leadership strategies are recommended that derive their power from effective strategies and the transformational power of a compelling vision” (Waugh & Streib, 2006, p. 131). FEMA lists the principles associated with their own vision; Comprehensive, Progressive , Risk-driven, Integrated, Collaborative, Coordinated, Flexible, and Professional (FEMA, 2007, p. 4)
In your opinion, what key desired outcomes should be considered when formulating a long-term vision in preparation for major natural disasters? Support your response with reasoning and examples.
There are two main outcomes that vision should contributes toward to the value in disaster planning; performance and goal identification within the organization. Bryson states that “deeply shared articulations of organizational identity through action-oriented mission and vision statements are clear contributors to performance” (2010, p. S263). Choi discusses the importance of goal identification, “Successful emergency management requires an effective leadership to establish an organizational mission and adopt new organizational changes and cultures” (2008, p. 10).

Bryson, J. M. (2010). The future of public and nonprofit strategic planning in the United States. Public Administration Review, 70(S1), S255–S267. Retrieved February 24, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/853426263?pq-origsite=summon

Choi, S. (2008). Emergency management: implications from a strategic management perspective. Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, 5(1), 1–21. Retrieved February 24, 2015 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=i3h&AN=31195725&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Federeal Memergency Management Agency . (2007). Emergency management definition, vision, mission, principles. Retrieved February 24, 2015 from www.training.fema.gov/hiedu/08conf/emergency%20management%20principles%20monograph%20final.doc

Waugh, W. L., & Streib, G. (2006). Collaboration and leadership for effective emergency management. Public Administration Review, 66(S1), 131. Retrieved February 24, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/197171710?pq-origsite=summon

2011 Tornado Outbreak and Public/Private Resource Allocation in relation to the National Response Framework (NRF)

2011 Tornado Outbreak and Public/Private Resource Allocation in relation to the National Response Framework (NRF)

In the record setting year for tornado activity in 2011, massive destruction occurred in Missouri and in several Southeastern states. The way that resources for recovery were allocated demonstrated a prinicple of the National Response Framework (NRF).

“You're going to see something different here [from New Orleans after Katrina] because there's this resilience and this resolve where the people in this community-that we're not waiting for somebody to come do it for us. We're going to get it done, and other people are attracted to that and come alongside to help and make it happen faster.

-Joplin resident who lived in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina” (Smith & Sutter, 2013, p.165)

Smith and Sutter argue that the voluntary sector (business and charity groups) drove the fast pace of recovery in Joplin, Missouri and that the public sector made it's biggest contribution by not interfering. Allocation of resources was in accord with public demand. This is in accord with NRF prinicple; “In many facets of an incident, the government works with private sector groups as partners in emergency management” (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p.18). Smith and Sutter use the example of Nixon to illustrate, “Missouri governor Jay Nixon issued several executive orders temporarily waiving laws and regulations to assist response and recovery” (Smith & Sutter, 2013, p.182).

In contrast, Smith and Sutter assert that “The public sector can inhibit recovery by creating regime uncertainty or perceptions of a possible change in the institutional rules supporting an economy” (Smith & Sutter, 2013, p.169). This is made apparent in the difference between disaster recovery between Joplin and in the Southeast. “In Joplin, the official plan not only makes property rights a priority but clocks in at only 21 pages, compared with Tuscaloosa's 128” (Beito & Smith, 2012, para. 7). In addition, “Instead of encouraging businesses to rebuild as quickly as possible, Tuscaloosa enforced restrictive zoning rules and building codes that raised costs -- prohibitively, in some cases” (Beito & Smith, 2012, para. 8).

Moving past the detrimental effect of the disaster management in Tuscaloosa, disaster management policy has had other unforeseen effects. One reason for the high death toll in Joplin was the public indifference to the warning system. “The perceived frequency of siren activation in Joplin led the majority of survey participants to become desensitized or complacent to this method of warning” (Department of Commerce, 2011, p. iii)

Federal and state agencies can assist in resource allocation for local governments during a disaster, and this is also in accord with NRF principle. “In today’s world, senior officials and their emergency managers build the foundation for an effective response. They organize and integrate their capabilities and resources with neighboring jurisdictions, the State, NGOs,and the private sector” (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 5). This recognizes the reality that “emergency officials of all sorts are expected simultaneously to meet both local needs as well as, though indirectly, national obligations” (Krueger, Jennings, & Kendra, 2009, p.1).

References

Beito, D. T., & Smith, D. J. (2012, April 14). Cross Country: Tornado Recovery: How Joplin Is Beating Tuscaloosa. Wall Street Journal, Eastern Edition, Retrieved February 21, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1000255561?pq-origsite=summon

Department of Commerce. (2011). NWS Central Region service assessment Joplin, Missouri, tornado – May 22, 2011. Retrieved February 21, 2015 from http://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/Joplin_tornado.pdf

Department of Homeland Security. (2008). National Reponse Framework. Retrieved February 21, 2015 from http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf

Krueger, S., Jennings, E., & Kendra, J. M. (2009). Local Emergency Management Funding: An Evaluation of County Budgets. Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, 6(1), 1–21.

Retrieved February 21, 2015 from http://web.a.ebscohost.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/ehost/detail/detail?sid=3972867c-7bdc-403d-a4ad-a9836c06c598%40sessionmgr4001&vid=0&hid=4212&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=i3h&AN=43110390

Smith, D. J., & Sutter, D. (2013). Response and Recovery after the Joplin Tornado: Lessons Applied and Lessons Learned. The Independent Review, 18(2), 165–188. Retrieved February 21, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1442998348?pq-origsite=summon

Preliminary Evaluation: Strategic Plan for Natural Disaster Response Training and Development

Board of Commissioners

Assignmentland Emergency Regional Authority

Preliminary Evaluation: Strategic Plan for Natural Disaster Response Training and Development

1. Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide the Board of Commissioners with the foundations for creating a strategic plan for training all personnel in our regional authority involved in emergency management.

2. Guidelines for the Strategic Plan

Our purpose in establishing guidelines is to train our employees in the procedures that will allow them to respond to critical incidents with maximum efficiency. “The public increasingly expects better public sector leadership before, during, and after catastrophic disasters (emergencies) and extreme events (crises) than it has seen in the past” (Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010, p. 452). To do so, we will look at the National Incident Management System (NIMS) guidelines, successful incident responses, and failed incident responses.

1. National Incident Management System (NIMS)

NIMS was developed in order to provide standard guidelines to emergency agencies, “The scope of its intended use is comprehensive, including mitigation, preparedness, response, and disaster recovery” (Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006, p.16) The key component of NIMS is in it's interoperability component.

1. Interoperability

Due to the necessity of having multiple agencies respond to an emergency crisis, it is imperative that training provides a framework for standardization between agencies, especially in communications. “One of the most prominent issues facing the public safety community today is the lack of communications interoperability, which is commonly defined by many as 'the ability of public safety emergency responders to communicate with whom they need to, when they need to, as authorized.' Communications interoperability serves as a vital tool for public safety and public service professionals” (The Governor's Office of Emergency Services,2011, para. 2).

2. Reviews of Successful Operations

We should look to California's emergency agencies for guidelines to develop our training plan. The success of the response to the 2009 wildfires demonstrated that their training guidelines were efficient. “Cal EMA evaluated that they had achieved successful response in the following areas; “efficient resource deployment; effective fire suppression and control, notification and alert, and sheltering operations; and well organized and rapid communications and coordination between state agencies and local governments, and state/federal partnership” (Cal EMA, n.d., p. 4)

3. Reviews of Failed Operations

There are many lessons to be learned from the Katrina response, but perhaps the greatest failure of significance was in the area of communications; “Research since Katrina...,shows that a higher percentage of respondents blamed “lack of communication between levels of government” for the Katrina debacle than for any other reason” (Garnett & Kouzmin, 2009. p.392). Communications must be emphasized in our training plan.

3. Expected Outcomes

In order that our training plan have any practical effect on incident response, we need to focus on the realities of our current level of preparedness and the effects the training will have on that level. “In order for response to be effective, planning and groundwork must be done to set an agreed-upon framework that will be employed in actual response efforts” (Wise, 2006, p. 312)

4. Anticipated Challenges

Hoskin and Wood attribute the failure to implement planned change to “incomplete organizational acceptance” (1993, para. 3). Jensen applies the concept of “organizational acceptance” specifically to emergency planning. In that “not all counties in the United States intend to implement the system they are mandated to use in the way it was designed [which] has important implications for the potential of the system to act as an organizing mechanism for emergency management” (2010, p. 96).

5. Implementation

This Board recommends the following steps be taken to implement our training plan.

1. Review and Implement NIMS Standards

2. Evaluate additional training requirements based upon actual response evaluations, both successful and failed.

3. Include an evaluation monitoring process in the training plan to match expected training goals to reality.

4. Recognize and provide additional training or resource support to agencies that may experience “organizational resistance”

5. Include realistic training exercises that take into account day to day operations of participating agencies.

References
Buck, D. A., Trainor, J. E., & Aguirre, B. E. (2006). A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS. Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, 3(3), 1–27. Retrieved February 3, 2015 from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=i3h&AN=22625019&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Cal EMA. (n.d.). California Emergency Management Agency 2009 Los Angeles County Wildfires  after action / corrective action report: Executive summary.  Retrieved February 6, 2015 from
 http://www.calema.ca.gov/PlanningandPreparedness/Documents/2-%20Los%20Angeles%20County%20Fires%20Exec%20Summ%203_8_11%20Edits.pdf

Garnett, J., & Kouzmin, A. (2009). Crisis Communication Post Katrina: What are we Learning? Public Organization Review, 9(4), 385–398. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1007/s11115-009-0096-5

Hoskin, R., & Wood, S. (1993). Overcoming strategic planning disconnects. The Journal for Quality and Participation, 16(4), 50.  Retrieved February 19, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/219116713?pq-origsite=summon

Jensen, J. A. (2010). Emergency management policy: predicting National Incident Management System (NIMS) implementation behavior (Dissertation). North Dakota State University. Retrieved February 3, 2015 from https://cms-devel.ndsu.nodak.edu/fileadmin/emgt/Final_Dissertation_Complete.pdf

Kapucu, N., Arslan, T., & Demiroz, F. (2010). Collaborative emergency management and national emergency management network. Disaster Prevention and Management, 19(4), 452–468. doi:http://dx.doi.org.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/10.1108/09653561011070376

The Governor's Office of Emergency Services. (2011). Interoperable Communications Program. Retrieved February 8, 2015 from http://www.calema.ca.gov/TechnologyOperations/Pages/Communications-Interoperability-%28CICO%29.aspx
Wise, C. R. (2006). Organizing for Homeland Security after Katrina: Is Adaptive Management What’s Missing? Public Administration Review, 66(3), 302.  Retrieved February 5, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/197175662?pq-origsite=summon

Leadership in the Strategic Planning Process

In your opinion, how can leaders ensure proper working of the strategic planning process? Support your explanation with reasoning and examples.

Whichever planning process is used ( SMEAC, SARA, the strategic-change cycle), it is the leader's responsibility to ensure that the process works properly. “Organisation leaders are generally given responsibility for overall design of the planning system” (Drago & Clements, 1999, Abstract). Leaders must first keep in mind the basic levels of information;Welsh and Harris distill the planning process into it's simplest expression; “we must answer the following questions as specifically as possible: Who does what to whom, where, in what order, how much, and how often?” (2012, p.105). To ensure that these questions are answered at every step of the process, leaders must evaluate each step of the process. “Assessing the current position requires measurement, monitoring and evaluation of outputs and outcomes from the previous planning cycle to determine whether policy objectives are being achieved” (“Leadership, strategic thinking and planning drive good government, JAKARTA POST,” 2004, para. 11). An important element in ensuring that the process works is communication., in “the strategic planning process there was a commitment to share valid information with all staff” (McClamroch, Byrd, & Sowell, 2001)

How should leaders and leadership be evaluated regarding the proper working of the strategic planning process? Provide an analysis supporting your response.

Drago and Clements asser that leadership characteristics have an effect on the planning process (Drago & Clements, 1999, p.11). One way to evaluate leadership characteristics is through the level of enpowerment leaders assign to followers (Brumm & Drury, 2013, p.17). While “those in the higher levels of the organization have the most experience” (Welsh & Harris, 2012, p.84) input from the bottom may provide an up to date view of the situation, and counter the danger that “goals handed down from above may be unrealistic” (Welsh & Harris, 2012, p.84). Ultimately, the leadership responsible for the strategic planning process will be evaluated upon the success of the policy or program that is being planned for.

Brumm, C. A., & Drury, S. (2013). Leadership that empowers: How Strategic planning relates to followership. Engineering Management Journal, 25(4), 17–32. Retrieved February 19, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1503771908?pq-origsite=summon

Drago, W. A., & Clements, C. (1999). Leadership characteristics and strategic planning. Management Research News, 22(1), 11–18. Retrieved February 19, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/223548645?pq-origsite=summon

Leadership, strategic thinking and planning drive good government, JAKARTA POST. (2004, October 12). WorldSources Online. Retrieved February 19, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/340564046?pq-origsite=summon

McClamroch, J., Byrd, J. J., & Sowell, S. L. (2001). Strategic planning: Politics, leadership, and learning. The Journal of Academic Librarianship, 27(5), 372–378. doi:10.1016/S0099-1333(01)00222-1

Welsh, W. and Harris, P. (2012). Criminal Justice Policy and Planning [VitalSouce bookshelf version]. Retrieved from http://digitalbookshelf.southuniversity.edu/books/9781437735000 





In your opinion, what are the challenges to the leaders and leadership regarding the proper implementation of the strategic planning process? Provide an explanation supporting your response.
Leaders in the strategic planning process face many challenges. “Strategic planning can be time-consuming and cost extra human capital and monetary resources” (Hu, Kapucu, & O’Byrne, 2014, p.83). In addition, “Strategic planning is inherently prone to break down” (Bryson, 2011, p.363). Hoskin and Wood attribute the failure to implement strategically planned change to “inadequate thinking; and incomplete organizational acceptance” (1993, para. 3). Many failures can be linked to a breakdown in communication, which is critical in the planning process. For successful planning, “the strategic planning process there was a commitment to share valid information with all staff” (McClamroch, Byrd, & Sowell, 2001)



How can the leaders make certain the strategic planning process is properly implemented and effectively maintained? Provide an analysis supporting your response.

Bryson maintains that leaders must champion and sponsor the change (2011, p. 363-364). To be an effective leader, one will choose the best method of leadership at any given time; “That is the way one leads a group of people will depend on whom one is working with, and what one is doing. A person will lead a group making sandwiches differently than one will lead a group making nuclear bombs. According to this theory, the effectiveness of the style depends on the specific situation” (Morreale, n.d., p.26). This comes down to recognizing the specific challenge to implementation and choosing the best leadership or management tool to overcome that challenge.

References

Bryson, J. M. (2011). Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 4th Edition. [VitalSource Bookshelf version]. Retrieved February 19, 2015 from http://digitalbookshelf.southuniversity.edu/books/9781118281161/Root/0

Hoskin, R., & Wood, S. (1993). Overcoming strategic planning disconnects. The Journal for Quality and Participation, 16(4), 50. Retrieved February 19, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/219116713?pq-origsite=summon

Hu, Q., Kapucu, N., & O’Byrne, L. (2014). Strategic Planning for Community-Based Small Nonprofit Organizations: Implementation, Benefits, and Challenges. Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship, 19(1), 83–101. Retrieved February 19, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1503078628?pq-origsite=summon

McClamroch, J., Byrd, J. J., & Sowell, S. L. (2001). Strategic planning: Politics, leadership, and learning. The Journal of Academic Librarianship, 27(5), 372–378. doi:10.1016/S0099-1333(01)00222-1

Morreale, S. (n.d.). Law enforcement leadership:Literature and practice. New England Community-Police Partnership. Retrieved August 17, 2014 from http://www.fstopltd.com/Police_Leadership.pdf

 

Mississippi River Flood of 2011: Incident Response Review

Mississippi River Flood of 2011: Incident Response Review

Resource allocation in respond to the flood was adequate despite the fact that “The flood waters exacerbated known weakness and created new weaknesses in the system requiring emergency response by the local levee boards coupled with technical assistance and other resources from the Corps” (U.S. Corps of Engineers, 2012, p.4). Response was adequate due to the collaboration of emergency agencies. “Districts aggressively pursued coordination internally and with outside agencies during this event in an effort to synchronize efforts and to share information. Coordination was

accomplished in many different ways, including establishing direct liaison with certain agencies, establishing internal and external websites, using social media to inform the public, and participating in recurring meetings and conference calls” (U.S. Corps of Engineers, 2012, p.4).

One positive outcome of planned levee destruction in response to th flood was the opportunity to study flood damage for later planning. The study was intended to “demonstrate that landscape vulnerabilities can be mapped ahead of time to help communities prepare for extreme flooding” (Homeland Security News Wire, 2014, para. 2).

There is little that could have been done to improve resource allocation in preparation of these floods. “'This is the best test it ever had,' said Peter Nimrod, chief engineer of the Mississippi Levee District, which maintains levees between Greenville and Vicksburg...Congress allotted $140 million last year for the Vicksburg Corps district to do 81 flood-related projects in Mississippi as well as parts of Arkansas and Louisiana.” (AP, 2012, para. 21-22).

Response to the flood appears to be much better than response to Hurricane Katrina. Both the public and the emergency responders anticipated the need to react with more alacrity. There was no hesitation in public evacuation. “In anticipation of the Morganza Spillway opening, there has been local news coverage over the last few days of folks proactively clearing out whatever valuables they could” (Scronce, 2011, para. 4). It may be that the frequency of flooding on the Mississippi has led residents to be more aware of the potential of danger, to show foresight. “What happened during the Great Flood of 2011 did not happen because of some overnight miracle. It happened because of the foresight of the people that formed a triad more than 80 years ago. The triad consisted of the United States Congress, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, and last, but certainly not least, the local people who had organized themselves in 1922 into what is now the Mississippi Valley Flood Control Association” (Mississippi River Commission, 2012, p. v).

References

Associated Press. (2012, April 7). 2011 Mississippi River flood recovery is still under way. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2012/04/2011_mississippi_river_flood_r.html

Homeland Security News Wire. (2014, February 19). Studying the 2011 Mississippi and Ohio rivers flood for better flood preparedness. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140219-studying-the-2011-mississippi-and-ohio-rivers-flood-for-better-flood-preparedness

Mississippi River Commission. (2012). Divine providence: The 2011 flood in the Mississippi River and Tributaries Project. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://cdm16021.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p16021coll4/id/181/rec/2

Scronce, G. (2011, May 11). Early thoughts on the Mississippi River flooding of 2011. I Think (therefore) IEM. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://blog.iem.com/2011/05/11/early-thoughts-on-the-mississippi-river-flooding-of-2011/

U.S. Corps of Engineers. (2012). Operation watershed–recovery 2012 flood season preparedness and emergency response summary. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/Portals/52/docs/regional_flood_risk_management/FINAL%202012%20Flood%20Season%20Preparedness%20Summary%20Report%20%284-12-12%29.pdf

Agency by Role in the Strategic Plan; A Summary

Agency by Role in the Strategic Plan; A Summary

• Collaboration as the primary strategy for effectiveness in ensuring public safety in response to natural disasters and mass emergency.

A common thread in emergency management critiques is that collaboration between agencies responding to critical incidents is the necessity of collaboration as a planned strategy. “Collaboration is a necessary foundation for dealing with both natural and technological hazards and disasters and the consequences of terrorism “ (Waugh & Streib, 2006, p. 131). This is due to the nature of catastrophic incident. “The changing nature of disasters forces organizations from different sectors and jurisdictions to work together to confront overwhelming problems that a single organization cannot solve on its own. Traditional hierarchical structures and methods have increasingly become problematic and less effective solutions to disaster management” (Kapucu, Garayev & Wang, 2013, p. 104). Another method of describing this type of situation is 'heterarchical,' i.e. position and location of

control within the structure changes depending on altering environments and operations. Decision-making process is more horizontal because dependence on vertical links would consume much energy” (Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010, p. 456)

• Advantages and contrasts of collaborative strategy in the context our CEM

Collaborative strategy is in contrast to a hierarchical, or bureaucratic, chain of command. “One major area of criticism of the command and control model as a descriptive tool is concerned with its inability to account for the emergence of new or unexpected groups and tasks within the emergency response system” (Uhr, Johansson, & Fredholm, 2008, p.81). Waugh and Strieb suggest that “A lack of understanding of emergency management is likely one reason why officials have suggested that the nation's response to catastrophic disasters needs a stronger command and control system” (2006, p. 131).

• Roles and responsibilities of a DHS and FEMA, in ensuring that relief operation runs smoothly.

The purpose of FEMA is to provide standardization in training, methods of collaboration, and a basis for interoperability. “FEMA, as well as the DHS, lack the authority and the resources to protect life and property without collaboration” (Waugh & Streib, 2006, p. 138). This is the common understanding of local agencies. “According to National Governor's Association's 2006 State Homeland Security Directors Survey...90 percent thinks that federal agencies should coordinate with states in preparing and implementing homeland security policies” (Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010, p. 458).

• Local Agencies as lead organizations in incident response.

Although there is a common misperception that FEMA is meant to provide command and control functions during an incident, “The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) envision partnerships at all levels of government in disaster preparedness and management” (Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010, p. 454). In reality, “EM networks are built from the bottom up, not imposed by authorities from top down” (Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010, p. 454). The experience of emergency responses has shown this to be more effective.

“The success of Coast Guard operations during Hurricane Katrina led some scholars to assert decentralization policies should be formalized and implemented” (Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010, p. 455)

• Strategies to employ to ensure that all agencies, including FEMA, work in proper coordination.
  

Planning based upon systems analysis shows the necessity of flexibility in crisis response. “Other emergent phenomena that are of interest are improvization (Wachtendorf, 2004), self-organization (Comfort, 1999) and boundary spanners (Mulford, 1984;Kapucu, 2006). Such phenomena are important to identify and analyze in efforts to understand how an emergency response system adapts to the circumstances produced by a crisis” (Uhr, Johansson, & Fredholm, 2008, p.82). Coordination and collaboration relies on communications beyond formally adapted structure. “Personal relations, which are not normally incorporated into plans or bureaucratic structures, can be of importance for a functional response system” (Uhr, Johansson, & Fredholm, 2008, p.88). Finally, collaboration must involve the convergence of volunteer and non-governmental entities. “The large number of nongovernmental organizations involved in disaster operations has encouraged the creation of umbrella organizations” (Waugh & Streib, 2006, p. 134)

References

Kapucu, N., Arslan, T., & Demiroz, F. (2010). Collaborative emergency management and national emergency management network. Disaster Prevention and Management, 19(4), 452-468. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09653561011070376
Kapucu, N., Garayev, V., & Wang, X. (2013). Sustaining networks in emergency management. Public Performance & Management Review, 37(1), 104-133. doi:10.2753/PMR1530-9576370105

Uhr, C., Johansson, H., & Fredholm, L. (2008). Analysing emergency response systems. Journal Of Contingencies & Crisis Management, 16(2), 80-90. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5973.2008.00536.x

Waugh,William L.,,Jr, & Streib, G. (2006). Collaboration and leadership for effective emergency management. Public Administration Review, 66, 131. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com/docview/197171710?accountid=87314

Public Safety Health Experts

Public Safety Health Experts
What should be the role of public safety health experts in the emergency plan? Support your response with appropriate reasoning.
Public health experts play a variety of responses in critical incident planning. “In today’s world, emergencies and disasters take many forms, including natural disasters, technological and infrastructure failures, terrorist attacks, and health emergencies such as pandemic disease outbreaks” (Lee et al., 2007, p. 6). Public health experts take part in planning responses, responding to emergencies in their area of expertise, maintaining refugee relief and settlement, and evaluating damages and immediate responses to disasters. Public health experts may not necessarily take charge of the emergency response, but they play a part. For example, in an agroterrorism attack, “Many believe that public health officials would lead the response to an agroterrorism attack, but this might not be the case. The laws of most States require that such an event be handled as a crime scene investigation, giving law enforcement primary responsibility” (Gonzales, Schofield, & Schmitt, 2006, p. 1)
During what type of mass emergencies should public health experts be the principal experts?
Any mass emergency in which public health is affected. This is such as wide range of possibilities that they can not be listed shortly. Some examples include a tornado that displaces a community that then requires refugee aid, a flood that causes a community's sewer system to overflow into the water supply, a terror attack that leaves mass casualties, a bitterroot attack, a power outage that causes the potential for temperature related deaths, or agroterrorism. “In May 2006, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) held a regional planning meeting on preventing and responding to a bioterrorism attack on the Nation’s agriculture industry...Officials rated their State’s preparedness in preventing an agroterrorism attack and discussed ways to improve the response, should an attack occur. One of the most vital topics concerned coordination among law enforcement and veterinary and animal health authorities, within the State and across State borders” (Gonzales, Schofield, & Schmitt, 2006, p.2)
Explain why public health experts should be the lead experts in such types of mass emergencies.
Many emergencies require expert knowledge, not just in specific technological skills such as firefighting and medicine, but in attempting to understand the complex relations that our infrastructure sustains us. This is more apparent in crisis situations in which the normal supporting frameworks have been disrupted. Frickel and Vincent make the “basic argument [is] that society’s understandings of past, present, and future threats are dangerously compromised by expert systems that create and legitimate those understandings. Chief among those expert systems are scientific disciplines and regulatory agencies. In combination, these institutions reinforce a set of expectations and practices for producing knowledge that minimize the ecological and socio-historical contexts in which that knowledge is created and deployed. The result, in effect, is organized ignorance — a system of knowledge production that articulates risk in ways that do not, and perhaps cannot, answer some of our most basic questions concerning safety, health, and sustainability” ( 2007, p.182).

Frickel, S., & Vincent, M. B. (2007). Hurricane Katrina, contamination, and the unintended organization of ignorance. Technology in Society, 29(2), 181–188. doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2007.01.007

Gonzales, A. R., Schofield, R. B., & Schmitt, G. R. (2006). Agroterrorism—Why we’re not ready: A look at the role of law enforcement. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs
Retrieved October 2, 2014 http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/publichealthresources/96/

Lee, E., Logan, C., Mitchell, & J. T., Trella, J. (2007). A governor’s guide to homeland security. Washington, D.C.: National Governors’ Association, Center for Best Practices. Retrieved October 2, 2014 from http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0703GOVGUIDEHS.PDF

Barriers To Strategic Planning

What are the major barriers to agreement in the strategic planning process? Provide an explanation for your response.

O’Regan and Ghobadian list several barriers in the strategic planning process, among them; “Communication was inadequate”, “Overall goals of strategy were not well enough understood by staff “, and “Crises distracted attention from implementation” (2007, Table 5). These are all barriers to agreement within the process. In addition, goals of various stakeholders may differ. “Some departments argue that there is simply not enough money or time to devote to strategic planning in order to achieve the results expected by top-level officials”(Franklin, 2003, p.544). Finally, in public organizations, strategic planning will be affected by the political process and it's “different concerns. Chief among them is the effect of a change in administration. As this quote suggests, uncertainty fosters a wait and see attitude: 'People are thinking about the 3 year [strategic plan update submission] cycle. When the plan is due, it will be less than two months before the new administration. The new administration may want a different plan'” (Franklin, 2003, p.543)

Suggest at least three strategies to overcome these major barriers to agreement. Explain how your strategies will help in overcoming the major barriers.

Team building is one strategy to overcome barriers to agreement. “Strategic planning works best when it is a team effort and involves team members from all levels of the organization. Team building is more effective when the team works on real tasks that have meaning for the organization” (Kormanski, 1999, p. 5)

A second strategy is the formalization of the strategic planning organization across all participating agencies. “The primary purpose of a strategic planning entity is to designate authority and responsibility to make data-driven decisions for the criminal justice system in its jurisdiction” (Archer, Neusteter, & Lachman, 2012, p. 3). Clear recognition of pertinent stakeholders reduces static from irrelevant “stakeholders”.

Finally fore planning is important to avoid crecive change and the resources it draws away from the strategic planning process. “Organizations with a weak strategic planning culture will likely tend to be dominated by crisis management”(Wasilewski & Motamedi, 2007, p. 232)

Archer, J., Neusteter, S., & Lachman, P. (2012). Improving strategic planning through collaborative bodies. Urban Institute: Justice Policy Center. Retrieved September 21, 2014 from http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412542-Improving-Strategic-Planning-through-Collaborative-Bodies.pdf

Franklin, A., & Long, E. (2003). THE challenge of changing federal management processes: Implementation barriers relating to strategic planning and the Government Performance and Results Act. International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior, 6(4), 534-552. Retrieved February 11, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com/docview/212064687?accountid=87314 

 

Kormanski, C. (1999). Team building for strategic planning. Counseling and Human Development, 31(7), 1. Retrieved February 11, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com/docview/206850280?accountid=87314 

 

Wasilewski, N., & Motamedi, K. (2007). Insights for effective strategic planning. Competition Forum, 5(1), 229–235. Retrieved January 26, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/214852513?pq-origsite=summon

FIRESCOPE and Communications Interoperability

FIRESCOPE and Communications Interoperability

An examination of the scope of the 2009 California wildfires and the agencies that responded to those fires provides a good example for the benefit of interoperability. A Cal EMA review of the response to the situation identified several areas of success, two of which resulted from an interoperability of communications. Cal EMA found that “Implementation of the unified command structure resulted in successful and efficient operations” and that “Unified command and strong coordination between fire and law enforcement were key to evacuating large numbers of residents and animals threatened by the rapidly burning fires, especially during the Station Fire” (Cal EMA, n.d., p. 4). The interoperability of communications is perhaps the most important aspect of crisis management to be considered for standardization. “Currently firefighters from neighboring states; have responded and are familiar with the California FIRESCOPE operations and terminology used” (Morgan, Mosser, & Paker, 2011, p. 23). Communications are also crucial in establishing a unified command, which Maditinos and Vassiliadis have identified as an important factor in successful management of wildfire response (2011, p. 47). This was borne out by the Cal EMA review of the 2009 response. The importance of interoperability in communications is conversely recognized by it's inclusion as a command responsibility; Perry specifies “initiates, maintains and controls communications” as command functions (2003, p. 409). Finally, the importance of communications interoperability is recognized by the State of California. The Governor's Office of Emergency Services states that “One of the most prominent issues facing the public safety community today is the lack of communications interoperability, which is commonly defined by many as 'the ability of public safety emergency responders to communicate with whom they need to, when they need to, as authorized.' Communications interoperability serves as a vital tool for public safety and public service professionals” (2011, para. 2).

References

Cal EMA. (n.d.). California Emergency Management Agency 2009 Los Angeles County Wildfires after action / corrective action report: Executive summary. Retrieved February 6, 2015 from

http://www.calema.ca.gov/PlanningandPreparedness/Documents/2-%20Los%20Angeles%20County%20Fires%20Exec%20Summ%203_8_11%20Edits.pdf

Maditinos, Z., & Vassiliadis, C. (2011). Mega fires: Can they be managed effectively? Disaster Prevention and Management, 20(1), 41-52. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09653561111111072

Morgan, S., Mosser, M, and Paker, P. (2011). Wildfires in California Analysis of the Incident Command System and FIRESCOPE. Paper presented at the 2011 Cambridge Business & Economics Conference. Cambridge, UK Retrieved February 6, 2015 from http://www.gcbe.us/2011_CBEC/data/Sheron%20Morgan,%20Marian%20Mosser,%20Phillip%20Paker.doc.

Perry, R. W. (2003). Incident management systems in disaster management. Disaster Prevention and Management, 12(5), 405-412. Retrieved February 8, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com/docview/214387744?accountid=87314

The Governor's Office of Emergency Services. (2011). Interoperable Communications Program. Retrieved February 8, 2015 from http://www.calema.ca.gov/TechnologyOperations/Pages/Communications-Interoperability-%28CICO%29.aspx

Wildfire Response Management: California 2009 Incident Review

Wildfire Response Management: California 2009 Incident Review

California's history of dealing with forest fires led local agencies to conduct studies in the 1960's with the goal of establishing a response management system; the system created was “called “Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies,” and became known as FIRESCOPE. The meaning was recently changed to FIrefighting RESources of California, Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE)” (Morgan, Mosser, & Paker, 2011, p.6). The creation of FIRESCOPE recognizes that “addressing wildfire as a threat is also a major management and policy issue” (California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection Fire and Resource Assessment Program, 2010, p. 95). In 2009, The California Emergency Management Agency entered into an agreement “between the State of California Emergency Management Agency, hereinafter referred to as Cal EMA; the State of California , Department of Forestry and Fire Protection; hereinafter referred to as CAL FIRE, the USDA Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region; the USDI Bureau of Land Management, California Office; the USDI National Park Service, Pacific West Region; USDI Fish and Wildlife Service, Pacific Southwest Region, and USDI Bureau of Indian Affairs, Pacific Region”(Cal EMA, 2009, p.1). This agreement established that “Cal EMA is responsible to provide for systematic mobilization, organization and operation of necessary fire and rescue resources”Cal EMA, 2009, p.2). Cal EMA delegates some responsibility of coordination to Cal FIRE. “It is because of these cooperative efforts that you may see fire engines and fire fighters from different agencies at the scene of an emergency, working under a unified command relationship” (Cal FIRE, 2014. p.1). In 2009, a higher than normal incidence of wildfires put these responsibilities to the test. “The Los Angeles Station Fire began on August 26, 2009, and reached 100% containment on October 16, 2009. The fire burned 160,577 acres and destroyed 209 structures, including 89 homes, making it the largest fire recorded in Los Angeles County and tenth largest fire recorded in California history” (Squire, Chidester, & Raby, 2011, p. 464).

Cal EMA evaluated that they had achieved successful response in the following areas; “efficient resource deployment; effective fire suppression and control, notification and alert, and sheltering operations; and well organized and rapid communications and coordination between state agencies and local governments, and state/federal partnership” (Cal EMA, n.d., p. 4). These areas of success, particularly in communications and coordination, indicate that crisis management expectations and responsibilities were clear prior to the fires. This is important as areas of responsibility in normal situations may be confused in a wildfire incident; “The boundary of a wildfire constantly moves, sometimes very swiftly as it continues its path of destruction”(Morgan, Mosser, & Paker, 2011, p. 26). It appears that FIRESCOPE and it's implementation also benefited from previous experience. “These lessons suggest that the most important advances in fire safety in this region are to come from advances in fire prevention, fire preparedness, and land-use planning that includes fire hazard patterns”(Keeley, Safford, Fotheringham, Franklin, & Moritz, 2009).

However, Cal EMA also identified areas that needed improvement:

• There is no clear understanding of the requirements that must be met by State and/or local

government agencies for establishing a cleanup level for asbestos.

• Joint commands between the USFS and the Los Angeles County Fire Department were only

established when the spreading Station Fire became an imminent danger to foothill

communities. This allowed the Station Fire to grow so quickly that firefighters could not

gain control of the spreading fire early in the response.

• Local agencies were slow in requesting assistance for initiating fire recovery operations

effectively.

• Current data management tools, especially the Response Information Management System

(RIMS), are inadequate to meet the demands of today’s emergency management needs. In

addition, Los Angeles County’s Emergency Management Information System had technical

problems and their Incident and Event information could not be uploaded to share the

information with management.

• Several state and local agencies still have a need for additional SEMS/RIMS training for

position specific roles and responsibilities, as it relates to the SOC, REOC, and the

Emergency Operations Center (EOC). This training should include on-line courses for

agencies without the resources to send personnel to training. (Cal EMA, n.d., p. 5)

Recommendations for resolving these issues include:

• Additional training in FIRESCOPE and NIMS procedure
  
• A review of technological tools, including management applications and central data hosting/reporting servers
  
• Periodic command drills to be conducted by Cal FIRE for a better understanding of local agency communications and control response
  

These recommendations can be carried out without additional costs to the participant agencies; however, a major weakness involved in this consideration is the time loss of personnel to primary training duties, or possibly to conducting their primary duties.

References

Cal EMA. (n.d.). California Emergency Management Agency 2009 Los Angeles County Wildfires after action / corrective action report: Executive summary. Retrieved February 6, 2015 from

http://www.calema.ca.gov/PlanningandPreparedness/Documents/2-%20Los%20Angeles%20County%20Fires%20Exec%20Summ%203_8_11%20Edits.pdf

Cal EMA. (2009).Agreement for local government fire and emergency assistance to the State of California and Federal fire agencies between State of California, California Emergency Management Agency; State of California, Department of Forestry and Fire Protection; USDA Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region; USDI Bureau of Land Management, California State Office;

USDI National Park Service, Pacific West Region; USDI Fish and Wildlife service, Pacific Southwest Region; and USDI Bureau of Indian Affairs, Pacific Region. Retrieved February 8, 2015 from http://www.calema.ca.gov/FireandRescue/Documents/Reimbursement%20Documents/2009-2013%20CFAA%20Updated%20Exhibits%20published%20June%2026%202013.pdf

Cal FIRE. (2014). Cooperative Emergency Response. Retrieved February 6, 2015 from http://calfire.ca.gov/communications/downloads/fact_sheets/CoopResponse.pdf

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection Fire and Resource Assessment Program. (2010). California’s Forests and Rangelands: 2010 Assessment. Retrieved February 6, 2015 from http://frap.fire.ca.gov/data/assessment2010/pdfs/california_forest_assessment_nov22.pdf

Calkin, D., & Gebert, K. (2009). Economics of wildland fire management. Retrieved from http://www.treesearch.fs.fed.us/pubs/37116

Keeley, J. E., Safford, H., Fotheringham, C. J., Franklin, J., & Moritz, M. (2009). The 2007 Southern California wildfires: Lessons in complexity. Journal of Forestry, 107(6), 287–296. Retrieved February 6, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/220781115?pq-origsite=summon

Morgan, S., Mosser, M, and Paker, P. (2011). Wildfires in California Analysis of the Incident Command System and FIRESCOPE. Paper presented at the 2011 Cambridge Business & Economics Conference. Cambridge, UK Retrieved February 6, 2015 from http://www.gcbe.us/2011_CBEC/data/Sheron%20Morgan,%20Marian%20Mosser,%20Phillip%20Paker.doc.

Squire, B., Chidester, C., & Raby, S. (2011). Medical events during the 2009 Los Angeles County Station Fire: Lessons for wildfire EMS planning. Prehospital Emergency Care, 15(4), 464–472. doi:10.3109/10903127.2011.598607