9/11 Commission Recommendation Evaluation:A Sample
Selection of Three Recommendations
The 9/11 Commission was created by
Public Law 107-306 in 2002 with a mandate to investigate the
background of the terror attack on the United States of September 11,
2001 (The 9/11 Commission, 2004. p. xv). An overview of their
responsibilities includes
not only looking into the background
causes and facts relating to the attack, but for finding methods of
preventing further attacks. The Commission was comprised of 10
members, five each from both political parties. The Commission
formally thanked the surviving members of the victims of the attack
for their “persistence and dedication” in helping to create the
Commission (The 9/11 Commission,
2004. p. xvii). This should be kept in mind as this paper examines
implementation of the Commission's findings and recommendations.
The
9/11 Families for a Secure America Foundation in conjunction with
Family Security Matters issued a report card on the implementation of
the 9/11 Commission's findings at the end of the ten year period
after the attack. This report card covered twenty-six of the
Commission's forty-one recommendations; a full list of these
recommendations can be found in the GAO's Summary
of Recommendations -- the 9/11 Commission Report.
The majority of these grades were in the “C” to “F” range.
The implementation of the following three recommendations was graded
below a “C” (The Commission did not number their recommendations,
Family Security Matters labeled the recommendations by the order that
the Commission made the recommendations in the report):
Recommendation
4 (Grade: F): Family Security Matters concluded that the U.S –
Saudi relation was one in which not only did the Saudis fail any
significant or honest attempt at reform, but funded efforts to
undermine Western institutions (Gadiel
& Dunleavy, 2011, para. 25-28). This recommendation is a foreign
relations matter; implementation of this recommendation has no formal
method in Texas, although an examination of institutions to which the
Saudis have financial connections may be in order.
The problems in the U.S.-Saudi
relationship must be confronted, openly. The United States and Saudi
Arabia must determine if they can build a relationship that political
leaders on both sides are prepared to defend publicly – a
relationship about more than oil. It should include a shared
commitment to political and economic reform, as Saudis make common
cause with the outside world. It should include a shared interest in
greater tolerance and cultural respect, translating into a commitment
to fight the violent extremists who foment hatred (Gadiel &
Dunleavy, 2011, para. 24)
Recommendation
11 (Grade: D): Family Security Matters stated that the implementation
of this recommendation would have been an “F” if not for the fact
that no detainees had escaped from detention at Guantanamo Bay
(Gadiel &
Dunleavy, 2011, para. 65). The report card was issued in 2011,
before the Administration's trade of five terrorists for a deserter.
This recommendation is again a foreign relations matter and has
little bearing on implementation
in Texas.
The United States should engage
its friends to develop a common coalition approach toward the
detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists. New principles
might draw upon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions on the law of
armed conflict. That article was specifically designed for those
cases in which the usual laws of war did not apply. Its minimum
standards are generally accepted throughout the world as customary
international law (Gadiel & Dunleavy , 2011, para. 59)
Recommendation
14 (Grade: F): Family Security Matters arrived at this grade based
upon two propositions. The first was a lack of border control, and
the second was on a failure to punish government employees
for recognized failure (Gadiel
& Dunleavy, 2011, para. 67-68, 73). Cutler reinforces the idea
that failed border controls sabotage this recommendation, “the
Department of Homeland Security ... is gearing up to provide millions
of illegal aliens with temporary lawful status and official identity
documents without in-person interviews — violating commonsense,
making a mockery of our legal immigration system and violating the
findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission” (2015, para.
2).
Targeting travel is at least as
powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their money. The
United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence,
operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept
terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain
terrorist mobility (Gadiel & Dunleavy, 2011, para. 66)
Legal
implementation of the recommendations did not begin
until 2007 with the enactment of Public Law 110–53, Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
Public disclosure on
implementation of these recommendations has been provided primarily
by the United States General Accountability Office (GAO), which was
known as the General Accounting Office until 2004. The GAO has
provided reports such as the 9/11
Commission Report: Reorganization, Transformation, and Information
Sharing report . Other
agencies that have provided the public with information regarding the
implementation of the recommendations have been the the Congressional
Research Service (CRS), 9/11
Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status
; the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
implementing
9/11 Commission Recommendations Progress Report;
and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, The
FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century..
However, such disclosures have been without Congressional oversight
in 2010.
The
first two recommendations discussed are primarily based on foreign
relations, the third recommendation relates both to foreign
intelligence as to border control issues. This potentially affects
local criminal
justice agencies, but no specific aid to these agencies was proposed.
Cyberspace
issues, from criminal enterprise to terrorist capabilities for
attacking American infrastructure, are not discussed in the 9/11
Commission report. However, the 2011 DHS report does address this as
an infrastructure
issue beginning on page 35. Although the Intelligence Led Policing
model is not discussed in the report, there is an associated
discussion of integrating law enforcement intelligence with Federal
intelligence. This is an issue recognized throughout the security
community;”The new face of terror requires a robust, decentralized
intelligence-gathering apparatus that reaches far beyond the usual
scope of the federal government” (Mayer & Erickson, 2011, p.1).
References
Congressional
Research Service. (2006). 9/11
Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status.
Retrieved April 23, 2014 from
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33742.pdf
Cutler,
M. (2015, March 11). Ignoring the 9/11 Commission’s Warnings. Front
Page Magazine. Retrieved
April 23, 2015, from
http://www.frontpagemag.com/2015/michael-cutler/ignoring-the-911-commissions-warnings/
Department
of Homeland Security. (2011). Implementing
9/11 Commission Recommendations Progress Report.
Retrieved April 23, 2014 from
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/implementing-9-11-commission-report-progress-2011.pdf
Gadiel,
P. and Dunleavy, P. (2011, September 7). Report card on the 9/11
Commission's recommendations. Family
Security Matters.
Retrieved
April 23, 2014 from
http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.10324/pub_detail.asp
Implementing
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 Public Law 110–53
§
121
STAT. 266 (2007)
Mayer,
M. A., & Erickson, S. G. (2011). Changing
Today’s Law Enforcement Culture to Face 21st-century Threats.
Heritage Foundation. Retrieved April 24, 2014 from
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2566.pdf
The 9/11 Commission. (2004). The
9/11 Commission Report.
Retrieved February 28, 2015 from
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf
Federal
Bureau of Investigation. (2015). The
FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century.
Retrieved April 23, 2014 from
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/protecting-the-homeland-in-the-21st-century
United
States General Accountability Office. (2004). 9/11
Commission Report: Reorganization, Transformation, and Information
Sharing (No.
GAO-04-1033T). Retrieved April 23, 2014 from
http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/111208.pdf
United
States General Accountability Office. (2004). Summary
of Recommendations -- the 9/11 Commission Report
(No. B-303692). Retrieved April 23, 2014 from
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/other/303692.pdf
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