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Saturday, November 28, 2015

2011 Tornado Outbreak and Public/Private Resource Allocation in relation to the National Response Framework (NRF)

2011 Tornado Outbreak and Public/Private Resource Allocation in relation to the National Response Framework (NRF)
In the record setting year for tornado activity in 2011, massive destruction occurred in Missouri and in several Southeastern states. The way that resources for recovery were allocated demonstrated a prinicple of the National Response Framework (NRF).
You're going to see something different here [from New Orleans after Katrina] because there's this resilience and this resolve where the people in this community-that we're not waiting for somebody to come do it for us. We're going to get it done, and other people are attracted to that and come alongside to help and make it happen faster.
-Joplin resident who lived in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina” (Smith & Sutter, 2013, p.165)
Smith and Sutter argue that the voluntary sector (business and charity groups) drove the fast pace of recovery in Joplin, Missouri and that the public sector made it's biggest contribution by not interfering. Allocation of resources was in accord with public demand. This is in accord with NRF prinicple; “In many facets of an incident, the government works with private sector groups as partners in emergency management” (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p.18). Smith and Sutter use the example of Nixon to illustrate, “Missouri governor Jay Nixon issued several executive orders temporarily waiving laws and regulations to assist response and recovery” (Smith & Sutter, 2013, p.182).
In contrast, Smith and Sutter assert that “The public sector can inhibit recovery by creating regime uncertainty or perceptions of a possible change in the institutional rules supporting an economy” (Smith & Sutter, 2013, p.169). This is made apparent in the difference between disaster recovery between Joplin and in the Southeast. “In Joplin, the official plan not only makes property rights a priority but clocks in at only 21 pages, compared with Tuscaloosa's 128” (Beito & Smith, 2012, para. 7). In addition, “Instead of encouraging businesses to rebuild as quickly as possible, Tuscaloosa enforced restrictive zoning rules and building codes that raised costs -- prohibitively, in some cases” (Beito & Smith, 2012, para. 8).
Moving past the detrimental effect of the disaster management in Tuscaloosa, disaster management policy has had other unforeseen effects. One reason for the high death toll in Joplin was the public indifference to the warning system. “The perceived frequency of siren activation in Joplin led the majority of survey participants to become desensitized or complacent to this method of warning” (Department of Commerce, 2011, p. iii)
Federal and state agencies can assist in resource allocation for local governments during a disaster, and this is also in accord with NRF principle. “In today’s world, senior officials and their emergency managers build the foundation for an effective response. They organize and integrate their capabilities and resources with neighboring jurisdictions, the State, NGOs,and the private sector” (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 5). This recognizes the reality that “emergency officials of all sorts are expected simultaneously to meet both local needs as well as, though indirectly, national obligations” (Krueger, Jennings, & Kendra, 2009, p.1).

















References

Beito, D. T., & Smith, D. J. (2012, April 14). Cross Country: Tornado Recovery: How Joplin Is Beating Tuscaloosa. Wall Street Journal, Eastern Edition, Retrieved February 21, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1000255561?pq-origsite=summon

Department of Commerce. (2011). NWS Central Region service assessment Joplin, Missouri, tornado – May 22, 2011. Retrieved February 21, 2015 from http://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/Joplin_tornado.pdf

Department of Homeland Security. (2008). National Reponse Framework. Retrieved February 21, 2015 from http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf

Krueger, S., Jennings, E., & Kendra, J. M. (2009). Local Emergency Management Funding: An Evaluation of County Budgets. Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, 6(1), 1–21.
Retrieved February 21, 2015 from http://web.a.ebscohost.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/ehost/detail/detail?sid=3972867c-7bdc-403d-a4ad-a9836c06c598%40sessionmgr4001&vid=0&hid=4212&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=i3h&AN=43110390

Smith, D. J., & Sutter, D. (2013). Response and Recovery after the Joplin Tornado: Lessons Applied and Lessons Learned. The Independent Review, 18(2), 165–188. Retrieved February 21, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com.southuniversity.libproxy.edmc.edu/docview/1442998348?pq-origsite=summon






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